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Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C. 4 


Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University 



It was suggested to me many years ago by Prof. A. E. Taylor 
that a translation of some of the fragments of Aristotle's lost 
works would be a useful addition to the Oxford Translation 
of the extant works. I then thought that I had enough on 
my hands without this addition. In the interval, however, 
interest in the fragments has been quickened by the pioneer 
work of such scholars as Prof. Jaeger, Prof. Bignone, and 
Prof. Wilpert, and many passages not included in Rose's 
editions of the fragments have been recognized as being 
derived from Aristotle's lost works. 

A translation of the whole of the fragments included by 
Rose would not be of much general interest, and I have 
thought it best to limit this selection to three of the sections 
in his editions — the dialogues, the logical works, and the 
philosophical works. The references in the notes to this trans- 
lation are to the page and line of Rose's Teubner edition. At the 
same time I have included many other passages which have 
been with probability assigned to Aristotle by the scholars 
named above and others. I must in particular express my 
indebtedness to Dr. R. Walzer, who has not only published 
a useful edition of some of the fragments, but has called my 
attention to others which would otherwise have escaped my 
notice, and has lent me some useful books and articles. 

It is not intended to make any further addition to the 
Oxford Translation of Aristotle. 

W. D. R. 






Gryllus, or On Rhetoric 






Eudemus, or On Soul 








On Wealth 


On Prayer 


On Good Birth 


On Pleasure 


On Education 


On Kingship 






On Poets 


On Philosophy 


On Justice 




On Problems 








On Contraries 




On the Good 


On Ideas 


On the Pythagoreans 


On the Philosophy of A rchytas 


On Democritus 










The oldest lists of Aristotle's works that have come down to 
us from antiquity are those written by Diogenes Laertius, in 
the third century a.d., and by Hesychius, probably in the 
fifth. A strong case has been made out by E. Howald 1 for the 
view that both lists rest on the good authority of Hermippus 
(about 200 B.C.). 
Diogenes' list begins as follows: 

On Justice, 4 books 2 

On Poets, 3 books 3 

On Philosophy, 3 books 4 

Politicus, 2 books 5 

On Rhetoric, or Gryllus, 1 book 6 

Nerinthns, 1 book 

Sophistes, 1 book 

Menexenus, 1 book 

Eroticus, 1 book 

Symposium, 1 book 7 

On Wealth, 1 book 

Protrepticus, 1 book 

On Soul, 8 1 book 

On Prayer, 1 book 

On Good Birth, 9 1 book 

1 In Hermes, 1920, 204-21. 

2 Cicero, p. 100 infra, refers to its four books; Suetonius, p. 100 infra, 
refers to the first book. 

3 Diogenes Laertius, p. 73 infra, refers to book 1 ; Macrobius, p. 75 infra, 
to book 2 ; Ps.-Plutarch, p. 76 infra, to book 3. 

4 Hesychius says '4 books'; Syrianus, p. 83 infra, refers to book 2; 
Philodemus, p. 78 infra, and Cicero, p. 97 infra, refer to book 3. 

5 ttoXi.ti.kov a jS 4 MSS. of Diogenes; -nepl ttoXltikov i MS. of Diogenes; 
■noXniKov a Hesychius. Syrianus, p. 68 infra, refers to the second book. 

6 '3 books', Hesychius. 

7 From pp. n-14 infra we may infer that this work was also known as 
the work On Drunkenness. 

8 We learn from Plutarch, pp. 16, 18 infra, and from Simplicius, p. 21 
infra, that this was also called Eudemus. 

9 Plutarch says, p. 60 infra, that the genuineness of this work is doubtful, 


On Pleasure, i book 

Alexander, or On Colonists, 1 i book 

On Kingship, i book 

On Education, i book. 

The list goes on to 

On the Good, 3 books 
From Plato's Laws, 3 books 
From the Republic, 2 books 
On Economy, 1 book 
On Friendship , 1 book, 

and so on. 

It is clear that the first nineteen works in Diogenes' list 
formed for him a separate group, arranged according to the 
number of books each work contained, and that from it he 
went on to a second group similarly arranged. The same 
nineteen works appear at the beginning of Hesychius' list, 
except that the Alexander appears a little later and its place 
is taken by the Economicus. 

Some of these works are known to have been dialogues. 
The works On Poets, On Philosophy, and On Soul (or Eudemus) 
are explicitly so described by ancient authors. 2 The form of 
Politicus fr. 1, Eudemus fr. 6, and On Good Birth frs. 1, 2, 4 
shows that these were dialogues. Themistius' reference to 
'the Corinthian dialogue' 3 is usually taken to refer to the 
Nerinthus. The Historia Augusta says that Cicero's Horten- 
sius was modelled on the Protrepticus* and as the Hortensius 
was a dialogue 5 the Protrepticus was probably one too. There 
is thus good evidence that several of the nineteen works that 
stand at the head of Diogenes' and Hesychius' lists were 
dialogues ; it may be inferred with high probability, though 
not with certainty, that the others were so too. 

but Stobaeus, pp. 59, 61 infra, and Athenaeus, p. 61 infra, confirm its 

1 Diogenes has vnep dnoiKcvv, Hesychius vnep dnoiKia>v, which is more 
probable. But if, as is likely, inep is used in the sense of 'about', the sub- 
title probably does not go back to Aristotle, who rarely uses vnep in this sense. 

2 For On Poets, see p. 72 infra ; for On Philosophy, pp. 78, 82 infra ; for the 
Eudemus, pp. 19-22 infra. 

3 See p. 24 infra. 4 See p. 27 infra. 5 See pp. 41, 42, 46 infra. 


It seems probable that Aristotle began with short dialogues 
called (on the Platonic model) by one-word names (three of 
which are actually identical with the names of Platonic 
dialogues), that from these he proceeded to works which were 
still dialogues but began to have something of the character 
of treatises and are therefore designated as 'on' so-and-so, 
and later still went on to the large works containing more 
than one book. Thus we get, tentatively, three groups : 

i. Menexenus, Symposium, Sophistes, Nerinthus, Eroticus, 
Gryllus, Eudemus, Protrepticus, Alexander. 

2. On Wealth, On Prayer, On Good Birth, On Pleasure, On 
Kingship, On Education. 

3. Politicus, On Poets, On Philosophy, On Justice. 

Before we make any further attempt to date the dialogues, 
it is necessary to have in mind the various periods of Aris- 
totle's life. From his eighteenth year to his thirty-seventh 
(367-348/7) he was a member of the school of Plato at 
Athens. The next five years he spent partly at Assos, in 
Mysia, and partly at Mitylene, in Lesbos. From 343/2 to 
about 340 he was in Macedonia, tutoring Alexander the Great, 
and for about five years thereafter he was pursuing his studies 
in his native town, Stagira. From 335/4 till his death in 323 
he was actively engaged as the head of his own school, the 
Lyceum, in Athens. 

We must make one alteration in our tentative grouping. 
The work Alexander, or On Colonists, is, as Jaeger has pointed 
out, suitable only to the time at which Alexander was en- 
gaged in setting up colonies in Asia, from (say) 331 B.C. 
onwards, while the work On Kingship (also addressed to 
Alexander) can most suitably be dated at or before Alexan- 
der's succession to the throne in 336. Thus the work Alexander 
must be removed from the first group, and placed later than 
On Kingship in the second group. 

The Gryllus must be dated after the death of Gryllus at 
the battle of Mantinea in 362/1, 1 but probably not very long 
after it. It may therefore well be the earliest of all Aristotle's 
works ; it is worth while to note that he had a model for it 

1 See p. 7 infra. 


in Plato's Gorgias. 1 The Eudemus must be dated after, but 
probably not long after, the death of Eudemus in 354/3. 
Thus these two works, at least, probably belong to the time 
of Aristotle's membership of the Academy, while the work 
On Kingship and the Alexander belong to the period 343-331. 
The date of the Protrepticus has been examined by B. 
Einarson and by P. Von der Muhll in the articles mentioned 
in our bibliography. On the basis of connexions between the 
dialogue and Isocrates' Antidosis, Einarson has argued for 
a date shortly after, and Von der Muhll for a date shortly 
before, 353, and it is likely that one or other of these scholars 
is right. The work On Philosophy, in which Aristotle 
vigorously attacked Plato's theory of Ideas, must have been 
written after Plato's death and Aristotle's withdrawal from 
the Academy. With regard to the rest of the dialogues we 
cannot be certain whether they were written during or after 
Aristotle's membership of the Academy; but it is probable 
that most of them were written during it ; for the remaining 
twenty-five years of his life are none too long to serve for 
the task of founding and directing the Peripatetic school, 
and of composing the vast fabric of the complete works that 
have survived to our day, and the very many lost works 
other than dialogues that are named in the ancient lists of 
his works. 

There is an important point of form in which some of 
Aristotle's dialogues differed from Plato's. Plato never ap- 
pears as a speaker in any of his dialogues. Cicero in one 
passage 2 speaks of 'the Aristotelian plan, in which the parts 
are so assigned to others that the writer himself has the 
principal part'. But in another passage 3 he describes his own 
De Oratore as Aristotelian in method, though he is not in that 
work the chief speaker. Aristotle's practice, therefore, must 
have varied. The only dialogue in which it is certain that he 
must have appeared as a speaker himself is the Politicus, in 
which Cicero says expressly 4 that he did so. But there are 
phrases in fragments from the Eudemus 5 and the work On 

1 As he had for the Eudemus in the Phaedo, and for the Protrepticus in the 
Euthydemus. z Att. 13. 19. 4, p. 3 infra. 3 Fam. 1. 9. 23, p. 3 infra. 
4 Q- F r - 3- 5- J » P- 68 infra. s fr. 2, p. 17 infra. 


Philosophy 1 which suggest that there too Aristotle appeared 
in person. 

In his Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus and in his Berlin edition 
of the fragments Rose included the work On Kingship and 
the Alexander among the dialogues (for him, the pseudo- 
Aristotelian dialogues), but in his Teubner edition he places 
these works partly among the speeches and partly among the 
letters ; in the latter case his ground seems to have been the 
occurrence of the phrase tGsv amearahcoroiv (' the senders ') in 
an extract from Strabo. 2 In this he was mistaken. Diogenes 
expressly distinguishes these two works, which come in the 
first section of his list of Aristotle's works, from the four 
volumes of letters to Alexander, which come near the end of 
the list ; and Hesychius places the two works near the be- 
ginning of his list, but the letters to Alexander among the 
pseudographa at the end of his life. The phrase 'the senders' 
proves nothing ; a dialogue, no less than a letter, might have 
been sent to Alexander. The pseudo-Ammonius distinguishes 
the two works in question from the letters, 3 and describes 
the work On Kingship as a single- volume book ; 4 and Cicero 
also calls it a book. 5 

Rose includes among the dialogues the work On the Good 
and the Magicus. But there is ample evidence that the former 
was not a dialogue, but Aristotle's record of Plato's famous 
lectures on the Good. As for the Magicus, Suidas s.v. 
'AvTLoOevrjs says that some people assign it to Aristotle, but 
he himself assigns it to Antisthenes; it occurs nowhere in 
Diogenes' list, and in Hesychius' list only at the end, in a 
list of works which he describes as spurious. 

Of the works other than dialogues included in our selection, 
the most important were those On the Good and On Ideas. 
The former was Aristotle's record of the lectures in which 
Plato unfolded the latest phase of his theory of Ideas, the 
theory of Ideal numbers ; and every fragment of it that we 
possess is of interest as helping to give us some understanding 
of that mysterious theory. Again, the researches of Jaeger 
and Wilpert have shown that the criticism of the ideal theory 

1 frs. 10, ii, pp. 82, 83 infra. 2 p. 67 injra. 

3 p. 65 injra. 4 p. 65 injra. 5 p. 65 injra. 


in Metaphysics A. 9 is in all probability based on an earlier 
and much fuller criticism in the work On Ideas, which, with 
the work On Philosophy, formed Aristotle's earliest expres- 
sion of his breakaway from the Platonic system. Wilpert has 
been able to show that much more of On the Good and On 
Ideas (and also of On the Pythagoreans) can be recovered from 
the pages of the Greek commentators on Aristotle than had 
previously been recognized. 

The best existing commentary on the Eudemus, the Pro- 
trepticus, and the work On Philosophy is to be found in 
Jaeger's Aristoteles. 

The ransacking of ancient literature to find fragments of 
Aristotle has been carried further by E. Bignone in many 
articles catalogued in our Bibliography, and in his massive 
work L'Aristotele Perdnto e la Formazione Filosofica di 
Epicnro. It is doubtful whether Greek or Latin literature has 
much more to yield in this kind. More is to be expected from 
the still unexplored field of Arabic literature on philosophy, 
and here a beginning has been made by R. Walzer (see pp. 
23, 26 infra), who has also published a scholarly text of the 
fragments of the Eudemus, the Protrepticus, and the work 
On Philosophy. 

In our numbering of the fragments, 'R 2 ' refers to Rose's 
Berlin edition, ' R 3 ' to his Leipzig edition, ' W ' to Walzer's 
edition. In the notes on readings, ' R ' refers to Rose's Leipzig 



Arist. Ph. i94 a 35~36: see p. 99 infra. 

Arist. De An. 404 b i8-2i: see p. 83 infra. 

Arist. Poet. I454 b i5-i8. All these rules one must keep in 
mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of 
stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since 
in these, too, one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, 
has been said on the subject in our published writings. 1 

Cic. Inv. 2. 2. 6. Aristotle so greatly excelled in charm and 
brevity of speech the inventors of rhetoric themselves, that 
no one knows their precepts from their own books, but all 
who wish to understand their precepts return to him as to 
an expositor much more suited to their needs. 

Cic. De Or. 1. n. 49. For this reason, if the natural philosopher 
Democritus was eloquent (as is commonly held and as I 
myself think), while his matter was that of a natural philo- 
sopher his eloquence must be deemed to be that of an orator. 
And if Plato has, as I admit, spoken like a god about matters 
far removed from political controversy — if Aristotle, Theo- 
phrastus, and Carneades were, on the subjects they discussed, 
eloquent, charming, and polished in their language — then, 
though the subjects they discuss belong to other studies, 
their language itself belongs to this single art which we are 
speaking about and inquiring into. 

Ibid. 3. 21. 80. But if anyone ever comes forward who can, 
in the Aristotelian manner, put forward both sides on every 
subject, and can with knowledge of Aristotle's precepts 

1 i.e. in the dialogue On Pods. 

645.29 B 


develop two contrary speeches on every question, or who can 
in the manner of Arcesilaus and Carneades argue against any 
proposition that is put forward, and who adds to that method 
this practice and training in speaking, let us agree that he 
is the true, the perfect, the only orator. 

Cic. Brut. 31. 120-1. For this reason I approve all the more 
of your judgement, Brutus, in following the Academic school, 
in whose doctrine and precepts methodical discussion is 
united with charm and fluency of speech ; although that very 
practice of the Peripatetics and Academics in the matter of 
speaking is such that, while there cannot be a perfect orator 
without it, it does not by itself make a perfect orator. For as 
the language of the Stoics is too terse and a little too much 
compressed to appeal to the ears of the public, so the lan- 
guage of those others is too free and expansive for the prac- 
tice of the courts and the forum. Who is richer in style than 
Plato ? The philosophers say Jove speaks so, if he speaks 
Greek. Who is more sinewy than Aristotle, more charming 
than Theophrastus ? 

Cic. Top. 1. 3. The obscurity of Aristotle's Topics has re- 
pelled you ; and the great rhetorician replied, I fancy, that 
he did not know the works of Aristotle. I have, indeed, been 
very little surprised that a rhetorician did not know a philo- 
sopher who is unknown to philosophers themselves, all but 
a very few; for which they are the less to be pardoned 
because they ought to have been attracted not only by the 
things he has said and discovered, but also by the incredible 
fluency and charm of his style. 

Cic. Fin. 5. 5. 12. Since there are two kinds of books, one 
written in popular style, and called by them exoteric, and 
another more precise kind which they left in the form of 
treatises, Aristotle and Theophrastus seem not to be always 
consistent with themselves on the subject of the supreme 

Cic. Lucullus 38. 119 (Plasberg): see p. 92 infra. 


Cic. Fam. i. 9. 23. 1 have written, therefore, in the Aristotelian 
manner (at least that was what I wanted to do) , three books 
in my discussion or dialogue On the Orator. 

Cic. Att. 4. 16. 2. You know the style of my dialogues. ... I 
have put into the mouths of Africanus, Philus, Laelius, and 
Manilius the discussion On the State which I have started; 
I have added some young men. . . . And so I planned, in 
having a preface in each book, as Aristotle does in the books 
which he calls exoteric, to do something that would justify 
me in appealing to him — which I believe will please you; 
heaven grant that I may complete my effort ! 

Ibid. 13. 19. 3-4. If I had represented Cotta and Varro as 
disputing with one another, as your last letter advises me to 
do, my role would have been a silent one. This has a good 
effect when characters from antiquity are introduced ; Hera- 
clides has used the device in many works, and we have done 
so in our six books On the State. There are also three books of 
ours On the Orator which I think very highly of ; in those, too, 
the persons are such that it was right for me to be silent. . . . 
I am supposed to be a boy when that dialogue starts, so that 
I could have no part of my own. But what I have now written 
follows the Aristotelian plan, in which the parts are so 
assigned to others that the writer himself has the principal 
part. I have completed in this manner five books On Ends. 

Cic. Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1 : see p. 68 infra. 

Quint. 10. 1. 83. What shall I say of Aristotle? I doubt 
whether I admire him more for his knowledge, for the 
copiousness of his writings, for the charm of his language, 
for his keenness of invention, or for the wide range of his 

Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1. Indeed Aristotle himself, from whom they 
say criticism and grammar took their origin, discusses the 
poet in several dialogues, for the most part admiring and 
honouring him. 


Plu. M or. 447 f-448 a. Why is it that in philosophical in- 
quiries the process of being led by others and often changing 
one's ground is not always painful, and that Aristotle him- 
self, Democritus, and Chrysippus gave up without fuss or 
ill-feeling, and indeed with pleasure, some of their former 
opinions? It is because no passion opposes the part of the 
soul that contemplates and learns ; in such cases the irrational 
part remains calm and does not concern itself, so that reason 
willingly turns towards the truth when it appears, and 
abandons what is untrue. 

Ibid. 1115 b-c. With regard to the Ideas, about which Aris- 
totle chides Plato, misrepresenting them completely and 
bringing every possible objection against them, in his ethical 
works, in his metaphysical works, in his physical works, in 
his popular dialogues, he seemed to some to be polemical 
rather than philosophical in his attitude towards this doc- 
trine, as though his object was to belittle the Platonic philo- 
sophy ; so far was he from following it. 

Diog. Oen. fr. 4, col. 1. 7-col. 2. 8. When they say that things 
cannot be apprehended, what else are they saying than that 
we ought not to study nature ; who will choose to look for 
what he can never find? Aristotle and the members of his 
school say nothing can be known, since owing to the mere 
speed of their fluxion things escape our apprehension. 

Eus. P.E. 14. 6. 9-10. Cephisodorus, when he saw his master 
Isocrates being attacked by Aristotle, was ignorant of and 
unversed in Aristotle himself, but, seeing the repute which 
Plato's views enjoyed, he thought that Aristotle was follow- 
ing Plato; so he waged war on Aristotle but was really 
attacking Plato. His criticism began with the Ideas and 
finished with the other doctrines — things which he himself 
did not know; he was only guessing at the meaning of the 
opinions held about them. This Cephisodorus was not fight- 
ing the person he was attacking, but was fighting the person 
he did not wish to attack. 1 

1 i.e. not Aristotle but Plato. 


Them. Or. 319 c. And so Aristotle's popular works, which are 
meant for the multitude, are full of light and translucent ; 
their usefulness is not unmixed with enjoyment and pleasure ; 
Aphrodite and the Graces blossom on them. 

Basil, Ep. 135. Even of secular philosophers those who wrote 
dialogues, Aristotle and Theophrastus, at once got to grips 
with the facts, because they were conscious of their lack of 
the Platonic graces. 

Amm. in Cat. 6. 25-27. 4. We say that the Philosopher has 
evidently expressed his views in different ways. In the 
acroamatic works he is, as regards the thought, terse, com- 
pressed, and full of questions, and as regards the language 
quite ordinary, owing to his search for precise truth and 
clearness ; he sometimes even invents words if necessary. In 
the dialogues, which he has written for the many, he aims 
at a certain fullness, a careful choice of diction and metaphor, 
and modifies the style of his diction to suit the speakers, and 
in short does everything that can beautify his style. 

Simp, in Cat. 4. 14. Of the general works, some are hypo- 
mnematic, viz. those which the philosopher put together to 
aid his own memory and with a view to submitting them to 
further testing. . . . 19-20. Alexander 1 says these works have 
been hastily put together and do not aim at one end; for 
which reason, and to distinguish them from these, he says 
the others are called systematic. Of these some are in dialogue 
form, while in others Aristotle speaks in his own person. 

Simp, in De Caelo 288. 31-289. 2. By 'popular philosophical 
discussions ' Aristotle means those originally intended for the 
many, which we are wont also to call exoteric, as we call 
the more serious books acroamatic and systematic ; Aristotle 
speaks of this in the books On Philosophy. 

Eli as in Cat. 114. 15. In some of his systematic works Aris- 
totle speaks in his own person (and these are also called 

1 i.e. of Aphrodisias. 


acroamatic), while others are in dialogue form, and are also 
called exoteric. The former class, as being works in which he 
speaks in his own person, are opposed to the dialogues, and 
as being acroamatic they are opposed to the exoteric works. 
For, wishing to benefit all men, Aristotle wrote both in his 
own person, for philosophical students ... 22 and in dialogue 
form, for those who were not. In the acroamatic works, since 
he was addressing people who were prepared to think philo- 
sophically, he used conclusive arguments, while in the 

dialogues he used probable arguments 115. 3-5. Alexander 

mentions another difference between the acroamatic w r orks 
and the dialogues, that in the former Aristotle says what he 
thinks and what is true, while in the latter he expresses the 
false opinions of others. 

Ibid. 124. 3-6. In those of the general works which are 
dialogues, i.e. the exoteric works, he is clear, because he is 
arguing for non-philosophers, but because he is arguing 
among dialecticians he is versatile in his impersonations, full 
of Aphrodite and overflowing with the Graces. 


i (r 2 57 > R 3 68) 

Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 55. Aristotle says that a host of people 
wrote encomia and funeral speeches on Gryllus, partly in the 
wish to please his father. 1 

2 (R 2 58, R 3 69) 

Quint. Inst. 2. 17. 1. Let us pass, then, to the question that 
follows, whether rhetoric is an art. This . . . was not doubted 
by any of those who have handed down rules for oratory. . . . 
With these most of the Stoic and the Peripatetic philosophers 
agree. ... 4. I, for my part, think that those who argued 
against this were not so much saying what they really 
thought as wishing to exercise their wits by dealing with a 
difficult subject. ... 5. Some want rhetoric to be a natural 
gift. ... 7. They maintain that nothing which proceeds from 
art can have existed before the art did . . . 11. that that 
which a man does without learning co do it has nothing to 
do with art, but that even men who have not learned to 
speak do speak. ... 14. Aristotle, according to his wont, from 
sheer love of inquiry worked out in the Gryllus some argu- 
ments which show his usual subtlety. But he also wrote three 
books on the art of rhetoric, and in the first of them admits 
that rhetoric is not merely an art; he assigned to it an 
element of political science, as well as one of dialectic. 

3 (r 2 133, r 3 139) 

Ibid. 3. 1. 13. The most famous of Gorgias' disciples was 
Isocrates — although the authorities are not agreed on the 
question who Isocrates' teacher was ; but we believe Aristotle. 

1 i.e. Xenophon. 



Plu. Mor. 612 d-e. To forget entirely what has been said 
and done in wine seems not only to conflict with the reputed 
tendency of the table to promote friendliness, but also to 
have the witness of the most famous philosophers against 
it — Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Speusippus, Epicurus, 
Prytanis, Hieronymus, and Dion the Academic, who have 
thought it worth some trouble to record sayings made at the 

Macrob. Sat. 7. 3. 23. I advise you at your feasts . . . 
either to propound or yourselves to resolve questions suit- 
able to the occasion. This kind of thing the ancients 
were so far from thinking ridiculous that both Aristotle 
and Plutarch and your Apuleius wrote on such ques- 

I 1 (R 2 175, R 3 I00) 

Ath. 178 e-f. Homer, exact in all things, did not omit even 
this small thing, that we ought to tend and wash our poor 
bodies before going to a meal. At least he says of Odysseus 
that before the feast at the Phaeacian court 'The house- 
keeper straightway bade him bathe'. 2 And of Telemachus' 
companions he says, 'They went to the polished baths and 
bathed'. 3 For it was unbecoming, as Aristotle says, to go to 
the drinking-party covered with sweat and dust ; a man of 
taste, as Heraclitus says, should not be slovenly or unwashed 
or delight in mire. 

1 R 3 's fr. 99 is omitted because, even if Nauck's emendation ApiaroriXovs 
is right, there is no reason for supposing the passage to refer to Aristotle's 

2 Od. 8. 449 

3 Od. 4. 48. 


2 (r 2 08, r 3 ioi) 

Ath. 674 e-675 a. Sappho )ids those who do sacrifice to be 
crowned with chaplets, as being something gayer and more 
pleasing to the gods. And Aristotle in his Symposium says that 
we offer nothing mutilated to the gods, but things perfect and 
whole ; now that which is complete is perfect, and garlanding 
oneself signifies a sort of completion. Homer says 'The 
young men crowned the bowls with wine', 1 and 'The god 
crowns his beauty with words ' ; 2 those who are unshapely 
in aspect, he means, are made good by the charm of speech. 
This, then, is what the garland seems to mean. Accordingly 
on occasions of grief we arrange things in the opposite way ; 
in fellow-feeling for the departed we disfigure ourselves by 
cutting our hair and giving up our garlands. 

Cf. Schol. in Theocr. 3. 21. 

3 (R 2 98, R 3 102) 

Ath. 40 c-d. Seleucus says it was the ancient custom not 
to take wine, beyond the ordinary, or to enjoy any other 
luxury, except in honour of the gods. It was for this reason 
that they used the words 'festivity', 'feast', and 'drunken- 
ness' ; the first because they thought it was in honour of the 
gods that we ought to drink wine, the second because it was 
in honour of the gods that they assembled and came together 
(this is what Homer's 'rich feast' 3 means), while drunken- 
ness, Aristotle says, is so called because it is the taking of 
wine after sacrifices to the gods. 4 

Philo, De Plant. 34. 141. What the lawgiver said about 
drunkenness we shall later see precisely ; let us now examine 5 
what others thought. The question was much debated by 
many of the philosophers, and is propounded thus: 'Will the 
wise man get drunk ? ' ' Getting drunk ' has two meanings ; 

1 II. 1. 470. 2 Od. 8. 170. 3 Od. 3. 420, etc. 

4 The common element is the theta in deos, Boivq, OaXia, dvetv, fiedvaw 

5 Reading in R. 99. 13 i$epewqa(ofiev, with Cohn and Wendland. 


in one it is equivalent to being in wine ; in the other to being 
silly when in wine. Of those who attacked the problem, some 
said the wise man would neither drink too much strong 
drink nor become maudlin. ... 35. 144. The others declared 
that being in wine was becoming even to a good man, while 
being maudlin was not. ... 38. 154. Unmixed drink the 
ancients called not only wine but also liquor; at all events 
the name is often used in poetry, so that if synonyms ('wine' 
and 'liquor') are names for a single thing, words derived 
from them (' being in wine ' and ' being in liquor ') will differ 
only in sound 1 . . . . 155. If the good man is to be in wine, he 
will also get drunk. . . . 156. We have mentioned one argu- 
ment to show that the wise man will get drunk ; the second 
is as follows. . . . 39. 160. My purpose has been to show that 
people do not now take strong drink in the way the ancients 
did. . . . 161. Our fathers began every good work with sacred 
rites, thinking that so the result would be most propitious, 
because they had begun with prayer and sacrifice ; and even 
if the need for action was urgent, still they waited, thinking 
that more haste is sometimes less speed. Speed without fore- 
sight was, they thought, harmful, while leisureliness with 
good hope for the future was advantageous. Knowing, then, 
that even 2 the enjoyment and use of wine needs much care, 
they did not take strong drink to their fill 3 nor at all times, 
but in fitting manner and in due season. They first prayed 
and offered sacrifices and propitiated the divine power, and 
purified their bodies and souls, the former with baths and 
the latter with the streams of laws and right education, 
and then turned, cheerful and rejoicing, to a relaxed way of 
life ; they often did not return to their homes but continued 4 
in the temples in which they had sacrificed, so that, remem- 
bering the sacrifices and respecting the place, they might 
feast in the manner most befitting to a sacred place, erring 
neither in word nor in action. It is from this, indeed, that 

' Reading in R. 99. 23-24 £n<f>ep6fi€vov, o>ot' el to. ovvajvvfiovvTa ko.9' evos 
vnoKfifievov Xeyerai, olvos Kal fieOv, Kal ra dno tovtwv ovoev on. fj.rj <j>u>vats 

Sioiaei fxovov, to re olvovaOai, Kal to pedveiv [ev], with Cohn and Wendland. 

2 Reading in R. 100. 8 ort *at 17, with Cohn and Wendland. 

3 Reading in R. 100. 9 dbrju, with Cohn and Wendland. 

4 Reading in R. 100. 16 BiaTeXovvres, with Cohn and Wendland. 


they say getting drunk gets its name, because it was the 
custom of our forefathers to take wine after sacrifice. 1 To 
whom, then, could the manner we have described of using 
strong drink be more fitting than to wise men, to whom 2 the 
sacrifice that precedes the drinking is also fitting ? For one 
might almost say that no bad man really performs the sacred 
rites, even if without cessation he brings ten thousand oxen 
to the altar every day. For the most necessary sacrifice, his 
mind, is blemished, and it is not lawful for blemished persons 
to touch the altar. This is the second argument. ... 40. 165-6. 
The third depends 3 on a different guess at the etymology. 
Some people think that drunkenness is so called not only 
because it is achie' xl after sacrifice, but also because it 
causes relaxation ot soul. 4 Now when the reasoning of the 
foolish is relaxed, tho.. leads to the strengthening of many 
errors, but when that of the wise is relaxed, it leads to the 
enjoyment of relaxation, contentment, and cheerfulness. For 
a wise man who has taken wine becomes sweeter-tempered 
than he was when sober, so that in this respect too 5 we should 
make no mistake in saying that he will get drunk. 

Cf. Plu. Mor. 503 e-504 b. 

4 (R 2 99, R 3 I03) 

Apollon. Mirab. 25 (Keller). Aristotle in his book on 
drunkenness says that Andron of Argos, though he ate many 
salty and dry foods, remained all through his life without 
thirst and without drink. Besides, he twice travelled to 
Ammon through the desert, eating dry barley-groats but 
taking no liquid. 

Cf. Ath. 44 d, Diog. Laert. 9. 11. 81, Sext. Emp. Pyrr. 
1. 84. 

1 fiedveiv = fieTa-\-dveiv ! 

2 Omitting vvv in R. 100. 22, with Cohn and Wendland. 

3 Reading in R. 100. 28-101. 2 t P Itos . . . ijprT^eVos, with Cohn and Wend- 

4 fiedri-fiedeois. 

5 Reading in R. 101. 8 oib' av ravrr), with Cohn and Wendland. 


5 (r 2 ioo, r 3 104) 

Ath. 641 d-e. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness calls 1 
these, as we do, second tables, in these words: 'We must 
consider that a sweetmeat differs entirely from food, as much 
as 2 an eatable differs from a "sucket" (the old Greek name 
for a sweetmeat when it is served as dessert) ; 3 so that the 
first person to speak of "second tables" seems to have been 
justified; for the eating of sweets is a sort of extra dinner, 
and a sweet course forms a second meal.' 

Ibid. 641 b. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says that 
sweetmeats were called by our ancestors suckets ; they were 
a kind of extra dinner. 

Cf. Schol. in Aristoph. Pacem 1. 772. 

6 (r 2 2i8, r 3 io5) 

Ps.-Jul. Ep. 391 b-c. The fig is not only pleasant to the 
taste, but also better for the digestion. It is so useful to man- 
kind that Aristotle even calls it an antidote to every poison, 
and says it is just for that reason that at meals 4 it is served 
both as an hors-d'ceuvre 5 and as dessert, as though it were 
being wrapped round the iniquities of the food in preference 
to any other sacred antidote. And indeed that the fig is 
dedicated to the gods, is placed on the altar in every sacrifice, 
and is a better incense than any frankincense, this is not my 
account only; anyone who has learned its use knows that 
this is the account any wise man skilled in sacred rites would 

7 (r 2 ioi, r 3 io6) 

Ath. 447 a-b. As Aristotle says in his book on drunkenness, 
those who have drunk the barley liquor called beer fall on 

1 Reading in R. 102. 9 Trpoaayopevei, with Kaibel. 

2 Reading in R. 102. 11 oaov, with the MSS. 

3 Omitting ra ^pw^ara in R. 102. 12 with Kaibel. 

4 Reading in R. 102. 26 xav rots Selnvois, with Hercher. 

5 Reading in R. 102. 27 -npo-napaTideadai, with Hercher. 


their backs; he says: 'The liquor made from barley called 
beer has a certain peculiarity ; people who are intoxicated 
by other liquors fall in all sorts of directions — to the left, 
to the right, on their faces, on their backs ; only those who 
are intoxicated with beer always fall backwards and lie on 
their backs.' 

Cf. Ath. 34 b. 

8 (r 2 102, R 3 107) 

Ath. 429 c-d. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says: 'If 
the wine is boiled down to a moderate extent it is less 
intoxicating' ; the force of the liquor, he says, is weakened 
by the boiling down. 'The old', he adds, 'are intoxicated 
most quickly, owing to the scarcity and weakness of the 
natural heat in them. But also those who are very young are 
intoxicated fairly quickly because of the abundance of the 
inherent heat ; they are easily overcome by the added heat 
from the wine. Of dumb animals, too, pigs get intoxicated 
if they are fed with masses of pressed grapes; ravens and 
dogs if they eat the wine-plant ; monkeys and elephants if 
they drink wine. This is why they capture monkeys and 
ravens by intoxicating the former with wine or the latter 
with wine-plant.' 

9 (R 2 103, R 3 108) 

Plu. Mor. 650 a. Florus was surprised at the fact that 
Aristotle, who has written in his book on drunkenness that 
old men are overtaken most easily, and women least easily, 
by drunkenness, did not work out the reason, a thing he 
was not wont to fail to do. 

10 (R 2 104, R 3 109) 

Ath. 429 f. The cup called Samagoreion made from three 
pints mixed will, according to Aristotle, intoxicate more than 
forty men. 


II (R 2 IO5-6, R 3 IIO-Il) 

Ath. 464 c-d. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says: 
'The so-called Rhodian cups are introduced at drinking 
parties both because of the pleasure they give and because 
when they are heated they make the wine less intoxicating ; 
they are made by boiling water in which myrrh and rushes 
and the like have been thrown, and when they are poured 
into the wine the drinkers get less intoxicated.' Elsewhere 
he says: 'The Rhodian cups are made of myrrh, rushes, dill, 1 
saffron, balsam, cardamom, and cinnamon boiled together; 
the cup made from these 2 , when poured into the wine, checks 
intoxication, so that it even restrains people from sexual 
intercourse, by cooling down their spirits.' 

Cf. ibid. 496 f. 


Plu. Mor. 651 f-652 a. 'I want to learn whence came our 
notion that wine is cold.' 'You think', said I, 'that that is 
our view ? ' ' Whose is it, then ? ' he said. 'Well, I remember,' 
said I, 'happening — not lately but quite a while ago — on a 
discussion of this problem by Aristotle.' 

1 Reading in R. 104. 19 axolvov, avrjBov, with Wilamowitz. 

2 Omitting ko.1 in R. 104. 20, with the MSS. 


i (r 2 54, r 3 65) 

Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 57 (3). Aristotle says in the Sophisies that 
Empedocles first discovered rhetoric, and Zeno dialectic. 

Cf. ibid. 9. 5. 25 (4), and Sext. Emp. Dogm. 1. 6-7. 

2 (R 2 55, R 3 66) 

Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 63 (9). Aristotle, too, says that Empedocles 
was free-minded and averse to all rule, since he declined the 
kingship which was offered him (as Xanthus says in his 
account of him) — no doubt because he preferred the simple 

3 (R 2 56, R 3 67) 

Diog. Laert. 9. 8. 54 (5). The first of his books that Prota- 
goras read in public was that about the gods. ... He read it 
at Athens, in the house of Euripides, or, as some say, in that 
of Heraclides, while others say it was in the Lyceum; his 
pupil Archagoras the son of Theodotus read it for him. He 
was accused by Pythodorus son of Polyzelus, one of the Four 
Hundred ; though Aristotle says his accuser was Euathlus. 


i (r 2 32, r 3 37, w i) 

Cic. Div. ad Brut. i. 25. 53. What ? Is the great, the almost 
divine, intellect of Aristotle in error, or does he wish others 
to fall into error, when he writes that his friend Eudemus 
of Cyprus while on a journey to Macedonia came to Pherae, 
a Thessalian town of considerable note at the time, but held 
in cruel subjection by the tyrant Alexander. In that town 
Eudemus fell so ill that all the doctors feared for his life. 
He dreamed that a handsome young man told him that he 
would soon recover, that in a few days the tyrant Alexander 
would die, and that in the fifth year thereafter Eudemus 
himself would return home. Aristotle writes that the first 
two predictions were fulfilled forthwith ; Eudemus recovered 
and the tyrant was killed by his wife's brothers. But towards 
the end of the fifth year, when the dream had led him to 
hope that he would return from Sicily to Cyprus, he died in 
battle at Syracuse. And so the dream had been interpreted 
as meaning that when Eudemus' soul had left his body, it 
had returned to its home. 

Plu. Dion 22. 3. With Dion acted many of the politicians, 
and of the philosophers Eudemus the Cyprian, to whom 
after his death Aristotle dedicated his dialogue On Soul, and 
Timonides the Leucadian. 

2 (r 2 33, R 3 38, W2) 

Them, in De An. 106. 29-107. 5. Of the arguments that Plato 
used about the immortality of the soul, pretty much the 
greater number and the most weighty find their basis in the 
reason. This is true both of the argument from self-move- 
ment (for it was shown that only the reason is self-moved, if 
we take movement to mean activity), of that which assumes 
learning to be recollection, and of that which speaks of the 


soul's likeness to God. Of the other arguments those thought 
the more convincing could be without difficulty referred to 
the reason, and also the more convincing of those worked 
out by Aristotle himself in the Eudemus. From these facts 
it is clear that Plato, also, takes reason alone to be immortal. 

3 (R 2 33, R 3 39> w 3) 

Elias in Cat. 114. 25. Aristotle establishes the immortality 
of the soul in his acroamatic works 1 as well, and there he 
establishes it by conclusive arguments, but in the dialogues 
he naturally uses probable arguments. ... 32. In his dialogues 
he says that the soul must be immortal because we all 
instinctively make libations to the departed and swear by 
the departed, but no one can make a libation to that which 
is completely non-existent, or swear by it. . . . 115. 11-12. 
It is chiefly in his dialogues that Aristotle seems to announce 
the immortality of the soul. 

4 (r 2 34, r 3 40, W4) 

Procl. in Tim. 338 c. Plato joined the soul to the body 
immediately, cutting out all the problems about the descent 
of the soul. . . . d. Nor will he tell us here what happens after 
the departure of the soul . . . because (as I will maintain) he 
confines himself to what is fitting to the purpose of the 
dialogue, and admits here just so much of the theory of the 
soul as is physical, describing the soul's companionship with 
the body. Aristotle in emulation of him treats physically of 
the soul in the De Anima, saying nothing either about its 
descent or about its fortunes ; but in his dialogues he dealt 
separately with those matters and offered 2 the preceding 

5 (r 2 35, r 3 4I, W5) 

Procl. in Remp. 2. 349. 13-26 (Kroll). The divine Aristotle, 
also, states the reason why the soul on coming hither from 

1 i.e. scientific works representing Aristotle's teaching to the members of 
his school. 

2 Reading in R. 47. 1 KarefiaXeTo, with Diehl. 

645.29 C 


yonder forgets the sights it saw there, but on going from here 
remembers yonder its experiences here. We must accept 1 the 
argument ; for he himself says that on their journey from 
health to disease some people forget even the letters they 
had learned, but that no one ever has this experience when 
passing from disease to health; and that life without the 
body, being natural to souls, is like health, and life in the 
body, as being unnatural, is like disease. For there they live 
according to nature, but here contrary to nature ; so that it 
naturally results 2 that souls that pass from yonder forget 
the things there, while souls that pass yonder from this world 
continue to remember the things in it. 

6 (r 2 40, r 3 44, w 6) 

Plu. Mor. 115 b-e. Many wise men, as Crantor says, not only 
recently but long ago have bewailed the human lot, thinking 
life a punishment, and merely to be born a man the greatest 
of misfortunes. Aristotle says that even Silenus revealed this 
to Midas when caught by him. But it is better to record the 
philosopher's very words. He says this in the work called 
Endemus or On the Soul: 'Wherefore, best and most blessed 
of all men, not only 3 do we think the dead happy and blessed, 
and think it impious 4 to say anything untrue about them 
and to slander them, since they have already become better 
and greater — this custom is so ancient and long established 
among us that absolutely no one knows either the time of 
its origin or who first established it ; it seems to have been 
followed continuously for endless ages — not only that, but 
you see the saying that has been current in the mouths 
of men for many years.' 5 'What is that?' said the other. 
And he said in answer: 'Why, that not to be born is best 
of all, and death better than life ; to many a man has the 
heavenly voice so testified. This, they say, is what happened 

1 Reading in R. 47. 7 a-nohiKreov, with Kroll. 

2 Reading in R. 47. 12-13 vyieta, ttjv Se iv crco/xacriv, <Ls trapa tfrvoLv, voaw. 
l,fjv yap eVei fxev Kara <f>vcri.v aura?, ivravda Se Trapa <f>votv war' cikotcos ovp.- 
fialvtiv, with Kroll. 

3 Omitting in R. 48. 11 Kal before npos, with one MS. 

4 Omitting ^yov/xeda in R. 48. 14, with Bernays. 

5 Reading in R. 48. 20 (for ndXai) ttoXXwv £tu>v, with Paton. 


to the famous Midas when he had caught Silenus and asked 
him what is the best thing for men and the thing most 
desirable of all ; Silenus at first would not say anything but 
maintained unbroken silence ; but when at last by using 
every device Midas had with difficulty induced him to say 
something, he said under compulsion: 1 "Shortlived seed of 
a toilsome spirit and of a hard fate, why do you force me to 
say what it is better for you not to know ? The most painless 
life is that lived in ignorance of one's own ills. To men it is 
quite impossible for the best thing of all to happen, nor can 
they share in the nature of the best (for it is best for all men 
and women not to be born), but the next best, and the best 
achievable for men, 2 is, having been born, to die as soon as 
may be." It is clear that 3 by this he meant that the time 
spent in death is better than that spent in life.' 

7 (R 2 4l, R 3 45, W7) 

Philop. in De An. 141. 22. Aristotle, having blamed alike 
all those who had spoken of the soul, for having said nothing 
about the body which was to receive it. ... 30 naturally goes 
on to link with this his opinion about the soul. Some thinkers 
looked to the same fact, that it is not a body of any chance 
constitution 4 that shares in soul, but it needs a definite con- 
stitution, 5 just as attunement is not produced by any chance 
state of the strings but needs 6 a definite degree of tension of 
them ; they thought, therefore, that the soul too is an attune- 
ment of the body, and that the different kinds of soul answer 
to the 7 different attunements of the body. This opinion 
Aristotle states and refutes. At first he merely records the 
opinion itself, but presently he sets forth the arguments that 
led them to it. He had already opposed this opinion else- 
where, in the dialogue Eudemus, and before him Plato in the 
Phaedo had used some five arguments against this view. . . . 

1 Reading in R. 49. 2 avayKat,6fx€vov, with Paton. 

2 Reading in R. 49. 8 dvflpoWois, with Wilamowitz. 

3 Reading in R. 49. 9-10 SijXov ovv on coy, with Reiske. 

4 Reading in R. 49. 17 <Ls eVi^er exov, with Hayduck. 

5 Reading in R. 49. 17-18 Setrai roi-qabe Kpdoeios, with Hayduck. 

6 Reading in R. 49. 19 Sefrai, with Hayduck. 

. 7 Reading in R. 49. 20 rd? 8ia<f>6povs, with Hayduck. 


144. 21. These are Plato's five objections. Aristotle himself , 
as I have already said, has used in the dialogue Eademus the 
two following objections. One goes thus: 'Attunement', he 
says, 'has a contrary, lack of attunement, but the soul has 
no contrary. Therefore the soul is not an attunement.' One 
might reply to this that there is strictly no contrary to 
attunement, 1 but rather 2 an indefinite privation, and the 
soul, as being a form, has an indefinite opposite, and as we 
say in the case of music that a certain kind of lack of attune- 
ment changes into attunement, 3 so a certain kind of privation 
changes into soul. Aristotle's second objection 4 is this: 'The 
contrary of the attunement of the body is the lack of attune- 
ment of the body, and the lack of attunement of the living 
body is disease, weakness, and ugliness; of which, disease is 
lack of attunement of the elements, weakness lack of attune- 
ment of the tissues, ugliness lack of attunement of the 
organs. If, then, lack of attunement is disease, weakness, and 
ugliness, attunement is health, strength, and beauty; but 
soul is none of these, neither health nor strength nor beauty ; 
for even Thersites, the ugliest of men, had a soul. Therefore 
the soul is not an attunement.' This is what Aristotle says 
in the Eudemus. But here 5 he has used four objections to 
refute this opinion, of which the third is the second of those 
in the Eudemus. . . . 145. 21. Aristotle says 'in public dis- 
cussions'. He must mean either his unwritten discussions 
with his associates or the exoteric writings (among which are 
the dialogues, e.g. the Eudemus), which are called exoteric 
because they were not written for his genuine disciples, but 
for the general advantage of the many. . . . 147. 6-10. ' It is 
more appropriate to call health (or generally the good state 
of the body) an attunement than to assert this of the soul.' 
This is the third objection (the second in the Eudemus). 
That health is an attunement he has shown in the Eudemus 
from its being the contrary of disease ; we have stated above 
the course of the syllogism. 

1 Omitting in R. 50. 8 ivavrlov after Kvplojs, with Hayduck. 

2 Reading in R. 50. 9 dAAa p.d\Xov orepTjaig, with Hayduck. 

3 Reading in R. 50. II roidi'Se avapp.0OTiav p.eTaf3aiveiv els ttjv app.ovlav, with 

Hayduck. 4 Reading in R. 50. 12 hevrepov, with Hayduck. 

5 i.e. in the De Anirna. 


Simp, in De An. 53. 1-4. By the arguments used in public 
discussion Aristotle means those of the arguments used 
which are adapted to the intelligence of most people, hinting 
perhaps at those in the Phaedo, but meaning also those used 
by himself in the dialogue Eudemus to refute the attunement 

Them, in De An. 24. 13. Another opinion about the soul has 
been handed down, which is as plausible as any, and has 
rendered account of itself and been examined both in public 
and in private discussions. Some people say soul is an attune- 
ment ; for attunement is a mixture and combination of con- 
traries, and the body is composed of contraries, so that that 
which brings these into concord and harmonizes them — hot 
and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, and all the other 
contrarieties of the elements — is nothing other than soul, just 
as the attunement of notes blends low notes with high. The 
argument is plausible, but has been refuted in many places 
both by Aristotle and by Plato. The soul, they say, is prior 
to body, but harmony is posterior ; the soul rules and over- 
sees the body and often fights it, but harmony does not fight 
with the things that have been harmonized ; harmony admits 
of more and less, soul does not ; harmony, so long as it is 
preserved, does not admit disharmony, but soul admits 
wickedness; if the disharmony of the body is disease, ugli- 
ness, or weakness, the harmony of the body must be beauty, 
health, and strength, not soul — all these things have been 
said by the philosophers elsewhere ; but what Aristotle says 
now is this. ... 25. 23-25. That those who say the soul is 
a harmony would seem to be neither very near to nor very 
far from the truth is clear, then, both from what Aristotle 
has said now and from what he has said elsewhere. 

Olymp. in Phd. 173. 20 (Norvin). Aristotle in the Eudemus 
objects as follows: 'Disharmony is contrary to harmony, but 
soul has no contrary, since it is a substance ; the conclusion 
is obvious. Again, if the disharmony of the elements of an 
animal is disease, their harmony must be health, not soul. . . . 
30. The third argument is the same as the second in the 


Sophon. in De An. 25. 4-8. There has been handed down yet 
another opinion about the soul, which many people find 
plausible, as much so as any of those that are recorded. It has, 
however, already been brought to account and refuted by 
appropriate arguments which have been published — both by 
our arguments addressed to Eudemus and by those in 
Plato's Phaedo ; but none the less they will be criticized now 
as well. Some say the soul is a harmony. 

8 (R 2 42, R 3 46, W 8) 

Simp, in De An. 221. 20-33. Plato is in every case accustomed 
to call by the same name the Forms and the things that are 
formed according to them. But Aristotle, when the thing 
formed is divisible, avoids using the same name, because of 
the great difference between the divisible thing and the 
indivisible form. The reasoning soul he describes not only 
as limited but also as a limit ; for as it is between the in- 
divisible and the divisible, being in a sense both, so too it is 
between the limit and the limited, exhibiting both characters 
— the latter as moving discursively, the former because it 
always moves in obedience to limits and because all that has 
been unfolded is gathered into one; in this respect it is 
likened to the limiting reason. And because of this he says 
in his dialogue on the soul called Eudemus that the soul is 
a form, and praises those who describe the soul as receptive 
of forms — not the whole soul but the rational soul, as 
knowing the forms that have the second degree of truth : for 
it is to reason, which is greater than soul, that the really true 
forms correspond. 

9 (R 2 38, R 3 43) 

Plu. Mor. 733 c. Aristotle has recorded that in CiliciaTimon's 
grandmother hibernated two months in each year, giving no 
sign of life except by breathing. 


Plu. Mor. 382 d-e. The knowledge of that which is knowable, 
pure, and simple, flashing like lightning through the soul, 


grants it at times to touch and see. This is why Plato and 
Aristotle call this part of philosophy a mystic vision, inas- 
much as those who forsake these confused and various objects 
of opinion leap in thought to that primary, simple, and 
immaterial object, and, gaining true contact with the pure 
truth about it, think that, as though by initiation into the 
mysteries, they have attained the end of philosophy. 


al-KindI, cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 55. Aristotle tells of the 
Greek king whose soul was caught up in ecstasy, and who 
for many days remained neither alive nor dead. When he 
came to himself, he told the bystanders of various things in 
the invisible world, and related what he had seen — souls, 
forms, and angels ; he gave the proofs of this by foretelling 
to all his acquaintances how long each of them would live. 
All he had said was put to the proof, and no one exceeded 
the span of life that he had assigned. He prophesied, too, that 
after a year a chasm would open in the country of Elis, and 
after two years a flood would occur in another place ; and 
everything happened as he had said. Aristotle asserts that 
the reason of this was that his soul had acquired this know- 
ledge just because it had been near to leaving his body and 
had been in a certain way separated from it, and so had seen 
what it had seen. How much greater marvels of the upper 
world of the kingdom would it have seen, then, if it had 
really left his body ! 

al-Kindi, cod. Aya Sofia 4832, fol. 34. Aristotle asserts of 
the soul that it is a simple substance whose actions are 
manifested in bodies. 


Serv. in Aen. 6. 448. 'Caeneus, now a woman.' Caenis was 
a girl who won from Neptune as the price of her shame a 
change of sex. . . . Virgil refers to the Platonic or Aristotelian 
view that souls often by metempsychosis change their sex. 



i (R 2 53, R3 64) 

Them. Or. 295 c-d. This man, after some slight association 
with my studies or amusements — whichever you call them — 
had almost the same experience as the philosopher Axiothea, 
Zeno of Citium, and the Corinthian farmer. Axiothea, after 
reading a book of Plato's Republic, migrated from Arcadia 
to Athens and attended Plato's lectures for a long time with- 
out being discovered to be a woman — like Lycomedes' 
Achilles. The Corinthian farmer after coming into contact 
with Gorgias — not Gorgias himself but the dialogue Plato 
wrote in criticism of the sophist — forthwith gave up his farm 
and his vines, put his soul under Plato's guidance, and made 
it a seed-bed and a planting ground for Plato's philosophy. 
This is the man whom Aristotle honours in his Corinthian 
dialogue. The facts about Zeno are well known and are 
recounted by many writers — that the Apology of Socrates 
brought him from Phoenicia to the painted Stoa. 

1 The work Nerinthus, which occurs in the lists of Aristotelian works 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius, is not mentioned under that 
name by any other ancient writer, nor does the name Nerinthus occur else- 
where. The identification of the work with the 'Corinthian dialogue' named 
by Themistius, and of Nerinthus with the 'Corinthian farmer', is purely 
conjectural, but not unlikely to be right. 


1 (R 2 91, R 3 96) 

Ath. 564 b. Aristotle says that lovers look at no other part 
of the body of their beloved than the eyes, in which modesty 

2 (R 2 92, R 3 97) 

Plu. Pel. 18. 4. It is said also that Iolaus, who was the 
beloved of Hercules, shares in the contests of the Thebans 
and throws the spear with them. Aristotle says that even in 
his time lovers and their beloved still pledged their troth on 
the tomb of Iolaus. 

Cf. Plu. Mor. 761 d-e. 

3 (r 2 93, R 3 98) 

Plu. Mor. 760 e-761 b. 'You know, I suppose, what led to 
the death of Cleomachus of Pharsalus in battle. . . . He came 
with the Thessalian army as an ally to the people of Chalcis, 
when their war with the Eretrians was at its height. The 
Chalcidians thought their infantry strong, but the repulsing 
of the enemy's cavalry was a formidable task; so his allies 
called on Cleomachus, whose courage was famous, to lead 
the attack against the cavalry. He asked his beloved, who 
was present, whether he was going to watch the contest. 
When the young man said "Yes", greeted him lovingly, and 
nodded consent, Cleomachus, emboldened by this, called the 
best of the Thessalians together round him, made a brilliant 
charge, and fell on the enemy with such vigour as to throw 
the cavalry into confusion and rout them. When as a result 

1 R 8 's fr. 95 is omitted, because iv hevrepa) epatTiK&v seems to refer not to 
the Eroticus, which both Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius describe as having 
one book, but to the deoeis epuiTtKal, which they both describe as having 
four books. 


of this the hoplites also took to flight, the Chalcidians gained 
a mighty victory ; but it so happened that Cleomachus was 
killed. The Chalcidians show in their market-place his tomb, 
on which to this day the great pillar stands ; and to the love 
of boys, which formerly they had reprehended, they from 
that time gave more devotion and honour than others do. 
Aristotle, however, says that Cleomachus died in other 
fashion after defeating the Eretrians in battle, that the lover 
in question was a Chalcidian from Thrace who was sent to 
help the Chalcidians in Euboea, and that this is the origin 
of the Chalcidian song "Children, heirs of Graces and of 
splendid fathers, grudge not to the good the company of 
youthful prime; for along with courage limb-loosing love 
flourishes in the cities of the Chalcidians".' 

al-Dailami, cod. Tubingen Weisweiler 81. It is said in a 
certain book of the ancients that the pupils of Aristotle 
assembled before him one day. And Aristotle said to them: 
' While I was standing on a hill I saw a 3'outh, who stood on 
a terrace roof and recited a poem, the meaning of which was : 
Whoever dies of passionate love, let him die in this manner ; 
there is no good in love without death.' Then said his pupil 
Issos: 'O philosopher, inform us concerning the essence of 
love.' And Aristotle replied: 'Love is an impulse which is 
generated in the heart ; when it is once generated, it moves 
and grows; afterwards it becomes mature. When it has 
become mature it is joined by affections of appetite whenever 
the lover in the depth of his heart increases in his excitement, 
his perseverance, his desire, his concentrations, and his 
wishes. And that brings him to cupidity and urges him to 
demands, until it brings him to disquieting grief, continuous 
sleeplessness, and hopeless passion and sadness and destruc- 
tion of mind.' 



Hist. Aug. 2. 97. 20-22 (Hohl). Nor, I suppose, are the argu- 
ments unknown which Cicero used in his Hortensius, which 
he modelled on the Protrepticus. 

Nonius 394. 26-28. (Lindsay), s.v. contendere, intendere. 
Cicero in the Hortensius: 'for great mental effort must be 
applied to the explaining of Aristotle, if you are to read him.' 

Mart. Cap. 5. 44. The question whether we ought to philo- 
sophize is discussed in the Hortensius. 

1 (R 2 47, R3 50, W I) 

Stob. 4. 32. 21. From Teles' Epitome. Zeno said that Crates, 
as he sat in a shoemaker's workshop, read aloud the Pro- 
trepticus, which Aristotle had written to Themison king of 
Cyprus, saying that no one had greater advantages for be- 
coming a philosopher ; he had great wealth, so that he could 
afford to spend money on philosophy, and had reputation 
as well. As he read, the shoemaker listened while he went on 
with his stitching, and Crates said: 'I think, Philiscus, that 
I shall inscribe a Protrepticus to you ; for I see you have more 
advantages for the study of philosophy than were his 1 for 
whom Aristotle wrote.' 

2 (R2 50, R3 51, w 2) 

Alex. Aph. in Top. 149. 9-17. There are cases where, which- 
ever interpretation we adopt, we can on the basis of it refute 
the proposition proposed. Suppose someone said we ought 
not to pursue philosophy. Then, since even to inquire whether 
we ought to philosophize or not is (as Aristotle himself said 
in the Protrepticus) to philosophize, and since to pursue 

1 Reading in R. 56. 21 17 <L, with Diels. 


philosophical insight is also to philosophize, by showing that 
each of these two things is natural to man we shall on all 
counts refute the proposition proposed. In this case 1 our 
proposition can be proved on both counts, but in the examples 
first quoted it cannot be proved on all counts or on each of 
two, but only on one or more. 2 

Cf. Schol. in An. Pr., cod. Paris. 2064, f. 263 a, and Olymp. 
in Ale. p. 144 (Creuzer). 

Elias in Porph. 3. 17-23. We may also reason as Aristotle 
does in his Protrepticus, in which he encourages young men 
to philosophize. He says this: 'If we ought to philosophize 
we ought to philosophize, and if we ought not to philosophize 
we ought to philosophize ; in either case, therefore, we ought 
to philosophize. For 3 if philosophy exists we ought certainly 
to philosophize, because philosophy exists ; and if it does not 
exist, even so we ought to examine why it does not exist, 
and in examining this we shall be philosophizing, because 
examination is what makes philosophy.' 

David, Proll. 9. 2-12. Aristotle, too, in a hortatory work in 
which he encourages young men to study philosophy, says 
that whether we ought or ought not to philosophize, we ought 
to philosophize, so that in either case we ought to philoso- 
phize. That is, if someone says philosophy does not exist, 
he will have used arguments destructive of philosophy, but 
if he has used arguments he is clearly philosophizing (for 
philosophy is the mother of arguments). But if he says 
philosophy exists, he again philosophizes ; for he will have 
used arguments to prove that philosophy exists. In either 
case, then, they philosophize, both he who denies and he 
who does not deny that philosophy exists ; for each has used 
arguments to justify what he says, and if he uses arguments 

1 Reading in R. 57. 4 tovtov, with Wallies. 

2 Reading in R. 57. 6 ovk £k iravrcov r) tKaripov a\X' rj eV rivos rj e/c tivojv, 

with Wallies. 

3 Omitting romiarw in R. 57. 21, with Busse. 


he clearly philosophizes; for philosophy is the mother of 

Cf. Lact. Inst. 3. 16, and Clem. Al. Strom. 6. 18, 162. 5. 

3 (R 2 89, R3 57, w 3) 

Pap. Oxyrrh. 666 = Stob. 3. 3. 25. Seeing the misfortune 
of these men, we ought to avoid it and to consider 1 that 
happiness depends not on having many possessions but on 
the condition of the soul. For one would say that it is not 
the body which is decked with splendid clothing that is 
happy, but that which is healthy and in good condition, even 
if it has none of these things; and in the same way, if the 
soul has been disciplined, such a soul and such a man are to 
be called happy, not a man splendidly decked with outer 
things but himself worthless. It is not the horse which has 
a golden bit and costly harness, but is itself a poor creature, 
that we think worth anything ; what we praise is the horse 
that is in good condition. Besides, when worthless men get 
abundant possessions, they come to value these more than 
the good of the soul; which is the basest of all conditions. 
If a man were inferior to his own servants, he would become 
contemptible ; so too those for whom possessions are more 
important than their own nature must be considered miser- 
able. This is indeed so; surfeit, as the proverb says, breeds 
insolence ; possessions without discipline breed folly. For to 
those who are ill-disposed in soul neither wealth nor strength 
nor beauty is a good ; the more lavishly one is endowed with 
these conditions, the more grievously and the more often do 
they hurt him who possesses them but has not wisdom. 
'Give not a sword to a boy ' means ' do not entrust riches to bad 
men '. All men would admit that wisdom comes from learning 
and from seeking the things to which philosophy gives the 
key ; surely, then, we should sincerely pursue philosophy. 

4 (W 4) 

Iambl. Protr. b. 37. 3-22. The things with which we are 
furnished for life — the body and bodily things — are provided 

1 Reading in R. 67. 4 8cf tt)v tovtcjv dewpovvras arvx^av <f>evyeu> Kal vo(iiCeiv, 

with Wilamowitz. 

<f .Mil 



as tools, and the use of them is dangerous ; they have rather 
the contrary effect, for those who do not use them fittingly. 
We ought therefore to desire knowledge — to acquire it and 
to use it aright — if we are to attain all these good results. We 
must, therefore, philosophize if we are to be good citizens, 
and to lead our own life usefully. Further, there are some 
branches of knowledge that produce each of the advantages 
in life, others that use this first kind, others that minister 
to them, others that commend them to our obedience ; and 
in these last, as being more authoritative, consists the true 
good. If, then, only the science that has correctness of judge- 
ment, that which uses reason, that which envisages good as 
a whole — which is philosophy — can use and commend all 
things according to nature, we ought to philosophize in 
every possible way, since philosophy alone comprises right 
judgement and impeccable commanding wisdom. 

5 (R3 52, W 5) 

Iambl. Comm. Math. 26 (79. 1-81. 7 Festa). There have been 
some ancients and some moderns who have maintained the 
contrary view about mathematics, condemning it as com- 
pletely useless and as contributing nothing to human life. 
Some people attack mathematics thus : ' If the end for whose 
sake philosophers say we ought to study it is useless, much 
more must the study itself be vain. Now about the end 
all who are thought to have attained the greatest precision 
in mathematics are pretty much agreed. Some say the end 
is the knowledge of injustice and justice, of evil and good, 
which they think akin to geometry and the kindred sciences ; 
others think the end is wisdom with regard to nature and the 
like — the kind of wisdom introduced by the schools of 
Anaxagoras and Parmenides. He who is to consider these 
matters must therefore not fail to observe that all things 
good and useful for human life depend on use and action, not 
on mere knowledge. We become healthy not by knowing the 
things that produce health but by applying them to our 
bodies ; we become wealthy not by knowing wealth but by 
possessing much substance; most important of all, we live 


well not by knowing something but by doing well ; for this 
is true well-being. It follows that philosophy too, if it is to 
be profitable, must be either a doing of good things or useful 
as a means to such acts. Now, that neither philosophy nor 
any other of the aforesaid sciences is a doing of actions is 
clear to all ; that it is not useful as a means to action can be 
seen from what follows. We have the best example in the 
difference between the sciences akin to philosophy and the 
doctrines that come under them. Take the things that 
geometers study by way of demonstration ; we do not see 
them capable of doing any of these things. Land-surveyors 
can divide an estate, they can by virtue of experience deal 
with all the other properties of areas and regions ; but those 
who concern themselves with mathematical proofs know 
how they ought to act, but cannot act. The same is true of 
music and of all the other arts in which the role of knowledge 
is distinct from that of experience. For those who have 
studied the proofs and syllogisms about harmony and such- 
like matters are (like the philosophers) accustomed to specu- 
lation but take no part in practice; if perchance they can 
handle any of these matters practically, when they have 
learned the proofs they at once, as if on purpose, do their 
jobs worse. On the other hand, those who do not know the 
theories, but have become habituated by training and hold 
sound opinions, are altogether superior for practical purposes. 
So too with regard to astronomical subjects — the sun, the 
moon, and the other stars — those who have studied the 
theoretical explanations know nothing that is useful to man- 
kind, while those who have what these others call the 
navigational sciences can foretell for us storms, winds, and 
many other phenomena. Thus such sciences will be com- 
pletely useless for practical purposes, and if they fall short 
of correct practice the love of learning misses the greatest 

To these objections we reply that there are mathematical 
sciences and that they are capable of being acquired. 

Iambl. Protr. 6 (37. 26-41. 5 Pistelli). That we are capable 
of acquiring the sciences that deal with the just and the 


expedient, and also those that deal with nature and the rest 
of reality, it is easy to show. The prior is always more know- 
able than the posterior, and that which is naturally better 
more knowable than that which is worse. For knowledge is 
more concerned with things that are denned and ordered 
than with their contraries, 1 and more with causes than with 
effects ; now good things are more denned and ordered than 
evil things, just as a good man is more denned and ordered 
than a bad man ; there must be the same difference. Besides, 
things that are prior are causes, more than things that are 
posterior ; for if the former are removed the things that have 
their being from them are removed, lines if numbers are 
removed, planes if lines are removed, solids if planes are 
removed, so-called 'syllables' if the letters are removed. 2 
Therefore if soul is better than body (being more of the 
nature of a first principle), and there are arts and branches 
of knowledge concerned with the body, namely medicine 
and gymnastic (for we reckon these as sciences and say that 
some people possess them), clearly with regard to the soul 
too and its virtues there is a care and an art, and we can 
acquire these, since we can do this even with regard to things 
of which our ignorance is greater and knowledge is harder 
to come by. So too with regard to nature ; it is far more 
necessary to have knowledge of the causes and the elements 
than to have knowledge of what follows from them ; for the 
latter are not among the highest objects, and the first prin- 
ciples do not arise from them, but from and through the 
first principles all other things manifestly proceed and are 
constituted. Whether it be fire or air or number or other 
natures that are the causes and originals of other things, if 
we are ignorant of them we cannot know any of the other 
things. How could one recognize speech if one did not know 
the syllables, or know these if we knew none of the letters ? 
On the theme that there is knowledge of truth and of 
excellence of soul, and that we can acquire these, let this 
suffice. That it is the greatest of goods and the most valuable 

1 Reading in R. 60. 22 eortv rj twv evavrlwv, en, with Pistelli. 

2 Reading in R. 61. I (after emireSwv) oroixelwv Se at oropa^onevai avAXafiai, 
with Wilpert. 


of all things will be clear from what follows. We all agree that 
the best man and the man of strongest character ought to 
rule, and that the law alone is ruler and supreme; now the 
law is a form of wisdom, a form of words proceeding from 
wisdom. Again, what standard, what determinant, of what 
is good have we, other than the man of practical wisdom ? 
The things that such a man would choose if his choice 
followed his knowledge are good, and their contraries evil. 
Now since all men choose by preference what accords with 
their own characters, the just man choosing to live justly, 
the brave man to live bravely, the temperate man to live 
temperately, similarly it is clear that the wise man will 
choose above all things to think wisely, that being the 
exercise of this faculty. It is clear, then, that according 
to the most authoritative opinion wisdom is the greatest 
of goods. We ought, therefore, not to flee philosophy, if it 
is, as we think, the acquisition and use of wisdom, and wis- 
dom is among the greatest goods; and if in pursuit of gain 
we run many risks by sailing to the pillars of Hercules, we 
should not 1 shrink from labour or expense in the pursuit of 
wisdom. Indeed, it is the part of a slave to desire life rather 
than the good life, to follow the opinions of the many instead 
of expecting the many to follow one's own, to seek gain and 
pay no heed whatever to what is noble. 

About the value and the greatness of the thing I think 
we have proved our case. That the acquisition of wisdom is 
much easier than that of other goods, one might be con- 
vinced by the following argument. Those who pursue philo- 
sophy get no reward from men to spur them to the efforts 
they make; they may have spent much on other branches 
of knowledge, yet in a short time their progress in philosophy 
outstrips their progress in other branches: that seems to 
me a sign of the easiness of philosophy. So too the fact that 
all men feel at home in philosophy and wish to spend their 
lives in the pursuit of it, leaving all other cares, is no small 
evidence that devotion 2 to it is pleasant ; for no one is willing 
to suffer pain for long. Besides, the practice of philosophy is 

1 Reading in R. 62. 9 oi3Se Sef, with Pistelli. 

2 Reading in R. 63. 6 rrpooeBpeta, with Pistelli. 

645.29 D 


pre-eminent in that its followers need no tools or places for 
their work; wherever in the whole world one sets one's 
thought to work, it is surrounded on all sides by the presence 
of truth. 

Thus it has been proved that philosophy is possible, that 
it is the greatest of goods, and that it is easy to acquire, so 
that on all counts it is fitting that we should eagerly lay 
hold of it. 

Procl. in Eucl. 28. 13-22 (Friedlein). That to those who 
pursue it mathematics is desirable for its own sake is shown, 
as Aristotle somewhere says, by the fact that, though no 
reward is held out to those who pursue it, facility in the 
study of mathematics increases so rapidly, and also by the 
fact that all who have had even a slight experience of what 
it can give one feel at home in it and are willing to spend 
their time in it, neglecting all else, so that those who despise 
the knowledge 1 of mathematics can never themselves have 
tasted its delights. 

6 (W6) 

Iambl. Protr. 7 (41. 15-43. 25 Pistelli). Part of us is soul, part 
body ; the one rules, the other is ruled ; the one uses, the other 
is present as its instrument. Therefore the use of the subject, 
i.e. of the instrument, is always directed to that which rules 
and uses. In the soul, reason is that which naturally rules 
and judges of our own interest ; the other element follows 
and its nature is to be ruled. It is in accordance with its 
proper excellence that everything is well arranged ; for to 
attain this excellence is a good. Further, when the chief 
parts, the supreme and most honourable parts, possess their 
proper excellence, then is a thing well arranged ; therefore 
the natural excellence of that which is naturally better is 
the better. Now that which is by nature more originative 
and authoritative is the better, as man is in relation to the 
other animals; therefore soul is better than body (being 
more authoritative), and of soul, that which has reason and 

1 Reading in R. 63. 8 yvwoecos, with the MSS. 


thought ; for such is that which commands and forbids, and 
says what we ought to do or not to do. Whatever excellence, 
then, is the excellence of this part must be, for all beings in 
general and for us in particular, the most desirable of all 
things ; for one would (methinks) maintain that this part is, 
either alone or above all other things, ourselves. Further, 
when a thing achieves in the best way that which is, not by 
accident but by its own nature, its work, then that thing 
must be said to be good, and that excellence in virtue of 
which each thing can achieve this result must be termed 
its supreme excellence. Now that which is composite and 
divisible into parts has several different activities, but that 
which is by nature simple and whose being does not consist 
in a relation to something else must have only one proper 
excellence. If then man is a simple animal and his being is 
ordered according to reason and intelligence, he has no 
function other than the attainment of the most exact truth, 
truth about reality ; but if he is composed of several faculties, 
it is clear that where a thing naturally produces several results 
the best of them is always its proper work ; health is the work 
of the doctor, and safety that of the steersman. Now we 
can name no better work of thought, or of the thinking part 
of the soul, than the attainment of truth. Truth therefore 
is the supreme work of this part of the soul. Now this work 
it does simply in virtue of knowledge, or rather in virtue of 
what is more completely knowledge, and the supreme end 
of this is contemplation. For when of two things one is 
worthy of choice for the sake of the other, the latter is better 
and more worthy of choice, e.g. pleasure than pleasant 
things, health than wholesome things ; for these are said to 
be productive of those. Now than thought, which we main- 
tain to be the faculty of the supreme element in us, there is 
nothing more worthy of choice, when one state is compared 
with another ; for the part that knows, whether taken alone 
or in combination with other parts, is better than all the 
rest of the soul, and its excellence is knowledge. Therefore 
none of the particular excellences is its work ; for it is better 
than all of them, and the end produced is always better than 
the knowledge that produces it. Nor is every excellence of 


the soul the work of wisdom in this way, nor is happiness. 
For if an excellence is to be productive, it will produce 
results different from itself ; e.g. the art of building produces 
a house but is not part of a house ; but wisdom is a part of 
excellence and of happiness ; for we say that happiness either 
comes from wisdom or is it. According to this argument also, 
then, knowledge cannot be productive ; for the end must be 
better than that which is coming to attain it, but nothing 
is better 1 than wisdom, unless it be one of the things we 
have named ; but none of these is a product distinct from 
wisdom. Therefore we must say that this form of knowledge 
is contemplative, since that which is the end cannot be a 
process of production. Thinking and contemplation, therefore, 
are the work of virtue, and this is of all things the most 
worthy of choice for men, as (methinks) sight is for eyes; 
one would choose to have sight even if nothing other than 
sight itself were to result from it. 

7 (w 7) 

Iambl. Protr. 7 (43. 25-45. 3 Pistelli). Further, if we love sight 
for its own sake, that is sufficient evidence that all men love 
thinking and knowing most of all. Again, if we love one 
thing because some property attends on it, clearly we shall 
wish more for that to which this property belongs in greater 
degree ; e.g. if a man happens to choose walking because it 
is healthy, but running is more healthy for him and he can 
get it, he will (if he knows this) prefer running and choose it 
rather than walking. If, therefore, true opinion is like know- 
ledge, then — since true opinion is worthy of choice in respect 
of being, 2 and in so far as it is, like knowledge by reason of 
being true — if knowledge is more true, it is more worthy of 
choice than true opinion. But living is distinguished from 
not living by sense-perception ; it is by the presence and 
power of this that life has its distinctive character ; if this is 
taken away life is not worth living — it is as though life itself 
were extinguished by the loss of sense-perception. Now of 

1 Reading peXnov cart, suggested by Pistelli. 

2 Reading ravrj], suggested by Vitelli. 


sense-perception one kind — the power of sight — is distin- 
guished by being the clearest, and it is for this reason that 
we prefer it to the other senses; but every sense acquires 
knowledge by means of the body, as hearing perceives sound 
by means of the ears. Therefore if life is worthy of choice 
for the sake of perception, and perception is a kind of 
knowing, and we choose it because the soul can come to 
know by means of it, and (as we said before) of two things 1 
that is always preferable which possesses the desirable quality 
more fully, then of the senses sight must be the most worthy 
of choice and honourable ; but knowledge is preferable to it 
and to all the other senses, and to life itself, since it has a 
stronger grasp of truth; 2 so that all men aim at knowing, 
most of all things. For in loving life they love thinking and 
knowing; they value life for no other reason than for the 
sake of perception, and above all for the sake of sight ; they 
evidently love this faculty in the highest degree because it 
is, in comparison with the other senses, simply a kind of 

8 (R 2 l, R 3 53, w8) 

Cic. Tusc. 3. 28. 69. Therefore Aristotle, criticizing the old 
philosophers who had thought philosophy completed by 
their intellectual labours, says they were either very stupid 
or very conceited, but that he sees that, since great progress 
has been made in a few years, philosophy will in a short time 
be brought to completion. 

Iambl. Comm. Math. 26 (83. 6-22 Festa). The study of pre- 
cision with regard to the truth is admittedly the youngest 
of all pursuits. For after the catastrophe of the flood men 
were compelled to think first about food and the preservation 
of life ; when they had become better provided they worked 
out the arts that conduce to pleasure— music and the like ; 
and it was only when they had acquired more than enough 
of the necessities of life that they essayed philosophy. But 

1 Reading on Svoiv, with Jaeger. 

2 Reading Kvpuorcpa (ovaa), with Jaeger. 


those who concern themselves with geometry and calculation 
and the other sciences have from small beginnings made by 
now such progress in a very short time as no other race has 
made in any of the arts. Yet while all men join in promoting 
the other arts by giving them public honour and rewarding 
the artists, we not only do not encourage mathematicians, 
but often even put difficulties in their way ; yet these studies 
make most advance, 1 because they have a natural prece- 
dence ; for that which is later in coming to be is prior in 
essence and perfection. 

9 (R 3 55> w 9) 

Iambl. Protr. 8 (45. 4-47. 4 Pistelli). It is worth while to 
point out that the view in question follows from common 
opinions, from views that are clearly held by all men. 

To everyone this much is plain, that no one would choose 
to live in receipt of the greatest wealth and power from men 
but deprived of thought and mad — not even if one were to 
be pursuing 2 with delight the most violent pleasures, as some 
madmen do. All men, then, it seems, shun above all things 
the loss of their wits. Now the contrary of witlessness is 
wisdom ; and of two contraries one is to be avoided, the other 
to be chosen ; as illness is to be avoided, so health is to be 
chosen. Thus according to this argument, too, in the light 
of common opinion, it seems that wisdom is most of all to 
be chosen, not for the sake of any 3 of its consequences. For 
even if a man had everything, but were destroyed and 
diseased in his thinking part, his life would not be worth 
living, since even the other good things could not profit him. 
Therefore all men, in so far as they are conscious of thinking 
and can taste its savour, 4 reckon other things as nothing, and 
for this reason not one of us would endure being drunk or 
a child throughout his life. For this reason too, though sleep 
is a very pleasant thing, it is not a thing to choose even if 

1 Reading in R. 64. 12 ttXciotov, with Festa. 

2 Reading in R. 65. 7 8iu>Keiv for t,a>eLv, with Diels. 

3 Reading in R. 65. 13-14 ov 81' erepov n, with the MSS. 

4 Reading in R. 65. 18-19 aiodavovrai rov <j>povetv xal yeveoOcu Swavrai 
tovtov tov Trpdy^aros, ovbev oiovrai, with the MSS. 


we suppose the sleeper to have all possible pleasures, because 
the images of sleep are false, while those of waking life are 
true. Sleep and waking differ in nothing but the fact that 
the soul when awake often knows the truth, but in sleep is 
always deceived ; for the whole nature of dreams is an image 
and a lie. 

Again, the shrinking of most men from death shows the 
soul's love of learning. For it shrinks from what it does not 
know, from darkness and obscurity, and naturally seeks 
what is manifest and knowable. This is, above all, the reason 
why we say we ought to honour and revere supremely, as 
authors of our greatest goods, the authors of our seeing the 
sun and the light — our fathers and mothers; these are, it 
seems, the authors of our thinking and seeing. It is for the 
same reason that we delight in things and men that are 
familiar, and call dear those whom we know. These things, 
then, show plainly that that which is knowable, manifest, 
and clear is a thing to be loved, 1 and if that which is knowable 
and clear, then also knowledge and thought are equally 
necessary to us. 

Besides this, just as in the case of property it is not the 
same possession that conduces to life and to happy life, so 
too in the case of thought we do not, methinks, need the 
same with a view to mere life and with a view to the good 
life. The bulk of mankind may well be pardoned for doing 
as they do ; while they pray for happiness they are content 
if they can but live. But unless one thinks one ought to endure 
living on any terms whatever, it is ridiculous not to endure 
every labour 2 and bestow every care to gain the wisdom 
which will know the truth. 

10 a (R 2 49, r3 59, w 10 a) 

Iambl. Protr. 8 (47. 5-21 Pistelli). One might know this even 
from the following facts, if one viewed human life in a clear 
light. For one will find that all the things men think great 
are mere scene-painting ; whence it is rightly said that man 

1 Reading in R. 66. 9 to <f>avep6v koX to S-fjXov dyamjTov, with the MSS. 

2 Reading in R. 66. 18 ttovov v-noixivav, with the MSS. 


is nothing, and nothing human is stable. Strength, size, 
beauty are a laugh and nothing more, and beauty 1 seems 
to be beauty only because we see nothing accurately. If one 
could have seen as clearly as they say Lynceus did, who saw 
through walls and trees, would one ever have thought any 
man endurable to look at, when one saw 2 of what poor 
materials he is made ? Honours and reputation, these much 
envied things, are, even more than other things, full of 
indescribable folly ; for to him who catches a glimpse of 
things eternal it seems foolish to busy himself with these 
things. What is there among human things that is long-lived 
or lasting ? It is owing to our weakness, methinks, and the 
shortness of our life that even this appears great. 

Boeth. Consol. 3. 8. How slight, how fragile is the tenure of 
those who boast of bodily goods! Can you surpass the 
elephant in size, the bull in strength, the tiger in speed? 
Look to the vastness, the durability, the speed of the heavens, 
and cease to marvel at those cheap possessions. No less than 
for these qualities, the heavens are admirable for the reason 
by which they are ruled. As for beauty, how swift is its 
passing — more fleeting than the flowers of spring! If, as 
Aristotle says, men had had the eyes of Lynceus, so that 
their sight could pierce through obstacles, would not the 
body of Alcibiades, so fair on the surface, have seemed most 
foul when its inward parts were seen ? So it is not your own 
nature, but the weakness of the eyes which see you, that 
makes you seem beautiful. But consider how excessive is 
your desire of bodily goods, when you know that that which 
you admire can be dissolved by the paltry fire of a tertian 

Cic. Titsc. 1. 39. 94. But what age can truly be called old? 
What possession of man is lasting ? . . . Because we have 
nothing more, we call this lasting ; all these things are called 
long or short according to the proportion of each that is 
given to each of us. By the river Hypanis, which flows into 

1 Reading in R. 70. 6 /caAAos re, with the MSS. 

2 Reading in R. 70. 9 6p<2>v, with the MSS. 


the Pontus from the direction of Europe, Aristotle says there 
are born little creatures which live for but one day. One of 
these that has died at the eighth hour has died at an ad- 
vanced age ; one that has died at sunset is decrepit, especially 
if it is on a midsummer day. Compare our longest life with 
eternity ; we shall be found as short-lived as these little 

Sen. Brev. Vit. 1. 2. Aristotle's quarrel with the nature of 
things is most unsuitable to a wise man. He says that nature 
has indulged the animals so much that they live for five 
of our generations, while man, born to so many and such 
great achievements, has so much nearer a limit fixed for him. 

10 b (r 2 36, R 3 60, w 10 b) 

Iamb. Protr. 8 (47. 21-48. 9 Pistelli). Which of us, looking to 
these facts, would think himself happy and blessed — which 
of us, all of whom (in the first place) are from the start (as 
they say in the initiation rites) born as though for punish- 
ment ? For it is an inspired saying of the ancients that the 
soul pays penalty and that we live for the punishment of 
great sins. The conjunction of the soul with the body looks 
very much like this. For as the Etruscans are said often to 
torture captives by chaining dead bodies face to face with 
the living, fitting part to part, so the soul seems to be ex- 
tended throughout and affixed to all the sensitive members 
of the body. 

Aug. C. Inl. Pel. 4. 15. 78. How much better and nearer the 
truth than yours were the views about the generation of men 
held by those whom Cicero, as though led and compelled by 
the very evidence of the facts, commemorates in the last 
part of the dialogue Hortensius ! After mentioning the many 
facts we see and lament with regard to the vanity and the 
unhappiness 1 of men, he says: 'From which errors and cares 
of human life it results that sometimes those ancients — 
whether they were prophets or interpreters of the divine 

1 Reading in R. 71. 16 injelicitale, with Migne. 


mind by the transmission of sacred rites — who said that we 
are born to expiate sins committed in a former life, seem to 
have had a glimpse of the truth, and that that is true which 
Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were 
who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands 
of Etruscan robbers, were killed with studied cruelty ; their 
bodies, the living with the dead, were bound as exactly 1 as 
possible one against another: so our minds, bound together 
with our bodies, are like the living joined with the dead. 

Cf. Clem. Al. Protr. i. 7. 4. 

10 c (R 2 48, R 3 61, w 10 c) 

Iambl. Protr. 8 (48. 9-21 Pistelli). Mankind has nothing 
worthy of consideration as being divine or blessed, except 
what there is in us of reason and wisdom ; this alone of our 
possessions seems to be immortal, this alone to be divine. 
By virtue of being able to share in this faculty, life, however 
wretched and difficult by nature, is yet so cleverly arranged 
that man seems a god in comparison with all other creatures. 
For ' reason is the god in us ' (whether it was Hermotimus or 
Anaxagoras that said so), and 'mortal life contains a portion 
of some god'. We ought, therefore, either to pursue philo- 
sophy or to say farewell to life and depart hence, since all 
other things seem to be great nonsense and folly. 

Cic. Fin. 2. 13. 39-40. I shall hold that we must first exclude 
the opinions of Aristippus and the whole Cyrenaic school, 
who were not afraid to place the supreme good in the pleasure 
which moves our senses most delightfully, and spurned the 
freedom from pain of which you speak. They did not see 
that as the horse is born to run, the ox to plough, the dog 
to follow a scent, so man (as Aristotle says) is born as a sort 
of mortal god to do two things — for understanding and for 

Aug. Trin. 14. 19. 26. Commending this contemplative 
wisdom . . . Cicero says at the end of the dialogue Hortensius : 

1 Reading in R. 71. 25 aptissime, with the MSS. 


' To us . . . who spend our lives in philosophy this is a great 
hope — that if that by which we feel and think is mortal and 
perishable, we shall have a happy setting . . . and a rest from 
life ; if, on the other hand, as the ancient, the greatest and 
far the most famous, philosophers thought, we have minds 
eternal and divine, then we should reflect that the more 
these minds have been constant in their courses — in the use 
of reason and in the desire of discovery — and the less they 
have mixed and implicated themselves in the vices and errors 
of mankind, the easier will be their ascent and return to 
heaven.' Then, adding this very clause and summing up his 
argument, he says: 'Wherefore — to bring my speech at last 
to an end — if we wish either to be quietly extinguished when 
we have lived our life in this prison, or to move without 
delay from this to a far better home, all our interest and 
concern must be bestowed on these studies.' 

II (w II) 

Iambl. Protr. 9 (49. 3-52. 16 Pistelli). Of things that come 
into being some come from thought and art, e.g. a house or 
a ship (for the cause of both of these is a certain art and 
process of thought), while others come into being through 
no art, but by nature; nature is the cause of animals and 
plants, and all such things come into being according to 
nature. But some things, also, come into being as a result of 
chance ; for of most of the things that come into being neither 
by art nor by nature nor of necessity, we say that they come 
into being by chance Now of the things that come into being 
by chance none comes into being for the sake of anything, 
nor have they an end ; but in the case of things that come 
into being by art there is an end and an object of purpose 
(for he who possesses the art will tell you the reason why he 
wrote, and for what purpose he did so), and this is better 
than that which comes into being for its sake. I speak of the 
things of which art is the cause by its own nature and not by 
accident ; for we should describe the art of medicine as pro- 
perly the art of health and not of disease, and architecture 
as the art of making houses, not of pulling them down. 


Everything, therefore, that is according to art comes into 
being for the sake of something, and this is its best end, but 
that which comes into being by chance does not come into 
being for the sake of anything ; something good might come 
into being by chance, yet in respect of chance and in so far 
as it results from chance it is not good — that which comes 
into being by chance is always indeterminate. But that 
which comes into being according to nature does so for an 
end, and is always constituted to better purpose than the 
product of art ; for nature does not imitate art, but vice 
versa ; art exists to aid nature and to fill up its deficiencies. 
For some things nature seems able to complete by itself 
without assistance, but others it does with difficulty or can- 
not do at all — in the matter of birth, to take an obvious 
example; some seeds generate without protection, whatever 
ground they fall into, others need the art of farming as well ; 
and similarly some animals attain their full nature by them- 
selves, but man needs many arts for his preservation, both 
at birth and in the matter of nutrition later. If, then, art 
imitates nature, it is from nature that the arts have derived 
the characteristic that all their products come into being for 
an end ; for we should describe as coming into being for an 
end everything that comes into being rightly. Now that which 
comes into being beautifully comes into being rightly; and 
everything that comes into being or has come into being 
according to nature 1 comes into or has come into being 
beautifully, since that which is contrary to nature is bad and 
contrary to that which is according to nature ; natural coming 
into being, 2 therefore, is for an end. This one can see from 
any one of our parts ; if you were to consider the eyelid, you 
would see that it has come into being not at random but to 
aid the eyes — to give them rest and to ward off things that 
are falling on to them. Therefore that for the sake of which 
something has come into being is the same as that for which 
it ought to have come into being ; if it was right that a ship 
should come into being to provide transport by sea, it is for 
that reason that it has come into being. Now either absolutely 

1 Omitting n-qv. 

2 Reading to> Kara <f>vaiv ivavrtov ij ovv Kara <f>vaiv yeveois, with \ itelli. 


all animals belong to the class of things that have come into 
being by nature, 1 or the best and most honourable of them 
do ; for it makes no difference if someone thinks most animals 
have come into being contrary to nature, to destroy and do 
mischief. Now man is the most honourable of the animals 
in the world, so that clearly he has come into being by nature 
and according to nature ; and knowledge is that for the sake 
of which nature and God have brought us into being. Pytha- 
goras, when asked what this end is, said 'to observe the 
heavens', and used to say he was an observer of nature and 
it was for this that he had come into being. And they say 
that Anaxagoras, when asked for what end one would choose 
to come into being and to live, replied ' to observe the heavens 
and the stars, moon, and sun in them ', everything else being 
nothing worth. If, then, the end of each thing is always 
better than the thing (for everything that comes into being 
does so for the sake of its end, and its end is better and the 
best of all things) , and if that which is completed last in order 
of generation when this proceeds continuously is the natural 
end, we note that the bodily parts of men are completed 
first and the mental parts later, and the completion of the 
better is, one may say, always later than its generation. 
Therefore soul is later than body, and wisdom is the latest 
of the qualities of the soul; for we see that by nature it is 
the latest faculty to come into being for men — that is why 
old age lays special claim to this alone of good things ; there- 
fore some form of wisdom is by nature our end, and the 
exercise of it the final activity for whose sake we have come 
into being. Now if we have come into being in order to 
exercise it and to learn, we also exist for that end. According 
to this argument, then, Pythagoras was right in saying that 
every man has been created by God in order to know and 
to observe. But whether the object of this knowlege is the 
world or something whose nature is different, we must con- 
sider later ; what we have said suffices as a first conclusion ; 
for if wisdom is our natural end, the exercise of it must be 
the best of all things. Therefore the other things we ought 
to do, we ought to do for the sake of the goods that come 

1 Reading in twv <f>voct. yeyev7//ueVcoi', with the MSS. 


into being in oneself, 1 and of these the bodily actions should 
be done for the sake of the mental, and virtue should be 
practised for the sake of wisdom ; for this is the supreme end. 

12 (R 3 58, W 12) 

Aug. Trin. 14. 9. 12. Cicero in his dialogue Hortensius argues 
thus: 'If we, when we depart 2 this life, were permitted to 
live for ever, as the fables say, in the islands of the blest, 
what need should we have of eloquence when there were no 
causes to be pleaded — or even of the virtues themselves? 
We should not need courage, where no task or danger was 
prescribed to us, nor justice, where there was no property of 
another for us to seek, nor temperance, to rule non-existent 
lusts. We should not need even prudence, where no choice 
between goods and evils was held out to us. We should be 
blessed by the possession of one thing only — science and 
knowledge of nature, for which alone the life of the gods is 
to be praised. From this it may be seen that other things 
are matters of necessity, and only this a matter of choice. 
Thus that great orator, when he was preaching philosophy by 
repeating and expounding splendidly and persuasively what 
he had received from the philosophers, said that it is only 
in this life, which we see to be full of cares and errors, that 
all the four virtues are necessary. 

Iambl. Protr. 9 (52. 16-54. 5 Pistelli) . To seek from all 
knowledge a result other than itself, and to demand that 
knowledge must be useful, is the act of one completely ignor- 
ant of the distance that from the start separates things good 
from things necessary ; they stand at opposite extremes. For 
of the things without which life is impossible those that are 
loved for the sake of something else must be called necessities 
and contributing causes, but those that are loved for them- 
selves even if nothing follows must be called goods in the 
strict sense. This is not desirable for the sake of that, and 
that for the sake of something else, and so ad infinitum ; there 
is a stop somewhere. It is completely ridiculous, therefore, to 

: Reading avru>. 

2 Reading in R. 68. 3 emigraverimns, with the MSS. 


demand from everything some benefit other than the thing 
itself, and to ask ' What then is the gain to us ? ' and ' What 
is the use ? ' For in truth, as we maintain, he who asks this 
is in no way like one who knows the noble and good, or who 
distinguishes causes from accompanying conditions. One 
would see the supreme truth of what we are saying, if some- 
one 1 carried us in thought to the islands of the blest. There 
there would be need of nothing, no profit from anything; 
there remain only thought and contemplation, which even 
now we describe as the free life. If this be true, would not 
any of us be rightly ashamed if when the chance was given 
us to live in the islands of the blest, he were by his own fault 
unable to do so ? Not to be despised, therefore, is the reward 
that knowledge brings to men, nor slight the good that comes 
from it. For as, according to the wise among the poets, we 
receive the gifts of justice in Hades, so (it seems) we gain 
those of wisdom in the islands of the blest. It is nowise 
strange, then, if wisdom does not show itself useful or ad- 
vantageous ; we call it not advantageous but good, it should 
be chosen not for the sake of anything else, but for itself. 
For as we travel to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle 
itself, even if nothing were to follow from it (for the spectacle 
itself is worth more than much wealth), and as we view the 
Dionysia not in order to gain anything from the actors 
(indeed we spend money on them), and as there are many 
other spectacles we should prefer to much wealth, so too the 
contemplation of the universe is to be honoured above all 
the things that are thought useful. For surely it cannot be 
right that we should take great pains to go to see men 
imitating women and slaves, or fighting and running, just 
for the sake of the spectacle, and not think it right to view 
without payment the nature and reality of things. 

13 (w 13) 

Iambl. Protr. 10 (54. 10-56. 12 Pistelli). That theoretical 
wisdom also provides us with the greatest advantages for 

1 Reading after Xfyo/iev in R. 69. I ovSev eoiK€i> 6 toiouto? ei'Sdri KaXov 
Kaya96v ovhe rt airiov ra> SiayiyvwoKOVTi ko.1 avvairiov. toot o av tis oti ■navTos 
[Ma^XXov dXrjdij ravra Xeyo/xev, et ti? ktX., with the MSS. 


human life, one will discover easily from studying the arts. 
For as all skilful physicians and most gymnasts agree that 
those who are to be good physicians or gymnasts must have 
experience of nature, so it is agreed that good legislators 
must have experience of nature, and indeed much more than 
the former. For the former are producers only of bodily 
excellence, while those who are concerned with the excellences 
of the soul and undertake to give instruction about the well- 
being and the ill-being of the state need philosophy far more. 
As in the mechanical arts the best instruments have been 
borrowed from nature (e.g. in carpentry the ruddled line, 
the rule, and the lathe were suggested by the surface of 
water and by the rays of light, 1 and it is by reference to 
these that we test what is to our senses sufficiently straight 
or smooth), similarly the statesman must borrow from nature 
and reality certain limits by reference to which he will judge 
what is just, noble, or advantageous ; for as these tools excel 
all others, so the law that conforms best with nature is the 
best. Now this he cannot do unless he has practised philo- 
sophy and learned the truth. And in the other arts men do 
not take their tools and their most accurate calculations 
from the originals themselves and so attain something 
approaching to knowledge ; they take them from copies at 
second or third hand or at a distant remove, and base their 
reasonings on experience. The philosopher alone copies the 
exact originals ; he is a spectator of them and not of copies. 
As, then, he is not a good builder who does not use a straight 
rule or any other such instrument but compares his own 
building with others, so, presumably, if one either lays down 
laws for cities or does actions of his own, looking to and 
copying other actions or human constitutions, whether of 
Sparta or of Crete or of any other state, he is not a good 
lawgiver nor a virtuous man ; for an imitation of what is not 
good cannot be good, nor can an imitation of what is not 
divine and durable in its nature be immortal and durable ; 
it is clear 2 that to the philosopher alone among craftsmen 
belong laws that are durable and actions that are right and 

1 The text is corrupt, but the general sense is clear. 

2 Reading dXXa 8rj\ov on kt\., with Yitelli. 


noble. For he alone lives with his eye on nature and the 
divine, and like a good steersman directs his life 1 in depen- 
dence on what is eternal and unchanging, and lives his 
own master. This knowledge is theoretical indeed, but it 
enables us to frame all our practice in accordance with it. 
For as sight makes and shapes nothing (since its only work is 
to judge and to show us everything that can be seen), and 
yet it enables us to act as it directs, and gives us the greatest 
assistance towards action (for we should be almost entirely 
motionless if deprived of it), so it is clear that, though know- 
ledge is theoretical, yet we do a host of things in accordance 
with it, choose some actions and avoid others, and in general 
gain as a result of it all the goods we possess. 

14 (W 14) 

Iamb. Protr. 11 (56. 13-59. I ^ Pistelli) . That those who have 
chosen the life according to reason also enjoy life most will 
be clear from the following argument. The word 'live' seems 
to be used in two senses, one implying a potentiality, the 
other an actuality; for we describe as 'seeing' both those 
animals which have sight and are born capable of seeing, 
even if they happen to have their eyes shut, and those which 
are using this faculty and looking definitely at something. 
Similarly with cognition or knowing ; we sometimes mean by 
it the use of the faculty, actual contemplation, and sometimes 
the possession of the faculty of knowledge. If, then, we dis- 
tinguish life from non-life by the possession of perception, 
and 'perception' has two meanings, meaning properly the 
using of the senses, but in another significance the being 
able to use them (it is for this reason, it seems, that we say 
even a sleeping man perceives), 2 it is clear that 'live' will 
correspondingly have two meanings; a waking man must 
be said to live in the true and proper sense, a sleeping man 
must be said to live because he is capable of passing into the 
activity in virtue of which we say that a man is waking and 
perceiving something ; it is for this reason and with reference 

1 Reading 6pnq, with the MSS. 

2 It is not necessary to assume the existence of a lacuna here. For <f>afxev 
Xeyovres cf. L. and S. S.V. 4>r)fxl II. 2. 

645.29 E 


to this that we describe him as living. 1 When, therefore, each 
of two things is called by the same name, and one of the two 
is so called by virtue of acting or being acted on, 2 we shall 
assign the name by preference to this one ; we shall use the 
word 'know' rather of him who is using than of him who 
merely possesses knowledge, and ' see ' rather of him who is 
directing his sight than of him who merely can do so. For 
we apply the comparative degree not only to that which 
possesses more completely an attribute that has a single 
definition, but also to that whose possession of the attribute 
is prior; e.g. we say that health is better than wholesome 
things, and that which is by its own nature worthy of choice 
than that which tends to produce this, though we see that 
it is not by virtue of the definition's being predicable of both 
that we describe both useful things and virtue as good. Thus 
we must assign life in a higher degree to a waking man than 
to a sleeping one, to a man who is exercising his soul than 
to one who merely possesses a soul ; for it is because of the 
former that we assign life also to the latter, because he is such 
as to act, or be acted on, in the former way. 3 The exercising of 
anything, then, is this: if the faculty admits only of one 
realization, it is exercised when one does just that thing; 
if the faculty admits of more than one realization, it is exer- 
cised when one brings about its best realization; e.g. one 
uses the flute either only, or most completely, when one is 
actually playing it ; for presumably it is on the basis of this 
that the 'uses' of it by other people are called uses. So 
we must say that he who uses a thing aright uses it in a 
higher degree, since the natural purpose 4 and the natural 
manner belong to the man who uses the thing well and 
accurately. Now thinking and reasoning are, either alone or 
above everything else, the work of the soul. It is a simple 
inference, one that anyone can easily draw, that the man 
who thinks aright lives in a higher degree than others, that 
he who reaches truth in the highest degree lives in the 

1 Placing the full stop after pXe-novres, not after twos. 

2 Reading tw -noitiv 77 tu> -naoxeiv, with the MSS. 

3 Reading inelvois, as suggested by Pistelli. 

4 Reading if 6, with the MSS. 


highest degree, and that this is the man who thinks and 
theorizes according to the most precise knowledge ; and it is 
then and to these men that living completely must be 
ascribed — to those who think and to those who have the 
capacity to think. Now if living is, alike for every animal, 
its true being, it is clear that the thinker will be in the 
highest degree and in the most proper sense, and most of 
all when he is exercising this faculty and contemplating 
what is the most knowable of all things. But further, 
perfect and unimpeded activity contains in itself delight, so 
that the activity of contemplation must be the most pleasant 
of all. Further, there is a difference between enjoying 
oneself while drinking and enjoying drinking; for there is 
nothing to prevent a man who is not thirsty, or is not getting 
the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, 
not because he is drinking but because he happens at the 
same time to be looking at something, or to be looked at, as 
he sits. So we shall say that such a man enjoys himself, and 
enjoys himself while drinking, but not because he is drinking, 
nor that he is enjo3nng drinking. In the same way we shall 
say that walking, sitting down, learning, any activity, is 
pleasant or painful, not if we happen to feel pain or pleasure 
in the presence of these activities, but if we are all pained 
or pleased by their presence. Similarly we shall call that life 
pleasant whose presence is pleasant to those who have it ; 
we shall say that not all who have pleasure while living 
enjoy living, but only those to whom life itself is pleasant 
and who rejoice in the pleasure that comes from living. Now 
we assign life to the man who is awake rather than to him 
who is asleep, to him who thinks rather than to him who is 
thoughtless, and we say the pleasure of living is the pleasure 
we get from the exercise of the soul; that is true life. If, 
then, there are more than one exercise of the soul, still the 
chief of all is that of thinking as well as possible. 1 It is clear, 
then, that the pleasure arising from thinking and contempla- 
tion is, alone or most of all, the pleasure of living. Pleasant 
life and enjoyment, therefore, belong in truth only to philo- 
sophers, or to them most of all. For the activity of our truest 
1 Reading on na\t.cna, with Walzer. 


thoughts, that which is replenished from the most real 
realities, and preserves steadfastly for ever the perfection it 
receives, this is of all activities the most productive of joy. 
Thus even for the sake of enjoying true and good pleasures 
men of sense ought to practise philosophy. 

15 (w 15) 

Iambl. Protr. 12 (59. 19-60. 15 Pistelli). If we ought to draw 
this conclusion not only from considering the elements of 
well-being, but also start higher up and establish it by con- 
sidering well-being as a whole, let us say explicitly that as 
philosophizing is related to well-being, so is it related to the 
acquisition by us of anything good or bad. For it is as leading 
to this or as following from it that the existence of anything is 
for all men worthy of desire, and some of the things through 
which we have well-being are such because they are neces- 
sary, some because they are pleasant. Now we define well- 
being either as thoughtfulness (a sort of wisdom), or as virtue, 
or as the extreme of enjoyment, or as all of these together. If 
it is thoughtfulness, clearly philosophers alone will live hap- 
pily ; if it is excellence of the soul or enjoyment, then, too, it 
will belong to them alone or most of all ; for the highest element 
in us is virtue, and thinking is the most pleasant of all single 
things. Similarly, if one says that all these things together 
are well-being, well-being must be defined as thinking. 1 

Therefore all who can should practise philosophy ; for this 
is either complete good life, or of all single things most truly 
the cause of good life for souls. In this world, I suppose 
because life in it is unnatural to our race, learning and in- 
sight are difficult, and perception scarcely to be obtained 2 
because of our awkward and unnatural mode of life ; but if 
we can ever escape back to the place from which we have 
come, it is clear that we shall all do these things more 
pleasantly and more easily. 

16 (R 2 77, R 3 90, W iC) 
Ath. 335 f. . . . enjoying the life of Sardanapallus, son of 

1 Reading tu> <f>povelv. 

2 Reading ^dAu av aloddvotTo, suggested by Pistelli. 


Anacyndaraxes, whom Aristotle described as even sillier 
than 1 the name of his father would suggest. 

Cic. Tusc. 5. 35. 101. How then can a life be pleasant from 
which prudence and moderation are absent ? We see from 
this the error of Sardanapallus, the wealthy king of Syria, 
who ordered these words to be engraved on his tomb : ' What 
I ate and what sated lust drained to the dregs, that I 
have; many a famous deed lies left behind.' 'What else', 
Aristotle says, 'would you have inscribed on the grave, not 
of a king but of an ox ? He says he had in death the things 
which even in life he had no longer than for the moment of 

Cf. Strabo 14. 5. 9, p. C 672 ; Cic. Fin. 2. 32. 106. 

17 ( R3 54) 

Chalc. in Tim. 208-9 (Wrobel). In this Aristotle also agrees, 
saying that children at first, while still unweaned, think all 
men their fathers and all women their mothers, but as they 
grow up come to draw distinctions, and yet sometimes fail 
to do so, since they are often taken in by false images and 
hold out their hands to a mere simulacrum. He calls all these 
opinions unmanly; those who hold them think that the 
things that hurt us are beneficial and those that help us 
noxious; they are led towards pleasure that destroys, and 
take offence at healthy toil. This would certainly never have 
happened if they had not trusted too much to the senses, 
which by nature are most lively when they deceive. To make 
the whole matter plain, Aristotle uses an example of crystal 
clearness. The height of madness is reached when a man not 
only is ignorant, but does not know what he is ignorant of, 
and therefore gives his assent to false images and takes those 
that are true to be false ; as when men think that vice profits 
them and virtue acts to their prejudice and ruin. . . . These 
men Aristotle calls old children, because their mind differs 
very little from a child's. 

1 Rea.ding in R. 91. 2 dvai 77 Kara, with Madvig. 


18 (W 18) 

Cic. Tusc. 5. 30. 85. The case of the Peripatetics has been 
unfolded — apart from the views of Theophrastus and those 
who, following him, show a weak dread of and shrinking 
from pain ; the rest may do what they in fact practically do, to 
exaggerate the importance and dignity of virtue. When they 
have extolled it to the skies, which these eloquent men are 
wont to do at length ... 31. 87 according to the reasoning of 
these men the happy life will follow virtue even if it leads to 
torture, and will descend with it into the tyrant's bull, 1 with 
Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemon, to en- 
courage it; it will never, seduced by threats or blandish- 
ments, desert virtue. 

Ibid. 5. 10. 30. I do not, therefore, readily allow my friend 
Brutus, or our common masters, or the ancients, Aristotle, 
Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, when they count as 
evils the things I have enumerated above, at the same time 
to say that the ' wise man ' is always happy. If this noble and 
beautiful title, most worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and 
Plato, delights them, let them bring themselves to despise 
the things by whose splendour they are attracted — strength, 
health, beauty, riches, honours, power — and to count their 
opposites as nothing ; then they will be able with a voice of 
crystal clearness to profess that they are terrified neither by 
the onslaught of fortune, by the opinion of the multitude, by 
pain, nor by poverty, that everything lies in themselves, that 
there is nothing outside their power which they should 
reckon as a good. 

Cf. ibid. 5. 13. 39. 

Cic. Fin. 5. 5. 12. But since the happy life is sought for, and 
the one thing that philosophy ought to consider and pursue is 
the question whether happiness is entirely in the power of the 
wise man, or whether it can be weakened or snatched from 

1 Phalaris' brazen bull. 


him by adversity, on this point there seems to be sometimes 
variation and doubt among philosophers. This impression is 
produced most strongly by Theophrastus' book on the happy 
life, in which a great deal is ascribed to fortune. If this were 
true, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This seems 
to me, so to speak, a softer and more timid line of thought 
than that demanded by the force and dignity of virtue. 
Let us, therefore, cling to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus 
. . . but let us follow Theophrastus in most things, only 
allowing virtue more firmness and strength than he did. . . . 
14 Our own Antiochus seems to me to follow most faithfully 
the opinion of the ancients, which was (he maintains) com- 
mon to Aristotle 1 and to Polemon. 

19 (R3 25, W 19) 

Censor, c. 18. 11. There is, too, a year which Aristotle calls 
not the great but the greatest, which the spheres of the sun, 
the moon, and the five planets complete when they return 
together to the same constellation with which they were 
formerly in conjunction. 

Cic. N.D. 2. 20. 51-52. Most admirable are the motions of 
the five stars which we wrongly call wandering stars. ... It 
is on the basis of their diverse motions that mathematicians 
have given the name of 'great year' to that which is com- 
pleted when the sun, the moon, and the five 'wandering' 
stars, the course of all of them completed, have returned 
to the same relative positions. How long this period is, is 
a great question, but it must be certain and definite. 

Cf. Cic. Hortensius, fr. 35 Miiller; Tac. Dial. 16. 7. 


Tert. De An. 46. How many writers have commented on 
this matter 2 and asserted its existence — Artemon, Antiphon, 

1 Reading Aristotelis, with some MSS. 

2 sc. interpretation of dreams. 


Strato, Philochorus, Epicharmus, Serapion, Cratippus, Diony- 
sius Rhodius, Hermippus, the whole literature of the age! 
If I laugh at anyone it will be at the writer who thought he 
could persuade us that Saturn was the first to dream ; he 
could be this only if he was the first to live. Aristotle, pardon 
my laughter ! 


i (r 2 86, r3 56) 

Plu. Pel. 3. 1. Of the general run of people, as Aristotle says, 
some through meanness do not use their wealth, others 
through extravagance misuse it ; the latter are permanent 
slaves to their pleasures, the former to their business. 

Plu. Mor. 527 a. Aristotle says that some men do not use 
wealth, others misuse it, implying that both are wrong; 
the former get no benefit or grace from what they have, the 
latter derive injury and disgrace. 

2 (R 2 87, R 3 89) 

Cic. Off. 2. 16. 56-57. How much more weight and truth 
there is in Aristotle's reproach to us for not wondering at 
these lavish sums spent on cajoling the mob! That men 
besieged by an enemy should be forced into paying a mina 
for a pint of water, that (he says) seems incredible when we 
first hear of it, and we all marvel at it, but when we consider 
it we pardon their necessity; in these vast and boundless 
expenditures there is nothing that much surprises us, and 
that though there is no relief of necessity, no increase of 
dignity, and the very delight of the multitude is shortlived 
and derived from the meanest objects, and when satiation 
comes the very memory of the pleasure dies. He sums up 
the matter well when he says these things gratify children 
and mere women, slaves and freemen who are like slaves, 
but can in no way be approved by a serious man who weighs 
events with solid judgement. 


Philod. Pap. Here. 3, p. 41, col. 211. Which happened to 
Aristotle (as Metrodorus proved) in respect of the argument, 
in the work On Wealth, to show that the good man is also 
a good money-maker, and the bad man a bad money-maker. 


I (R 2 46, R 3 49, W i) 

Simp, in De Caelo 485. 19-22. That Aristotle has the notion 
of something above reason and being is shown by his saying 
clearly, at the end of his book On Prayer, that God is either 
reason or something even beyond reason. 


$7(^3 A e US T (R 2 82, R3 9 i) 

Stob. 4. 29 A 24. From Aristotle On Good Birth. 'With regard 
to good birth, I for my part am quite at a loss to say whom 
one should call well-born.' 

'Your difficulty ', I said, 'is quite natural; for both among 
the many and even more among the wise there is division 
of opinion and obscurity of statement, particularly about 
the significance of good birth. What I mean is this: Is it 
a precious and good thing, or, as Lycophron the sophist 
wrote, 1 something altogether trivial? Comparing it with 
other goods, he says the attractiveness of good birth is 
obscure, and its dignity a matter of words; i.e. that the 
preference for it is a matter of opinion, and in truth there is 
no difference between the low-born and the well-born.' 

2 (R 2 83, R 3 92) 

Stob. 4. 29 a 25. In the same book. 'Just as it is disputed 
what size is good, 2 so it is disputed who those are who ought 
to be called well-born. Some think it is those born of good 
ancestors, which was the view of Socrates; he said that 
because Aristides was good his daughter was nobly born. 
They say that Simonides, when asked who it is that are 
well-born, said "those whose family has long been rich"; 
but at that rate Theognis' caustic observation is wrong, and 
so is that of the poet who wrote "Mortals honour good birth, 
but marry rather with the rich". 3 Good heavens, is not a 
man who is rich himself preferable to one who had a rich 
great-grandfather or some other rich ancestor, but is himself 
poor ? ' 

'Surely,' he said. 

'And one ought to marry with the rich rather than with 
the well-born; for it is people of long ago that were wcll- 

1 Reading in R. 92. 4 Avx6<f>pa>v 6 oofaorris Zypatpe, with the MSS. 

2 sc. in any given type of thing. 3 Eur. fr. 399 Nauck. 


born, but people of today that are more powerful. Is it not 
much the same, then, if one supposes that it is not those 
born of rich ancestors but those born of good ancestors that 
are well-born ? One would suppose that recent goodness is 
better than ancient, that a man has more in common with 
his father than with his great-grandfather, and that it is 
preferable to be good oneself rather than to have a great- 
grandfather or some other ancestor who was good.' 

' You are right,' he said. 

'Well then, since we see that good birth does not consist 
in either of these things, should we not look elsewhere to 
see what it consists in ? ' 

'We should,' he said. 

"Good" means, I suppose, something praiseworthy and 
excellent; e.g. having a good face or good eyes means, on 
this showing, something excellent or beautiful.' 

'Certainly,' he said. 

' Well then, having a good face means having the goodness 
proper to a face, and having good eyes means having the 
goodness proper to eyes, does it not ? ' 

'Yes,' he said. 

'But one stock is good, another bad and not good.' 

' Certainly,' he said. 

' And we say each thing is good in virtue of the excellence 
proper to it, so that a stock is good in the same way.' 

'Yes,' he said. 

'Clearly, then,' I said, 'good birth is excellence of stock.' 

3 (R2 84, R3 93) 

Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 26 (10). Aristotle says Socrates married 
two wives — first Xanthippe, who bore him Lamprocles, and 
then Myrto, daughter of Aristides the Just, whom he took 
though she had no dowry, and who bore him Sophroniscus 
and Menexenus. 

Plu. Aristid. 27. 2. Demetrius of Phaleron, Hieronymus of 
Rhodes, Aristoxenus the writer on music, and Aristotle (if 
the work On Good Birth is to be reckoned among his genuine 


works) relate that Myrto, granddaughter of Aristides, lived 
with the Sage Socrates, who was married to another woman 
but took Myrto under his protection because she was a 
widow, poor and lacking in the necessities of life. 

Ath. 555 d-556 a. Starting from these facts, one must blame 
those who assign to Socrates two wedded wives, Xanthippe 
and Myrto the daughter of Aristides — not Aristides the Just, 
for the dates do not permit of this, but the third in descent 
from him. These writers are Callisthenes, Demetrius of 
Phaleron, Satyrus the Peripatetic, Aristoxenus; Aristotle 
gave them the keynote by relating this in his work On Good 

4 (R2 85, R3 94) 

Stob. 4. 29 c 52. From Aristotle's work On Good Birth. 'It 
is evident, then', I said, 'from our previous discussion, why 
those born of a long line of rich or good ancestors are thought 
to be better born than those whose possession of these ad- 
vantages is recent. A man's own goodness is nearer to him 
than that of a grandfather, and on that basis it would be the 
good man that is well-born. And some writers have said this, 
claiming to disprove by this argument the merits of good 
birth ; Euripides, for example, says 1 that good birth belongs 
not to those whose ancestors have long been good, but to 
him who is himself good, simply. That is not so ; those are 
right who give the preference to ancient virtue. Let us state 
the reasons for this. Good birth is excellence of stock, and 
excellence belongs to good men ; and a good stock is one in 
which there have been many good men. Now this happens 
when the stock has had a good origin ; for an origin has the 
power of producing many products like itself; this is the 
function of an origin — to produce many results like itself. 
When, then, there has been one man of this kind in the 
stock, a man so good that many generations inherit his good- 
ness, that stock is bound to be good. There will be many good 
men if the stock is human, many good horses if it is equine, 

1 fr. 345 Nauck. 


and so too with the other animals. Thus it is natural that not 
rich men nor good men, but those whose ancestors have long 
been rich or good, should be well-born. The argument has 
its eye on the truth ; the origin counts more than anything 
else. Yet not even those born of good ancestors are in every 
case well-born, but only those who have among their ances- 
tors originators. When a man is good himself, but has not 
the natural power to beget many like him, the origin has not 
in such a case the power we have ascribed to it. 

'. . . People are well-born if they come of such a stock — not 
if their father is well-born, but if the originator of the stock 
is so. For it is not by his own strength that a father begets 
a good man, but because he came of such a stock.' 


I 1 (R 2 72, R 3 83) 

Ath. 6 d. Others call Philoxenus a fish-lover, but Aristotle 
calls him simply a dinner-lover. He also writes somewhere 
as follows: 'When they are making speeches to crowded 
audiences they spend the whole day in relating marvels, and 
that to people who have just returned from the Phasis or 
the Borysthenes, 2 when they have themselves read nothing 
but Philoxenus' Banquet, and not the whole of that.' 

1 Rose places this fragment under the work On Justice, but it seems to have 
no connexion with that subject. It is in connexion with the love of bodily 
pleasures that Philoxenus is mentioned in Eth. Eud. i23i a 5-i7, and alluded 
to in Eth. Nic. in8 a 32- b i, so that the description of him as a dinner-lover 
is more likely to have occurred in the dialogue On Pleasure. In what work of 
Aristotle the words actually quoted by Athenaeus occurred, it is impossible 
to say. 

2 The Rion or the Dnieper. 


1 (R 2 51, R 3 62) 

Plu. Mor. 734 d. Floras was full of problems himself, and 
he used to share them with his associates, bearing witness 
to Aristotle's saying that much learning brings many 

2 (R 2 52, R 3 63) 

Diog. Laert. 9. 8. 53 (4). Protagoras was the first to discover 
the so-called ' knot ' on which porters carry their burdens — so 
Aristotle says in his work On Education ; for Protagoras was 
a porter, as Epicurus also says somewhere. It was in this 
way that Protagoras was brought to the notice of Demo- 
critus, who saw how he had bound his logs together. 

Cf. Ath. 354 c. 



Cic. Att. 12. 40. 2. I often try a letter of advice ; l I find noth- 
ing to say. I have, indeed, with me the books both of Aris- 
totle and of Theopompus addressed to Alexander. But what 
resemblance is there ? They wrote what was both honourable 
to them and acceptable to Alexander ; do you find anything 
of that sort here ? 

Ibid. 13. 28. 2. Nothing comes into my mind. You see what 
the advice sent to Alexander by eloquent and learned men 
is concerned with. They exhort to honourable conduct 2 a 
young man kindled by desire for the truest glory, wishing 
for some advice that shall redound to his eternal praise. 

Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. 9 b). Those works are 'per- 
sonal' which were written to some individual in particular, 
as for instance letters or what Aristotle wrote at the request 
of Alexander of Macedon about kingship and about the right 
way of establishing colonies. 

I (R 2 78, R3 646) 

Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. 56). Aristotle wrote to 
Alexander also about kingship, in a one-volume book, in- 
structing him how he ought to rule. 

Vit. Arist Marc. p. 430. 15-431. 2 (Rose). In order to confer 
a benefit on all men, Aristotle writes a book addressed to 
Alexander on kingship, instructing him how he should rule. 
This had such an effect on Alexander's mind that when he 
had failed to confer a benefit on anyone he said: 'Today 
I have not been king; I have done good to no one.' 

1 To Caesar. 

2 Reading in R. 408. 24 cohortantur ad decus, with the MSS. 

645.29 F 



2 (r 2 79, R 3 647) 

Them. Or. 107 c-d. Plato, even if in all other respects he 
was divine and admirable, was completely reckless when he 
uttered this saying, that evils would never cease for men 
until either philosophers became rulers, or kings became 
philosophers. His saying has been refuted and has paid its 
account to time. We should do honour to Aristotle, who 
slightly altered Plato's words and made his counsel truer; 
he said that it was not merely unnecessary for a king to be 
a philosopher, but even a disadvantage ; what he should do 
was to listen to and take the advice of true philosophers, 
since then he filled his reign with good deeds, not with good 


i (r 2 8o, r 3 648) 
Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. gb). See p. 65 supra. 

2 (R 2 81, R 3 658) 

Plu. Mbr. 329 b. Alexander did not do as Aristotle advised — 
play the part of a leader to the Greeks and of a master to the 
barbarians, care for the former as friends and kinsmen, and 
treat the latter as beasts or plants, and so fill his reign with 
wars, banishments, and factions ; he behaved alike to all. 

Strabo i. 4. 9, p. C 66. At the conclusion of his memoran- 
dum, Eratosthenes refuses to praise those who divided the 
whole human race into two — Greeks and barbarians — and 
advised Alexander to treat Greeks as friends, but barbarians 
as enemies ; he says it is better to draw the division between 
virtue and vice. . . . Alexander did not ignore his advisers 
but took their advice and acted accordingly, looking to the 
intention of those who had sent it. 



Cic. Fin. 5. 4. 11. Aristotle and Theophrastus had, each of 
them, taught what sort of man the ruler in a state should be. 

I (R 2 70, R 3 78) 

Cic. Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1. When these books were being read over 
to me in my Tusculan villa in the hearing of Sallust, I was 
advised by him that something much more authoritative 
could be said on these matters if I were myself to speak 
about the state ; especially because I was not a Heraclides 
Ponticus but a man of consular rank and one versed in the 
greatest affairs of state. What I put into the mouth of such 
ancient authorities would be seen to be fictitious. . . . Finally, 
he remarked that Aristotle himself says in his own name 
what he has to say about the state and the rule of it by the 
outstanding 1 man. 

2 (R3 79) 

Syrian, in Metaph. 168. 33-35. At all events Aristotle in the 
second book of his Politicus says expressly . . . ' The good is 
the most accurate measure of all things'. 

3 (R 2 94-95, R3 80) 

Sen. De Ira 1. 3. 3. Aristotle's definition is not far removed 
from ours ; he says anger is the desire to repay pain. 

Ibid. 1. 9. 2. Anger, Aristotle says, is necessary, nor can any 
battle be won without it — unless it fills the mind and kindles 
the spirit. But we must treat it not as a commander but as 
a soldier. 

1 Reading praestanti, with Wesenberg. 


Ibid. 1. 17. 1. Aristotle says certain passions serve as weapons, 
if we use them aright. 

Ibid. 3. 3. 1. But, as I have said in former books, Aristotle 
stands as the defender of anger and forbids the expulsion of 
it from our nature. He says it is the spur to virtme, and if it 
is taken from us the mind becomes unarmed, and too sluggish 
and inert for great endeavours. . . 5. There is, then, no reason 
why you should think that I am wasting time on useless 
matters, and that anger is disgraceful, as though it were a 
thing of doubtful repute among men, when there is someone, 
a famous philosopher indeed, who assigns definite functions 
to it, and invokes it as useful, and as supplying spirit for 
battle, for active life, for everything that demands a certain 

Ibid. 1. 7. 1. Is anger to be called to our aid? It has often 
been useful. It raises and excites the spirits ; courage does 
nothing splendid in war without it — nothing unless it is in- 
flamed by anger, unless anger has goaded men into boldness 
in face of danger. Some therefore think it best to temper 
anger, not to root it out ; to reduce it to healthy proportions 
by eradicating what is excessive, but to retain that without 
which action would languish and the force and vigour of the 
mind be relaxed. 

Cic. Tusc. 4. 19. 43. What shall we say of the Peripatetic 
view that those perturbations which we think should be 
extirpated are not only natural, but even a useful gift of 
nature ? This is what they say: First, they say much in praise 
of anger ; they call it the whetstone of courage and say that, 
whether it be against an enemy or against a bad citizen, the 
reaction of an angry man is far more vigorous. They make 
light of the petty reasonings of those whose thoughts took 
this form: 'It is right that this battle be fought ; it is fitting 
to fight for law, for liberty, for country.' These thoughts, 
they say, have no force unless courage is fanned into a blaze 
by anger. Nor do they argue only about soldiers in battle ; 
they think no strict discipline is possible without some 


bitterness of anger. Finally, they think little of a speaker 
unless, in defence as well as in attack, he feels the sting of 
anger. Even if anger is not there, they think it must be 
simulated in language and in gesture, that the speaker's 
action may kindle the hearer's anger. In short, they say he 
seems no man who does not know how to be angry, and what 
we call mildness they call by the opprobrious name of 
sluggishness. Nor, indeed, is it only this craving that they 
praise — for anger, as I have just denned it, is craving for 
revenge — they say that craving or desire in general is a most 
useful gift of nature, since no one can do supremely well what 
he does not desire to do. . . . 20. 45. They say that pain 
itself ... is established by nature to a most useful end, in 
order that in their ill-doing men should feel the suffering of 
punishment, blame, and disgrace. For those who bear with- 
out pain disgrace and infamy seem to be granted immunity 
for their sins ; it is better to suffer the gnawing of conscience. 
. . . 46. They say the other forms of pain also have their 
uses ; pity leads men to help others and relieve undeserved 
suffering ; even envy and disparagement are not without use, 
when one sees that one has gained less than another, or that 
another has gained as much as oneself ; if anyone took from 
us fear, he would take with it all diligence, which is greatest 
in those who fear the laws, the magistrates, poverty, dis- 
grace, death, pain. In their discussions they admit that 
desires must be pruned, but say that they neither can nor 
need be completely uprooted, and that in almost all things 
the mean is the best. 

Philod. De Ira, p. 65. 31-66. 2 (Wilke). Some at least of the 
Peripatetics, as we have previously indicated by reference 
to individuals, say that those who remove anger and temper 
cut outright the sinews of the soul ; that without these things 
there would be neither punishment nor vengeance . . . that 
men would not engage in wars without anger, which makes 
them bold and takes away all shrinking and cowardice, and 
makes men steadfast even to death. So, too, anger produces 
the spirit of vengeance on enemies, 1 the existence of which 

1 Reading in R. 84. 33-85. 1 TtuwprjTiKov ra>v exdpwv, with Wilke. 


is noble, just, privately and publicly advantageous, and 
pleasant to boot. 


Philod. Voll. Rhet. 2. 175, fr. 15. 1-6. A hare that makes its 
appearance among hounds cannot escape (Aristotle says), nor 
can that which is deemed shameless and despicable survive 
among men. 


Pap. Herc. 1020. From these facts, they say, it follows that 
wise men (as Aristotle says) cannot be deceived or err, and 
do all things well. 



Arist. Poet. I454 b i5-i8. All these rules one must keep in 
mind throughout, and, further, those also for such points of 
stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since 
in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, 
has been said on the subject in our published writings. 

Vita Arist. Marciana p. 427. 3-7 (Rose). While he was still 
young, he received the education of a free man, as is shown 
by his Homeric Questions, by the edition of the Iliad which 
he gave to Alexander, by the dialogue On Poets, the Poetics, 
and the rhetorical treatises. 

Cf. Vita Arist. vulgo (ante ps.-Ammon. in Cat). 

Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1: see p. 3 supra. 

1 (r 2 59, R3 70) 

Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 57-58 (3). In his work On Poets Aristotle 
describes Empedocles as Homeric, and an artist in language, 
skilled in metaphor and in the other devices of poetry; he 
adds that Empedocles wrote, besides other poems, one on 
Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont, and a prelude to Apollo, 
but that a sister — or, as Hieronyrnus says, a daughter — 
burned the prelude by accident, and the Persian poem in- 
tentionally, because it was unfinished. Aristotle adds, in 
general terms, that he also wrote tragedies and works on 

2 (R 2 60, R 3 71) 

Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 51-52 (1). Empedocles, according to 
Hippobotus, was the son of Meton son of Empedocles, and 
belonged to Agrigentum. . . . Eratosthenes in his list of 


Olympic winners says that Meton's father was successful in 
the seventy-first Olympiad ; his authority is Aristotle. Apol- 
lodorus the grammarian in his chronicles says Empedocles 
'was the son of Meton, and Glaucus says he went to Thurii 
just after its foundation'. Then a little later he says: 'Those 
who relate that he fled from home to Syracuse and fought 
with the Syracusans against the Athenians seem to me to 
be completely mistaken; for he was either no longer alive 
or in extreme old age, which, however, does not seem to 
have been the case. For Aristotle and also Heraclides say 
he died at the age of sixty.' The Empedocles who won a 
horse-race in the seventy-first Olympiad was his grandfather 
and namesake, so that Apollodorus indicates his date as well 
as his parentage. 

Cf. ibid. 8. 2. 74 (n). 

3 (R 2 6i, R 3 72) 

Diog. Laert. 3. 48 (32). It is said that Zeno the Eleatic was 
the first to write dialogues ; but Aristotle in the first book of 
his work On Poets says it was Alexamenos of Styra or of 
Teos, as Favorinus also says in his Memoirs. But Plato seems 
to me, by bringing the genre to perfection, to deserve the 
first prize for the invention, as well as for the beauty of his 

Ath. 505 b-c. The writer who has utterly condemned the 
others 1 recounts the praises of Meno ; in the Republic he 
banishes Homer and imitative poetry, but he himself wrote 
his dialogues in an imitative way. He was not even the in- 
ventor of this type; for before him Alexamenos of Teos 
invented this type of writing, as Nicias of Nicaea and Sotion 
testify. Aristotle in his work On Poets writes thus: 'Are we 
then to deny that the so-called mimes of Sophron, which 
are not even in metre, 2 are stories and imitations, or the 
dialogues of Alexamenos of Teos, which were written before 3 

1 i.e. Plato. 

2 Reading in R. 78. 11 iixfierpovs ovras rovs, with Kaibel. 

3 Reading in R. 78. 13 -rrporepov, suggested by Kaibel. 


the Socratic dialogues ? ' Thus the great savant Aristotle says 
outright that Alexamenos wrote dialogues before Plato. 

4 (R 2 62, R3 73) 

Diog. Laert. 3. 37 (25). Aristotle says that the genre of 
Plato's dialogues lies between poetry and prose. 

5 (R 2 63, R3 81) 

Procl. in Remp. 1. 42. 2 (Kroll). We must first mention and 
discuss Plato's reason for not admitting poetry. ... 10. 
Secondly, what can be the reason why he specially excludes 
tragedy and comedy, though these contribute to the purifica- 
tion of the passions, which can neither be completely re- 
pelled nor safely gratified to the full, but need seasonable 
exercise, the achievement of which in listening to drama 
saves us from being troubled by them at other times? . . . 
49. 13. The second point was that the expulsion of tragedy 
and comedy is paradoxical, since b}' means of them it is 
possible to gratify the passions in due measure and, by doing 
so, to have them at our service for the purpose of education, 
having cured what was diseased in them. This objection, 
which gave to Aristotle a great handle for criticism, and to 
the defenders of these forms of poetry a starting-point for 
their arguments against Plato, we shall, in continuation of 
what we have already said, refute. ... 50. 17-26. We shall 
agree, then, that the statesman must devise some outlets 
for these passions, but not so as to intensify our leanings 
towards them ; on the contrary, so as to bridle them and keep 
the exercise of them within due limits; but these forms of 
poetry, which in addition to their garishness make an un- 
measured appeal to these passions, are far from serving the 
purpose of purification ; for purification depends not on excess 
but on restrained exercise, and has little likeness to the 
passions which it purifies. 

Iambl. Myst. 1. 11 (Parthey). The powers of the human 
passions in us, hemmed in everywhere, wax stronger, but if 
they are permitted a modest exercise, within the limits of 


due proportion, they have a measured enjoyment and are 
satisfied, and being thereby purified they come to a stop 
in obedience to persuasion, and not to force. Therefore, both 
in comedy and in tragedy, by looking at the passions of 
others we stay our own passions, make them more moderate, 
and purify them. 

Ibid. 3. 9. This is by no means to be called an elimination, or 
a purification and a cure ; for it is innate in us not as a result 
of disease or superfluity or excess; it is divine. 

6 (r2 64, R3 74) 

Macr. 5. 18. 16. That it was the custom of the Aetolians to 
go to war with only one foot shod is shown by the famous 
tragic writer Euripides, in whose tragedy Meleager a messen- 
ger is introduced describing the dress of each of the captains 
who had come together to capture the boar. . . 19. In this 
matter ... we shall not fail to point out a fact known to 
very few, that Euripides was criticized by Aristotle, who 
maintained that this was Euripides' ignorance ; the Aetolians 
had not their left foot bare, but their right. That I may not 
make an assertion without proving it I will quote the very 
words of Aristotle in the second book 1 of his work On Poets, 
where he says this about Euripides : ' Euripides says the sons 
of Thestius went with their left foot unshod — "In their left 
step they were unshod of foot, while the right was shod — so 
that they should have one knee light". The custom of the 
Aetolians is just the opposite; their left foot is shod, the 
right unshod, I suppose because the leading foot should be 
light but not that which remains fixed.' 

7 (R2 65, R^ 75) 

Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 46. Socrates had as rivals (so Aristotle 
says in the third book of his work on poetry) a certain 
Antilochus of Lemnos and Antiphon the soothsayer, as 
Pythagoras had Cylon of Croton ; Homer while alive had 
Syagrus, and when dead Xenophanes of Colophon. Hesiod 
1 Reading in R. 79. 3 secundum scripsit, with Eyssenhardt. 


when alive had Cecrops, and after death the aforesaid 
Xenophanes; Pindar had Amphimenes 1 of Cos, Thales had 
Pherecydes, Bias had Salarus of Priene, Pittacus had Anti- 
menidas and Alcaeus, Anaxagoras had Sosibius, and Simo- 
nides had Timocreon. 

8 (R 2 66, R^ 76) 

Ps.-Plu. Vit. Horn. 3-4. Aristotle in the third book of his 
work on poetry says that in the island of Ios, at the time 
when Neleus the son of Codrus ruled this Ionic colony, a 
certain girl who was a native of the island became pregnant 
by a spirit which was one of the companions of the Muses 
in the dance. When she saw the signs of her pregnancy she 
was ashamed of what had happened and betook herself to 
a place called Aegina. Pirates raided the place, captured the 
girl, and took her to Smyrna, which was then under 
the Lydians ; this they did as a favour to Maeon, who was the 
king of Lydia and their friend. He fell in love with the girl 
for her beauty and married her. While she was living near 
the Meles the birth-pangs came upon her and she gave birth 
to Homer on the bank of the river. Maeon adopted him and 
brought him up as his own son, Critheis having died im- 
mediately after her delivery. Not long after, Maeon himself 
died. When the Lydians were being oppressed by the 
Aeolians and had decided to leave Smyrna, and their leaders 
had called on any who wished to follow them to leave the 
town, Homer (still an infant) said he too wished to follow ; 
for which reason he was called Homer 2 instead of Melesigenes. 
When he had grown up and already become famous for 
his poetry, he asked the god who were his ancestors and 
whence he came, and the god replied thus : ' Ios is thy mother's 
native island, which will receive thee dead ; but beware of 
the riddle of young men.' . . . Not long after, while sail- 
ing to Thebes, to the festival of Kronos (this is a musical 
contest which they hold), he came to Ios. Here he sat on a 
rock and watched the fishermen sailing in, and asked them 

1 Reading in R. 79. 17 '^^i/xe'n?j, with the MSS. 

2 6fiT)peiv — "O/irjpos. 


if they had anything. They had caught nothing, but were 
picking lice off themselves, 1 and owing to the difficulty of 
this chase they replied : ' What we caught we left ; what we 
did not catch we bring with us', intimating that the lice they 
had caught they had killed and left behind, and those they 
had not caught they were carrying in their clothing. Homer 
failed to interpret the riddle and died of discouragement. 
The people of Ios buried him and inscribed on his tomb the 
high-sounding words: 'Here earth covers the sacred head, 
Homer, divine glorifier of heroes.' 

Cf. Gell. 3. 11. 7 and Homeri Opera, ed. Allen, 5. 244, 247, 

Rose's fr. 77 is omitted, because it seems to belong not 
to the dialogue On Poets, but to the lost second book of the 

1 Reading in R. 80. 22 <j>9eiplt,eo9at., with most of the MSS. 



Philod. Piet. 7 b 4~8. 
On Philosophy. 

in the third book of Aristotle's work 

Prisc. Lydus 41. 16-42. 3. Our materials have been taken 
and put together from Plato's Timaeus . . . and from Aris- 
totle's Physics, De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and 
Meteorologica, and similarly from the De Somno and the De 
Somniis, and from what he wrote in dialogue form On Philo- 
sophy and On the Worlds. 

Simp, in De Caelo 288. 31-289. 2: see p. 5 supra. 

Ascl. in Metaph. 112. 16-19. 'About the first principles' 
(Aristotle says) 'we have already spoken in the Physics' ; and 
he promises to speak about these in Book a, 1 and to raise 
and solve the problems about them in the work On Philosophy. 

1 (R 2 4, R 3 I, W i) 

Plu. Mor. 1 1 18 c. Of the inscriptions at Delphi that which 
was thought to be the most inspired was ' Know thyself ' ; it 
was this, as Aristotle has said in his Platonic works, 2 that 
induced in Socrates this mood of uncertainty and questioning. 

2 (R 2 3, R 3 2, W 2) 

Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 23 (7). Aristotle says that Socrates went 
to Delphi; but also to the Isthmus, as Favorinus relates in 
the first book of his Memoirs. 

3 (r 2 5, R 3 3, w 3) 

Porph. apud Stob. 3. 21. 26. What and whose was the sacred 

injunction at Delphi, which bids him who is to seek anything 

1 Of the Metaphysics. 2 i.e. his dialogues. 


from the god to know himself ? . . . Whether it was Phemonoe . . . 
or Phanothea ... or Bias or Thales or Chilon that set it up . . . 
or whether we should give credence rather to Clearchus, who 
says the injunction was that of the Pythian oracle and was 
given to Chilon when he inquired what it was best for men to 
learn ; or whether even before the time of Chilon it was al- 
ready inscribed in the temple that was founded after the 
temple of feathers 1 and that of bronze, as Aristotle has said 
in his work On Philosophy . . . 

Clem. Al. Strom. 1. 14. 60. 3. The saying 'Know thyself 
some have ascribed to Chilon, while Chameleon in his work 
on the gods ascribes it to Thales, and Aristotle ascribes it 
to the Pythian priestess. 

4 (R 2 6, R3 4, w 4) 

Clem. Al. Strom. 1. 14. 61. 1. Again, the saying 'Nothing in 
excess!' is ascribed to Chilon the Lacedaemonian. . . . 'Give 
a pledge, and ruin waits you' is cited by Cleomenes in his 
work on Hesiod. . . . The Aristotelian tradition ascribes it to 
Chilon, while Didymus assigns the advice to Thales. 

5 (r 2 7, R^ 5, w 5) 

Etymol. Magn. 722. 16-17 (Sylburg) s.v. ao^tarr-qs. Properly 
one who practises sophistry ; but Aristotle uses it of the 
Seven Sages. 

6 (r 2 8, 29, R3 6, 34, w 6) 

Diog. Laert. 1 Prooem. 8 (6). Aristotle in the first book of 
his work On Philosophy says that the Magi are more ancient 
even than the Egyptians, and that according to them there 
are two first principles, a good spirit and an evil spirit, one 
called Zeus and Oromasdes, the other Hades and Areimanius. 

Pliny, N.H. 30. 3. The art of magic undoubtedly began with 
Zoroaster in Persia, as the authorities agree. But it is not 

1 Cf. Paus. 10. 5. 9 'The second temple was made by bees out of wax and 


quite clear whether there was only one Zoroaster, or a later 
one as well. Eudoxus, who claimed it to be the most illus- 
trious and most beneficial of the sects of philosophy, related 
that this Zoroaster lived six thousand years before the death 
of Plato; Aristotle agrees. 

Plu. Mor. 370 c. Of the planets, which they call the gods of 
birth, the Chaldaeans describe two as beneficent, two as 
maleficent, the other three as intermediate and neutral. . . . 
Aristotle calls the one form, the other privation. 

7 (r 2 9, R3 7, w 7) 

Philop. in De An. 186. 14-16. Aristotle says 'so-called' 
because the poems are thought not to be the work of Orpheus ; 
Aristotle himself maintains this in the books On Philosophy ; 
the opinions are those of Orpheus, but it is said 1 that 
Onomacritus spun them out in verse. 

Cic. N.D. 1. 38. 107. Aristotle says the poet Orpheus never 
existed ; the Pythagoreans ascribe this Orphic poem to a 
certain Cercon. 2 

8 (r 2 2, r 3 13, W 8) 

Synes. Calvit. Enc. 22. 85 c. ... if indeed a proverb is a wise 
thing; and why should those things not be wise which 
Aristotle describes as relics, saved by their conciseness and 
cleverness when ancient philosophy perished in the wide- 
spread destruction of mankind ? 

Philoponus in Nicom. Isagogen 1. 1. Wisdom (oofta) was 
so called as being a sort of clearness (cra^eia) , inasmuch as it 
makes all things clear. This clearness, being, as it were, some- 
thing light ((f>aes), has acquired its name from that of light 
(cj)dos, <j>a>s), because it brings hidden things to light. Since, 
then, as Aristotle says, things intelligible and divine, even 
if they are most clear in their own nature, seem to us dark 

1 Reading in R. 26. 19 4>aaiv, with Hayduck. 

2 Reading in R. 26. 22 Cerconis, with the MSS. 


and dim because of the mist of the body which hangs over 
us, men naturally gave to the knowledge which brings these 
things into the light for us the name of wisdom. But since we 
use the words 'wisdom' and 'wise' in a general way, it must 
be realized that these words are ambiguous. They have been 
taken by the ancients in five ways, which Aristotle mentions 
in his ten books On Philosophy. For you must know that men 
perish in diverse ways — both by plagues and famines and 
earthquakes and wars and various diseases and by other 
causes, but above all by more violent cataclysms, such as 
that in the time of Deucalion is said to have been ; it was 
a great cataclysm but not the greatest of all. For herdsmen 
and those who have their occupation in the mountains or 
the foothills are saved, while the plains and the dwellers in 
them are engulfed ; so, at least, they say that Dardanus was 
swept by the flood from Samothrace to what was afterwards 
called Troy, and thus was saved. Those who are saved from the 
water must live on the uplands, as the poet shows when he 
says: 'First Zeus the cloud-gatherer begat Dardanus, and 
he stablished Dardania, for not yet was holy Ilios built upon 
the plain to be a city of mortal men, but still they dwelt on 
slopes of many-fountained Ida. 1 The word 'still' shows that 
they had not yet courage to live in the plains. These survivors, 
then, not having the means of sustenance, were forced by 
necessity to think of useful devices — the grinding of corn, 
sowing, and the like — and they gave the name of wisdom to 
such thought, thought which discovered what was useful 
with a view to the necessities of life, and the name of wise 
to anyone who had had such thoughts. Again, they devised 
arts, as the poet says, 'at the prompting of Athene' — arts 
not limited to the necessities of life, but going on to the 
production of beauty and elegance ; and this again men have 
called wisdom, and its discoverer wise, as in the phrase 'A 
wise craftsman framed it', 2 'knowing well by Athene's 
promptings of wisdom '. 3 For, because of the excellence of the 
discoveries, they ascribed the thought of these things to God. 
Again, they turned their attention to politics, and invented 

1 Horn. //. 20. 215-18. 2 Cf. ibid. 23. 712. 

3 Cf. ibid. 15. 412, Od. 16. 233. 
< 1 . j'.i G 


laws, and all the things that hold a state together ; and such 
thought also they called wisdom ; for such were the Seven 
Wise Men — men who attained political virtues. Then they 
went farther and proceeded to bodies themselves and the 
nature that fashions them, and this they called by the 
special name of natural science, and its possessors we describe 
as wise in the affairs of nature. Fifthly, men applied the name 
in connexion with things divine, supramundane, and com- 
pletely unchangeable, and called the knowledge of these 
things the highest wisdom. 

9 (w 9) 

Sext. Em p. Phys. 2. 45-46. Some say that movement exists, 
others deny this . . . namely the followers of Parmenides and 
Melissus, whom Aristotle has called immobilists 1 and non- 
physical thinkers — immobilists because they maintain the 
immobility of being, non-physical because nature is the 
source of movement, and in saying that nothing moves they 
denied the existence of nature. 

10 (R 2 10, R 3 8, W 10) 

Procl. apud Philop. De Aet. Mundi, p. 31. 17 (Rabe). It 
looks as though there were nothing in Plato that Aristotle 
rejected so firmly as the theory of Ideas, not only in his 
logical writings ... 20 but also in his ethical writings ... 21 
and in his physical writings ... 32. 1 and much more in his 
Metaphysics . . . 5-8 and in his dialogues, where he asseverates 
most clearly that he cannot agree with this doctrine, even 
if he lays himself open to the charge of opposing it from love 
of polemic. 

Plu. Mor. 1 1 15 b-c: see p. 4 supra. 

11 (R 2 11, R 3 9, W 11) 

Syrian- in Metaph. 159. 33-160. 5. Aristotle himself admits 
that he has said nothing against the hypotheses of the 

1 Omitting ttJs <f>voecos, with some MSS. This seems to be a punning use of 
the word oto.oiu)tt]s. 


Platonists and quite fails to keep pace with the doctrine of the 
ideal numbers, if these are different from the mathematical. 
This is shown by the words in the second book of the 
work On Philosophy: 'Thus if the Ideas are a different sort 
of number, not mathematical number, we can have no under- 
standing of it ; for of the majority of us, at all events, who 
comprehends any other number ? ' Thus in fact he has 
addressed his refutation to the multitude who know no num- 
ber other than that which is composed of units, and did not 
begin to grasp the thought of these divine thinkers. 

Alex. Aph. in Metaph. 117. 23-118. 1. Aristotle sets out the 
Platonic dogma, which he has also stated in the work On 
Philosophy. Wishing to reduce realities (which is what he 
always means by ' substances ') to the first principles which 
they assumed (the great and the small, which they called the 
indefinite dyad), they said the first principles of length were 
the short and long (the assumption being that length takes 
its origin from a long and short, i.e. from a great and small, 
or that every line falls under one or other of these) , and that 
the first principles of the plane were the narrow and wide, 
which are themselves also great and small. 

Arist. De An. 404 b i6-24. In the same way Plato, in the 
Timaeus, fashions the soul out of his elements ; for like, he 
holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the 
principles or elements. 1 Similarly also in the work On Philo- 
sophy it was set forth that the Animal itself is compounded 
of the Idea itself of the One together with the primary 
length, breadth, and depth, everything else 2 being similarly 
constituted. Again, he puts his view in yet other terms: 
Mind is the monad, knowledge the dyad (because it goes 
undeviatingly from one point to another), opinion the num- 
ber of the plane, sensation the number of the solid. 

Simp, in De An. 28. 7-9. Aristotle now applies the name On 
Philosophy to his work On the Good (taken down from plato's 

1 sc. so that the soul must be so too. 

2 sc. the objects of its cognition. 


lectures), in which he relates both the Pythagorean opinions 
about reality and those of Plato. 

Cf. Philop. in De An. 75. 34-76. 1 (see p. 116 infra). 

Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 777. 16-21. The principle of the One 
they did not all introduce in the same way. Some said that 
the numbers themselves introduced the Forms into spatial 
magnitudes, the number 2 doing so for the line, the number 3 
for the plane, the number 4 for the solid (Aristotle relates 
this about Plato in the work On Philosophy, and that is why 
he here summarizes only briefly and concisely the theory of 
the Platonists) ; while others explained the form of the 
spatial magnitudes by participation in the One. 

12 a (r 2 12, R 3 10, w 12a) 

Sext. Emp. Phys. 1. 20-23. Aristotle used to say that men's 
thought of gods sprang from two sources — the experiences 
of the soul, and the phenomena of the heavens. To the first 
head belonged the inspiration and prophetic power of the 
soul in dreams. For when (he says) the soul is isolated in 
sleep, it assumes its true nature and foresees and foretells 
the future. So is it too with the soul, when at death it is 
severed from the body. At all events, Aristotle accepts even 
Homer as having observed this ; for Homer has represented 
Patroclus, in the moment of his death, as foretelling the death 
of Hector, and Hector as foretelling the end of Achilles. It 
was from such events (he says) that men came to suspect 
the existence of something divine, 1 of that which is in its 
nature akin to the soul and of all things most full of know- 
ledge. But the heavenly bodies also contributed to this be- 
lief ; seeing by day the sun running his circular course, and 
by night the well-ordered movement of the other stars, they 
came to think that there is a God who is the cause of such 
movement and order. Such was the belief of Aristotle. 

Cic. Div. ad Brut. 1. 30. 63. When, therefore, sleep has freed 
the mind from the society and contact of the body, then it 

1 Reading in R. 28. 13 detov, with Mutschmann. 


remembers the past, discerns the present, and foresees the 
future ; for the body of a sleeper lies like that of a dead man, 
but his mind is active and alive . . . and so when death 
approaches it is much more divine. . . . 64. That dying men 
have foreknowledge Posidonius confirms by the example he 
adduces. . . . Another instance of this is Homer's Hector, 
who when dying announces the approaching death of 

12 b (r 2 13, R 3 II, W 12 b) 

Sext. Emp. Math. 9 (Phys. 1) 26-27. Some men, when they come 
to the unswerving and well-ordered movement of the heavenly 
bodies, say that in this the thought of gods had its origin ; 
for as, if one had sat on the Trojan Mount Ida and seen the 
array of the Greeks approaching the plains in good order 
and arrangement, 'horsemen first with horses and chariots, 
and footmen behind', 1 such a one would certainly have come 
to think that there was someone arranging such an array and 
commanding the soldiers ranged under him, Nestor or some 
other hero who knew 'how to order horses and bucklered 
warriors'. 2 And as one familiar with ships, as soon as he 
sees from afar a ship running before the wind with all its 
sails well set, knows that there is someone directing it and 
steering it 3 to its appointed harbours, so those who first 
looked up to heaven and saw the sun running its race from 
its rising to its setting, and the orderly dances of the stars, 
looked for the Craftsman of this lovely design, and surmised 
that it came about not by chance but by the agency of some 
mightier and imperishable nature, which was God. 

13 (R 2 14, R3 12, W 13) 

Cic. N.D. 2. 37. 95-96. Great was the saying of Aristotle: 
' Suppose there were men who had lived always underground, 
in good and well-lighted dwellings, adorned with statues and 
pictures, and furnished with everything in which those who 
are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that they had 

1 Horn. //. 4. 297. 2 Ibid. 2. 554. 

3 Reading in R. 29. 6 Ka.Ta.ywv, with Mutschmann. 


never gone above ground, but had learned by report and 
hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose 
that then, at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and 
they were able to escape and make their way from those 
hidden dwellings into these regions which we inhabit. When 
they suddenly saw earth and seas and sky, when they learned 
the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, when they 
saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the 
power shown in his filling the sky with light and making 
day ; when, again, night darkened the lands and they saw 
the whole sky picked out and adorned with stars, and the 
varying lights of the moon as it waxes and wanes, and the 
risings and settings of all these bodies, and their courses 
settled and immutable to all eternity ; when they saw those 
things, most certainly they would have judged both that 
there are gods and that these great works are the works 
of gods.' Thus far Aristotle. 

Philo, Leg. Alleg. 3. 32. 97-99. The earliest thinkers inquired 
how we came to recognize the divine. Later, the most highly 
esteemed philosophers said that it was from the world and 
its parts and the powers inherent in these that we came to 
grasp their cause. If one saw a house carefully furnished with 
entrances, colonnades, men's quarters, women's quarters, and 
all the other buildings, he would acquire an idea of the archi- 
tect, since he would reflect that the house could not have been 
completed without the art of a craftsman ; and so too with 
a city, a ship, or any structure small or great. So also if one 
comes into this world as into a vast house or city, and sees 
the heavens revolving in a circle and containing all things 
within them, planets and unwandering stars moving uni- 
formly in orderly and harmonious fashion for the good of 
the whole, earth occupying the midmost region, streams of 
water and air in between, living things also, mortal and 
immortal, varieties of plants and crops ; he will surely reason 
that these things have not been framed without perfect skill, 
but that there both was and is a framer of this universe — 
God. Those, then, who reason thus grasp God by way of his 
shadow, apprehending the Craftsman through his works. 


Cf. Philo, De Praem. et Poen. 7. 40-46, De Spec. Leg. 1. 35. 
185-36. 194. 

14 (r 2 44, R3 14, w 14) 

Sen. Q.N. 7. 30. Aristotle says excellently that we should 
nowhere be more modest than in matters of religion. If we 
compose ourselves before we enter temples . . . how much 
more should we do this when we discuss the constellations, 
the stars, and the nature of the gods, 1 to guard against 
saying anything rashly and imprudently, either not knowing 
it to be true or knowing it to be false ! 

Cf. Plu. Mor. 477 c-f. 

15 (R 2 45> R3I5, w 15) 

Synesius, Dio. 10. 48 a. ... as Aristotle claims that those 
who are being initiated into the mysteries are to be expected 
not to learn anything but to suffer some change, to be put 
into a certain condition, i.e. to be fitted for some purpose. 

Michael Psellus, Schol. ad Joh. Climacum {Cat. des Man. 
Alch. Grecs, ed. Bidez, 1928), 6. 171. I undertook to teach 
you what I have learned, not what I have experienced . . . the 
one is matter for teaching, the other for mystical experience. 
The first comes to men by hearing, the second comes when 
reason itself has experienced illumination — which Aristotle 
described as mysterious and akin to the Eleusinian rites (for 
in these he who was initiated into the mysteries was being 
moulded, not being taught). 

16 (R 2 15, R 3 16, W 16) 

Simp, in De Caelo 289. 1-15. Aristotle speaks of this in the 
work On Philosophy. In general, where there is a better there 
is a best. Since, then, among existing things one is better 
than another, there is also something that is best, which will 

1 Reading in R. 31. 7-8 de sideribus, de stellis, de deorum natura disputamus, 
with Gercke. 


be the divine. Now that which changes is changed either by 
something else or by itself, and if by something else, either 
by something better or by something worse, and if by itself, 
either to something worse or through desire for something 
better ; but the divine has nothing better than itself by which 
it may be changed (for that other would then have been more 
divine), nor on the other hand is it lawful for the better to be 
affected by the worse ; besides, if it were changed by some- 
thing worse, it would have admitted some evil into itself, but 
nothing in it is evil. On the other hand, it does not change 
itself through desire for something better, since it lacks none 
of its own excellences; nor again does it change itself for 
the worse, since even a man does not willingly make himself 
worse, nor has it anything evil such as it would have acquired 
from a change to the worse. This proof, too, Aristotle took 
over from the second book of Plato's Republic. 

17 (R 2 16, R 3 17, W 17) 

Scliol. in Proverb. Salomonis, cod. Paris, gr. 174, f. 46 a. To 
Aristotle belongs the following: 'There is either one first 
principle or many. If there is one, we have what we are 
looking for; if there are many, they are either ordered or 
disordered. Now if they are disordered, their products are 
more so, and the world is not a world but a chaos ; besides, 
that which is contrary to nature belongs to that which is 
by nature non-existent. If on the other hand they are ordered, 
they were ordered either by themselves or by some outside 
cause. But if they were ordered by themselves, they have 
something common that unites them, and that is the first 

18 (R 2 17, R 3 18, W 18) 

Philo, De Aet. Mundi 3. 10-11. Aristotle was surely speaking 
piously and devoutly when he insisted that the world is 
ungenerated and imperishable, and convicted of grave un- 
godliness those who maintained the opposite, who thought 
that the great visible god, which contains in truth sun and 
moon and the remaining pantheon of planets and unwander- 


ing stars, is no better than the work of man's hands ; he used 
to say in mockery (we are told) that in the past he had feared 
lest his house be destroyed by violent winds or storms beyond 
the ordinary, or by time or by lack of proper maintenance, 
but that now a greater danger hung over him, from those 
who by argument destroyed the whole world. 

19 a (r 3 19, W 19 a) 

Philo, De Act. Mundi 5. 20-24 -The arguments which prove 
the world to be ungenerated and imperishable should, out 
of respect for the visible god, be given their proper precedence 
and placed earlier in the discussion. To all things that admit 
of being destroyed there are ordained two causes of destruc- 
tion, one inward, the other outward. Iron, bronze, and such- 
like substances you will find being destroyed from within 
when rust invades and devours them like a creeping disease, 
and from without when a house or a city is set on fire and 
they catch fire from it and are destroyed by the fierce rush 
of flame ; and similarly death comes to living beings from 
themselves when they fall sick, and from outside when they 
have their throats cut or are stoned or burned to death 
or suffer the unclean death by hanging. If the world, too, is 
destroyed, it must be either by something outside or by one 
of the powers in itself. Now each of these is impossible. 
For there is nothing outside the world, since all things have 
contributed to its completeness. For so will it be one, whole, 
and ageless; one because only if something had been left 
out of its composition would there be another world like the 
present world ; whole because the whole of being has been 
expended on it ; ageless and diseaseless because bodies caught 
by disease and old age are destroyed by the violent assault 
from without of heat and cold and the other contrary forces, 
of which none can escape and circle round and attack the 
world, since all without exception are entirely enclosed 
within it. If there is anything outside, it must be a complete 
void or an impassive nature which cannot suffer or do any- 
thing. Nor again will the world be destroyed by anything 
within it — firstly because the part would then be both 


greater and more powerful than the whole, which is the most 
incredible of all things ; for the world, wielding unsurpassable 
power, directs all its parts and is directed by none ; secondly 
because, there being two causes of destruction, one within 
and one without, things that can suffer the one are necessarily 
susceptible also to the other. The evidence? Ox and horse 
and man and such-like animals, because they can be destroyed 
by iron, will also perish by disease. For it is hard, nay im- 
possible, to find anything that is fitted to be subject to the 
external cause of destruction and entirely insusceptible to 
the internal. Since, then, it was shown that the world will 
not be destroyed by anything without, because absolutely 
nothing has been left outside, neither will it be destroyed 
by anything within, because of the preceding argument to 
the effect that that which is susceptible to the one cause 
is also susceptible to the other. 

19 b (r 3 20, w 19 b) 

Philo, DeAet. Mundi 6. 28 — 7. 34. This may be put in another 
way. Of composite bodies all that are destroyed are dissolved 
into their components ; but dissolution is surely nothing but 
reduction to the natural state of the parts, so that conversely 
where there is composition, it has forced into an unnatural 
state the parts that have come together. And indeed it 
seems to be so beyond a doubt. For we men were put to- 
gether by borrowing little parts of the four elements, which 
belong in their entirety to the whole universe — earth, water, 
air, and fire. Now these parts when mixed are robbed of 
their natural position, the upward-travelling heat being 
forced down, 1 the earthy and heavy substance being made 
light and seizing in turn the upper region, which is occupied 
by the earthiest of our parts, the head. The worst of bonds 
is that which is fastened by violence ; this is violent and 
shortlived, for it is broken sooner by those who have been 
bound, because they shake off the noose through longing for 
their natural movement, to which they hasten. For, as the 
tragic poet says, 'Things born of earth return to earth, 

1 Reading in R. 35. 13-14 KaTaooOeiorjs, with Diels. 


things born of an ethereal seed return to the pole of heaven ; 
nothing that comes into being dies; one departs in one 
direction, one in another, 1 and each shows its own form.' 2 
For all things that perish, then, this is the law and this the 
rule prescribed — when the parts that have come together in 
the mixture have settled down they must in place of their 
natural order have experienced disorder, and must move to 
the opposites of their natural places, so that they seem to 
be in a sense exiles, but when they are separated they turn 
back to their natural sphere. Now the world has no part in 
the disorder we have spoken of ; for let us consider. If the 
world is perishing, its parts must now each be placed in the 
region unnatural to it. But this we cannot easily suppose; 
for to all the parts of the world have fallen perfect position 
and harmonious arrangement, so that each, as though fond 
of its own country, seeks no change to a better. For this 
reason, then, was assigned to earth the midmost position, 
to which 3 all earthy things, even if you throw them up, 
descend. This is an indication of their natural place ; for in 
that region in which a thing brought thither stays and rests, 
when under no compulsion, there it has its home. Secondly, 
water is spread over the earth, and air and fire have moved 
from the middle to the upper region, to air falling the region 
between water and fire, and to fire the highest region of all. 
And so, even if you light a torch and throw it to the ground, 
the flame will none the less strive against you and lighten 
itself and return to the natural motion of fire. If, then, the 
cause of destruction of other creatures is their unnatural 
situation, 4 but in the world each of its parts is situated 
according to nature and has had its proper place assigned 
to it, the world may justly be called imperishable. 

19 c (R 3 21, W 19 c) 

Philo, De Aet. Mundi 8. 39-43. The most conclusive argu- 
ment is that on which I know very many people to pride 
themselves, as on something most precise and quite irrefutable. 

1 Reading in R. 35. 23 npos dXXo, with the MSS. 

2 Eur. fr. 836 Nauck. 3 Reading in R. 36. 11 e<f>' 6v. 
4 Reading in R. 36. 20-1 17 napa 4>vaiv ra£is rcov aAAcuv, with Cohn. 


They ask, Why should God destroy the world? 1 Either 
to save himself from continuing in world-making, or in order 
to make another world. The former of these purposes is alien 
to God ; for what befits him is to turn disorder into order, 
not order into disorder ; and further, he would be admitting 
into himself repentance, an affection and disease of the soul. 
For he should either not have made a world at all, or else, 
if he judged the work becoming to him, should have rejoiced 
in the product. The second alternative deserves full examina- 
tion. For if instead of the present world he is to make an- 
other, the world he makes will be in any case either worse 
or better than the present world, or like to it, and each of 
these possibilities is open to objection, (i) If it is worse, its 
artificer will be worse ; but the works of God are blameless, 
exempt from criticism, incapable of improvement, fashioned 
as they are by the most perfect art and knowledge. For, as 
the saying goes, 'not even a woman is so lacking in good 
judgement as to prefer the worse 2 when the better is avail- 
able' ; 3 and it is befitting for God to give shape to the shapeless 
and to deck the ugliest things with marvellous beauties. 
(2) If the new world is like the old, its artificer will have 
laboured in vain, differing in nothing from mere children, 
who often, when they make sand-castles on the shore, build 
them up and then pull them down. It were far better, instead 
of making a new world like the old, neither to take away nor 
to add anything, nor change anything for better or for worse, 
but to leave the original world in its place. (3) If he is to 
make a better world, the artificer himself must become 
better, so that when he made the former world he must have 
been more imperfect both in art and in wisdom — which it is 
not lawful even to suspect. For God is equal and like to him- 
self, admitting neither slackening towards the worse nor 
intensification towards the better. 

20 (R 2 18, R 3 22, W 20) 
Cic. Lucullus 38. 119 (Plasberg). When your wise Stoic has 

1 Reading in R. 36. 27 <j>depet, with Gomperz. 

2 Reading in R. 37. 12 ^cpeiof', with Meineke. 

3 Reading in R. 37. 13 dfieivorepajv napeovrcov, with Mangey. 


said all these things to you syllable by syllable, Aristotle will 
come with the golden flow of his speech, to say that the Stoic 
is talking nonsense ; he will say that the world never came 
into being, because there never was a new design from which 
so noble a work could have taken its beginning, and that it 
is so well designed in every part that no force can effect such 
great movements and so great a change, no old age can come 
upon the world by lapse of time, so that this beauteous 
world should ever fall to pieces and perish. 

Lact. hist. 2. 10. 24. If the world can perish as a whole 
because it perishes in parts, it clearly has at some time come 
into being ; and as fragility proclaims a beginning, so it pro- 
claims an end. If that is true, Aristotle could not save the 
world itself from having a beginning. Now if Plato and 
Epicurus wring this admission from Aristotle, then in spite 
of the eloquence of Plato and Aristotle, who thought the 
world would last for ever, Epicurus will force from them the 
same unwilling conclusion, since it follows that the world 
has also an end. 

21 (R 2 19-20, R 3 23-24, W 2l) 

Cic. N.D. 2. 15. 42. Since some living things have their 
origin in earth, others in water, others in air, Aristotle thinks 
it absurd to suppose that in that part which is fittest to 
generate living things no animal should be born. Now the 
stars occupy the ethereal region ; and since that region is 
the least dense and is always in movement and activity, the 
animal born in it must have the keenest perception and the 
swiftest movement. Thus, since it is in ether that the stars 
are born, it is proper that in these there should be perception 
and intelligence. From which it follows that the stars must 
be reckoned among the gods. 

Ibid. 16. 44. Aristotle is to be praised, too, for judging that 
all things that move do so either by nature or by compulsion 
or by choice, and that the sun and moon and all the stars 
are in movement, and that things that move by nature move 


either downwards by virtue of weight or upwards by virtue 
of lightness, neither of which could happen to the stars, 
because their movement is in an orb or circle. Nor again can 
it be said that some greater force makes the stars move 
contrary to nature; for what power can be greater? What 
remains, then, is that the movement of the stars is voluntary. 
He who sees these things would be acting not only ignorantly 
but also impiously if he denied that there are gods. 

22 (W 22) 

Stob. 1. 43 = Dox. Gr. 432. 4-8. Plato and Aristotle say 
there are four kinds of animals — of land, of water, winged, 
heavenly. For the stars too, thej' say, are said to be animals, 
and the world itself is divine, 1 a reasonable immortal animal. 

Olymp. in Phd. 180. 22-23 (Norvin). Aristotle ascribes the 
whole process of creation to the heavenly animals. 2 

Nemes. De Nat. Horn. ch. 34. Aristotle ascribes the genera- 
tion of these to the sun and the zodiacal circle. 

Cf. Plu. Mor. 908 f, Ps.-Galen, Phil. Hist. ch. 35. 

23 (r 2 37, R3 42, W 23) 

Olymp. in Phd. 200. 3-6 (Norvin). That there must even be 
a whole race of men which is thus nourished is shown by the 
case of the man in these parts who was nourished by the 
sun's rays alone; Aristotle told about him, having himself 
seen him. 

Ibid. 239. 19-21. If Aristotle recorded the case of a man in 
this world who was sleepless and was nourished only by the 
sun's rays, what must we think of things in another world ? 

24 (R 2 39, R3 48, W 24) 

Olymp. in Phd. 26. 22-27. 4 (Norvin). Proclus would have 
heavenly bodies possess only sight and hearing, as Aristotle 

1 Reading Aeyeodai kcu tov koo^iov kolvtov ZvOeov, with Diels. 

2 i.e. to the zodiacal animals. 


also would; of the senses they have only these, which are 
those that contribute to well-being, not those that contribute 
to being, as the other senses do. The poet testifies to this, 
saying: 'Sun, who seest all things and hearest all things' 1 — 
which implies that the heavenly bodies have only sight and 
hearing. Aristotle adds that these senses, most of all, have 
knowledge by way of activity rather than of passivity, and 
are fitter for the unchanging heavenly bodies. Damascius, 
however, holds that these bodies have also the other senses. 

25 (R 2 43, R3 47, w 25) 

Plu. Mor. 1 138 c-1104 b. We have shown that Plato rejected 
the other forms of music not from ignorance or musical inexperi- 
ence but as being unbefitting to such a constitution ; we will 
next show that he was skilled in music. . . . 1139 b-1140 b. On 
the theme that music is something noble, divine, and grand, 
Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, says: 'Music is heavenly, by 
nature divine, beautiful, and inspired ; having by nature four 
parts, it has two means, the arithmetical and the harmonic, 
and the parts of it, their extents, and their excesses one over 
another, have numerical and proportionate relations; for 
tunes 2 are arranged in two tetrachords. 3 These are his words. 
He meant that the body of music was composed of unlike 
parts ; which, however, harmonized with each other. But its 
means also harmonized in arithmetical ratio ; for the highest 
note, proportioned to the lowest in the ratio of 2 : 1, com- 
pleted the octave. For music has, as we said before, a highest 
note of twelve units and a lowest note of six. Paramese, 
harmonizing with hypate in the ratio of 3 : 2, has nine units, 
while, as we said, mese has eight. 4 It is of these that the 
fundamental musical intervals are composed — the fourth, 

1 Horn. //. 3. 277, Od. 12. 323. 

2 Reading in R. 53. 7 /xe'A??, with the MSS. 

3 The Greeks regarded a musical scale as formed by two tetrachords, 
either so that the highest note of one was identical with the lowest note of 
the other (as in EFGAB[?CD), or so that there was an interval of a note 
between them (as in EFGA BCDE). 

4 Plutarch takes account only of the fundamental notes of the scale — the 
base note (hypate), the fourth (mese), the fifth (paramese), and the octave 


involving the ratio 4 : 3, the fifth, involving the ratio 3 : 2, 
and the octave, involving the ratio 2:1. But the ratio 9 : 8 
is also found, which gives the interval of a single tone. The 
notes of the scale exceed, and are exceeded by, the notes, and 
the intervals by the intervals, by the same excesses, both in 
geometrical progression and in arithmetical. Aristotle, then, 
describes them as having such values, neate exceeding mese 
by the third part of itself, 1 hypate exceeded by paramese in 
the same ratio, 2 so that the excesses are correlative ; the notes 
exceed and are exceeded by the same fractions. Thus the 
extreme notes respectively exceed and are exceeded by mese 
and paramese in the same ratios, 4 : 3 and 3 : 2. 3 Such an 
excess is the harmonic. 4 And neate exceeds mese and para- 
mese exceeds hypate by arithmetically equal fractions. 5 For 
paramese is to mese as 9 : 8, neate to hypate as 2 : 1, para- 
mese to hypate as 3 : 2, and mese to hypate as 4 : 3. Thus, 
according to Aristotle, is the scale constituted in respect of 
the notes and the corresponding numbers. 

Both it and all its notes are, as regards their inmost nature, 
constituted by the even, the odd, 6 and the even-odd. For 
it is itself, as a whole, even, involving four terms, while its 
parts and their ratios are even, odd, and even-odd ; neate is 
even, containing twelve units, paramese odd, containing 
nine, mese even, containing eight, hypate even-odd, contain- 
ing six. 7 Being itself thus constituted, and its notes so related 

1 Reading in R. 53. 27 avTrjs, with Bernardakis. 

2 i.e. by the third part of paramese. 

3 i.e. neate : mese = paramese : hypate = 3:2, and neate : paramese = 
mese : hypate = 4:3. 

4 Three quantities a, b, c were described by the Greeks as forming a 

. . o. c 12 , 6 

harmonic progression if a = b-\ — and b = c-\ — . 12 = 8-\ — ■ and 8 =6-\ — , 

n « 3 3 

so that 12, 8, 6 (neate, mese, hypate) formed a harmonic progression. 

5 This sentence cannot be right as it stands in the Greek ; the sense requires 
in R. 54. 2-4 something like 17 8e vedrr) vnepexei ttjs p-earjg /car' dpi.dp.-qTt.K6v 
\6yov loco fiepei. ko.1 y Trapafxia-q rijs vTTaTrjs. Neate, paramese, mese, and 
hypate being to one another as 12, 9, 8, 6, neate exceeds mese, and paramese 
exceeds hypate, by equal fractions, i.e. by a half. 

6 The context seems to demand in R. 54. 9-10 the reading zk re ttjs aprlas 
K01 TTepLooijs, which was proposed by Yolkmann. 

7 12 is said to be even but 6 to be even-odd, because 'even-odd' was 
applied, and confined, to numbers whose halves are odd. 


in respect of their mutual excesses and ratios, it is as a whole 
in harmony with itself and with its parts. But furthermore, of 
the senses that come into being in bodies, those which are 
heavenly and divine, affording by God's help and by reason 
of this harmony 1 perception to men — namely sight and 
hearing — exhibit harmony by the aid of sound and light. 
And the senses that accompany them are, qua senses, 
harmoniously constituted ; for it is not without harmony that 
these too produce their effects ; they are lesser than sight and 
hearing, but not derived from them. When God is present, 
those. two come into being in bodies, in accordance with 
numerical principles, and their nature is both powerful and 

It is clear, then, that the ancient Greeks were right in 
valuing musical education most highly of all. 

26 (R 2 21, R 3 26, w 26) 

Cic. N.D. 1. 13. 33 (speaking in the person of an Epicurean). 
' Aristotle, in the third book of his work On Philosophy, creates 
much confusion through dissenting 2 from his master Plato. 
For now he ascribes all divinity to mind, now he says the 
world itself is a god, now he sets another god over the world 
and ascribes to him the role of ruling and preserving the 
movement of the world by a sort of backward rotation. Then 
he says the heat of the heavens is a god, not realizing that 
the heavens are part of the world, which he has himself 
elsewhere called a god. But how can the divine sense-per- 
ception which he ascribes to the heavens be preserved in a 
movement so speedy? Where, again, are all the gods of 
popular belief, if we count the heavens, too, as a god ? And 
when he himself demands that God be without a body, he 
deprives him of all sense-perception, and even of foresight. 
Moreover, how can the world move 3 if it lacks body, and how, 
if it is always moving itself, can it be calm and blessed ? ' 

1 Reading 8«i ttjv appovlav (with the MSS.) after aioQ-qciv in R. 54. 21, in- 
stead of in R. 54. 20. 

2 Omitting non in R. 39. 19, with the MSS. 

3 Reading in R. 40. 2 modo mundus moveri, with the MSS. 

645.29 H 


27 (w 27) 

Cic. Acad. 1. 7. 26. Therefore air — this word 1 too we use as 
a Latin word — and fire and water and earth are primary; 
from them spring the forms of animals and of the fruits of 
the earth. Therefore these are called first principles and, to 
translate from the Greek, elements; of them, air and fire 
have the power of producing movement and causing change, 
while the part of the others — water and earth — is to receive 
and, as it were, to suffer. The fifth kind, from which were 
derived stars and minds, Aristotle thought to be something 
distinct, and unlike the four I have mentioned above. 

Cic. Tusc. i. 10. 22. Aristotle, who far exceeded all others — 
Plato I always except — both in intellect and in industry, 
after taking account of the four well-known classes of first 
principles from which all things were derived, considers that 
there is a fifth kind of thing, from which comes mind ; for 
thought, foresight, learning and teaching, discovery, the 
riches of memory, love and hate, desire and fear, distress and 
joy, these and their like (he thinks) cannot be included in 
any of the four classes ; he adds a fifth, nameless class, and 
so calls the mind itself by the new name eVSeAe'xeta, as being 
a continuous and endless movement. 

Ibid. 1. 17. 41. If the mind is either a certain number (a subtle 
but not a very clear hypothesis) or the fifth nature, which is 
unnamed but well understood, these beings are much more 
perfect and pure, so that they move very far from the earth. 

Ibid 1. 26. 65-27. 66. But if there is a fifth nature, introduced 
first 2 by Aristotle, this is the nature both of gods and of 
minds. 3 We, following this opinion, have expressed it in these 
very words in our Consolatio : ' The origin of minds is not to 
be found on earth ; for in minds there is nothing mixed and 
composite, nothing that seems to be born and fashioned of 
earth, nothing even resembling water, air, or fire. For in 

1 sc. aer. 2 Reading inducta primum, haec, with the MSS. 

3 Reading animorum, with the MSS. 


these natures there is nothing that has the power of memory, 
mind, and thought, that retains the past, foresees the future, 
and can grasp the present — which alone are living powers — 
nor will it ever be discovered whence these can come to man, 
except from God.' There is, therefore, a singular nature and 
power of mind, disjoined from these customary and well- 
known natures. Thus, whatever it is that feels, knows, lives, 
thrives, it must be celestial and divine, and- therefore eternal. 
Nor can the God whom we know be otherwise understood 
than as a mind apart and free, separated from all mortal 
admixture, feeding and moving all things, and itself endowed 
with eternal motion. Of this kind and of the same nature is 
the human mind. 

Clem. Rom. Recogn. 8. 15. Aristotle introduced a fifth ele- 
ment, which he called aKarovo^aarov, i.e. unnameable, doubt- 
less pointing to the being who by uniting the four elements 
in one made the world. 

28 (w 30) 

Arist. Phys. i94 a 27-36. The end and the means must be 
studied by the same science ; and the nature is the end (for 
the terminus of a continuous process is also its final cause; 1 
hence the poet's 2 absurd remark, ' He has the end for which he 
was born', 3 which is absurd because not every final point 
but only that which is best is a final cause). Indeed, some arts 
make their matter and others make it workable, and we use 
their matter as existing for our own sake (for we are the 
end, in one of the two senses we have distinguished in 
the work On Philosophy). 

1 Reading com ti reXos, tovto to eaxarov kcu to ov fi'CKa. 

2 An unidentified comic poet (Kock, Com. Alt. Fr. in, p. 493). 

3 i.e. death. 



Cic. Rep. 3. 8. 12. The other writer 1 filled four huge books 
with his views on justice itself. 

1 (R 2 71, R 3 82) 

Demetr. Eloc. 28. Neither in passages meant to rouse terror, 
then, as I have shown, nor in passages of pathos or moral 
reflection, is the use of words of similar ending serviceable ; 
for pathos wants to be simple and unforced, and so does 
moral reflection. At all events in Aristotle's work On Justice, 
if the speaker who is bewailing the fate of Athens were to 
say ' They took an enemy city and lost their own ; compare 
their gain with their loss', he would have used the language 
of pathos and pity; but if he uses the jingle 'They took an 
enemy city and lost their own ; compare the profit they 
gained with the loss they sustained', by heaven he will rouse 
not sympathy nor pity 2 but (as we say) smiles mixed with 
tears. To use such false artifices in pathetic passages is, in 
proverbial language, to play among those who mourn. 

2 (R 2 73, R 3 84) 

Suet. De Blasph. p. 416 (Miller) s.v. EvpvfiaTos. A criminal, 
also called Eurybates. . . . Aristotle in the first book of his 
work On Justice says he was a thief who when he was caught 
and put in chains and encouraged by the warders to show how 
he got over walls and into houses, 'on being set free, fastened 
spikes to his feet and took the sponges, climbed very easily, 
escaped from the roof, and got away'. 

Cf. Greg. Cor. Ad Hermog. c. 19, and Suidas s.v. Evpvfiaros. 

1 Aristotle. 

2 Reading in R. 87. 1 Kivrjaei ouSe eXeov dXXd, with the MSS. 


3 (r 2 74, R3 85) 

Lact. Inst. 5. 15. Carneades, 1 in order to refute Aristotle's 
and Plato's praise of justice, in his first discourse collected 
all the things that used to be said in favour of justice, with 
the object of disproving them, as he in fact did. 

Lact. Epit. 55. A great number of philosophers, but princi- 
pally Plato and Aristotle, said much about justice, defending 
it and bestowing the highest praise on it because it assigns 
to each man what is his own and preserves equity in all 
things, and maintained that while the other virtues are, so 
to speak, silent and inward, it is justice alone that is not 
so self-contained and hidden, but stands boldly forth in 
readiness to act well for the general good. 

4 (r 2 75, R3 86) 

Plu. Mor. 1040 e. Chrysippus says in criticism of Aristotle 
on the subject of justice that he is not right in saying that 
if pleasure is the end justice is destroyed, and with justice 
each of the other virtues. 

Cf. Cic. Hortensius, fr. 81 (Miiller) = August. C. ltd. Pel. 
4. 14. 72. 

5 (r 2 76, R3 87) 

Porph. in De hit. apud Boeth. in De Int. ed. 2, 1. 1, p. 27 

(Meiser). Aristotle in his work On Justice says 'thoughts and 
sensations are from the very start distinct in their nature'. 

6 (R3 88) 

Them. Or. 26 d-27 b. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, 
though he was in all other respects proud and lofty, yet was 
pleased and flattered when on the strength of his discourses 
the Athenians conferred citizenship on him, a stranger and 

1 In Cicero's De Re Publico . 


a Phoenician ; is it likely then that I was so boorish, and so 
heedless of Aristotle, whom I had taken as my master both 
in life and in philosophy, as to think all honour, no matter 
from whom or on what ground, a thankless and mercenary 
object for a good man? Do I not remember the grounds on 
which Aristotle distinguishes vanity from true pride ? In dis- 
tinguishing them, 1 he says somewhere that with regard to 
great honours, as with regard to all other things that are 
called good, there is an immoderate care for them, but also 
a moderate and reasonable care. He adds that the man who 
is purled up and raises his eyebrows at the noisy applause 
given him by the mob because he has spent much on theatres 
or horse-races for their entertainment is a vain fellow, and 
is afflicted with the vice to which Aristotle gives the name of 
vanity ; while the man who despises the applause and thinks 
it little better than the noise of waves beating on the shore, 
but values more than anything else the approval without 
flattery which good men bestow on virtue, he is truly great- 
hearted and high-minded. 

1 Reading in R. 89. 22 biopl^v. 



Alex, in Top. 5. 17-19. Of this so-called dialectic Aristotle 
has treated both in other books and particularly in these, 
which are called Topics. 

Ibid. 27. 11. Perhaps he would apply the phrase 'mental 
gymnastic' to a discussion which probes both sides of a 
question. This type of discussion was not unusual with the 
ancients. . . . 14-18. They put forward a thesis, and practised 
on it their 1 inventiveness in argument, establishing and re- 
futing 2 the thesis by probable arguments. There are books 
both of Aristotle and of Theophrastus containing such argu- 
ments from probable premisses to opposite conclusions. 

Cf. Elias in Cat. 133. 9-17. 

Theon, Prog. 2, p. 165. Examples of training in theses may 
be got both from Aristotle and from Theophrastus; there 
are many books of theses bearing their names. 

1 Reading in R. 105. 8 o.vtu>v, with Wallies. 

2 Reading in R. 105. 9 KaraoKevd^ovTes re kcli dvaoKevd^ovres, with the MSS. 


I (R 1 IO9, R 2 112) 

Alex, in Top. 62. 30. One might consider in which class of 
problems one should include such problems as 'Why does 
the magnetic stone attract iron? ', or 'What is the nature of 
prophetic waters ? ' These do not seem to fall under any of 
the recognized kinds. Is it that these are not dialectical 
problems at all, such as those which we are discussing and 
whose kinds we are distinguishing? ... 63. n-19. Are these 
not physical problems, as Aristotle has said in his work On 
Problems} Physical phenomena whose causes are unknown 
constitute physical problems. Still, there are dialectical 
problems even about physical matters, as there are about 
ethical and logical matters ; those of one kind are dialectical, 
those of another physical. All dialectical problems will be 
reducible to the inquiry whether the connexion of an attri- 
bute with a thing is a fact, and the inquiry whether a thing 
exists, which are two of the four questions enumerated at the 
beginning of the second book of the Posterior Analytics ;* for 
the questions 'What is the reason of a connexion ?' and 'What 
is the nature of a thing?' are not dialectical problems. 

1 Ch". 1. 


i (r 2 iio, r 3 113) 

Alex, in Top. 242. 1-9. 'Moreover, what is itself nobler and 
more precious and praisewortrry is more desirable than what 
is less so.' Aristotle here uses the phrases 'nobler', 'more 
precious', 'more praiseworthy' in a wide sense. In the 
division of goods he reserves the word ' precious ' for the more 
primary good things, such as gods, ancestors, happiness, the 
words 'noble' and 'praiseworthy' for the virtues and vir- 
tuous activities, the word 'capacities' for those things which 
may be used well or ill, the word ' useful ' for what produces 
these same goods or contributes towards them. But here he 
seems to apply the words 'noble', 'praiseworthy', and 
' precious ' even to things that are good as capacities. 

2 (R 2 III, R 3 114) 

Diog. Laert. 3. 80 (45). Plato, according to Aristotle, used 
to divide things in this way: of goods some are in the soul, 
some in the body, some external. For example, justice, 
wisdom, courage, temperance, and the like are in the soul, 
beauty, good condition, health, and strength in the body ; 
friends, the happiness of one's country, and wealth fall among 
external goods. . . . 107 (74). Of existing things some exist 
in their own right, others are relative. . . . 109 (74). It was 
thus that, according to Aristotle, Plato classified primary 
things as well. 

3 (r 2 112, R 3 115) 

Cod. Marc. 257, f. 250. Aristotle's Divisions. The soul is 
divided into three elements. 


Simp, in Cat. 65. 4. In the Divisions . . . 7-8 after putting 
forward the categories he adds: 'I mean these with their 
cases' (i.e. inflexions). 


I (R 2 113, R 3 116) 

Simp, in Cat. 64. 18-65. I0 - But why, say the followers of 
Lucius, did he omit the conjunctions, if these too are signifi- 
cant utterances ? . . . They also ask where the articles are to 
be placed. The same account must be given of these. These 
words also are, as it were, conjunctions which in addition 
indicate indefinitely the male and the female sexes ; for they 
do not show the essence of anything — which is why some 
people call them indefinite. But where are negations, priva- 
tions, and the various inflexions of verbs to be placed ? This 
question Aristotle himself answered in his Dissertations. For 
both in his works on method, in his Dissertations, in his 
Divisions, and in another dissertation called Fallacies de- 
pending on Language (which, even if it is thought by some 
not to be a genuine work of Aristotle, is at all events the 
work of some member of the school) — in all of these, after 
putting forward 1 the categories, he adds, ' I mean these with 
their cases' (i.e. inflexions), thus connecting the theory of 
them with that of negations, privations, and indefinite terms. 

Dexippus, in Cat. 33. 8-13. But where, they say, are nega- 
tions, privations, and indefinite terms, and the inflexions 
answering to each category, to be placed ? Aristotle himself 
dealt better with this matter in his Dissertations ; he put for- 
ward the categories, with their 'cases' and with negations 
and indefinite terms, and thus connected together the theory 
of all these things ; by cases he meant inflexions. 

1 Reading in R. 108. 3 npodels, with Kalbfleisch. 



Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546), f. 13 a. Indeed, they say that 
in the Great Library there have been found forty books of 
Analytics and two of Categories; it was judged by the com- 
mentators that of the Categories this one was a genuine work 
of Aristotle. . . . This judgement was based on the thoughts 
expressed, on the language, and on the fact that the Philo- 
sopher has in his other treatises always mentioned this book. 

Cf. Elias, in Cat. 133. 9-17. 

I (r 2 114, R 3 117) 

Simp, in Cat. 18. 16-21. Adrastus, in his work on the order of 
Aristotle's treatises, relates that another book of Categories 
is referred to as being by Aristotle — itself short and concise 
in its language and differing little from the other Categories, 
but starting with the words ' Of existing things, some are. 
He records that both versions had the same number of lines, 
so that he used the word 'short' with reference to the style, 
implying that each of the proofs was set out concisely. . 

Ammon. in Cat. 13. 20-25. It should be known that in the 
old libraries forty books of Analytics have been found, but 
only two of Categories. One began 1 'Of existing things, some 
are called homonymous, others synonymous'. The other, 
which we now have lying before us, had this introduction : 
' Those things are called homonymous which have only their 
names in common, their definitions being different.' 2 This 
version has been preferred as being superior in order and in 
matter, and as everywhere proclaiming Aristotle as its 

1 Omitting ttjv . . . fani in R. 108. 28, with Busse. 

2 This is almost identical with the beginning of the Categories which have 
come down to us. 


Cf. Ps.-Ammon. in Cat. (Ven. 1546), f. 17 a, and Schol. in 
Arist. Cat. 33 b 25-33 (Brandis). 

Boeth. in Cat. 1. p. 161 d-162 a (Migne). The book is the work 
of Aristotle and of no other, since in his whole philosophy he 
consistently maintains the doctrine of this work, and its 
brevity and subtlety are not unworthy of Aristotle . . . 
though there exists another work of Aristotle discussing the 
same topics, containing much the same comments, while 
differently expressed. But this book has been generally 
regarded as the authentic one. 



Arist. Metaph. ioo3 b 33-ioo4 a 2. There must be exactly as 
many species of being as of unity. To investigate the nature 
of these is the work of a science that is generically one — I 
mean, for instance, the discussion of the same, the similar, 
and the other concepts of this sort ; and nearly all contraries 
may be referred to this origin ; let us take them as having 
been investigated in the Selection of Contraries. 

Ibid. io54 a 2o,-32. To the One belong (as we indicated graphi- 
cally in our distinction of the contraries) the same, the like, 
and the equal, and to plurality belong the other, the unlike, 
and the unequal. 

Alex, in Metaph. 250. 17-19: see p. 122 infra. 

Syr. in Metaph. 61. 12-17. The same, the like, the equal, 
the straight, and in general the terms on the better side of the 
list of cognates, are differentiae and as it were species of the 
One, as the terms on the worse side belong to the Many. The 
Philosopher himself treated of the subject separately, making 
a selection of all contraries and classing some under the One, 
others under the Many. 

Cf. Asc. in Metaph. 237. 11-13 (p. 122 infra). 

Simp, in Cat. 382. 7-10. Aristotle seems to have taken what 
he says about contraries from the Archytean book entitled 
On Contraries, which he did not group with his discussion of 
genera, but thought worthy of a separate treatise. 

Ibid. 407. 15. Now that Aristotle's account of the difference 
between opposites has been completed, it would be well to 
quote Archytas' discussion of them .... 19-20. For anyone 


who had examined Aristotle's book On Contraries could not 
have neglected Archytas' book. 

I (R 2 115, R3 118) 

Simp, in Cat. 387. 17. But now that the language of Aristotle 
has been clarified, let us see what the more famous inter- 
preters make of the passage. The Stoics pride themselves 
on their working out of logical problems, and in the matter 
of contraries, as well as in all other matters, they are anxious 
to show that Aristotle furnished the starting-point for every- 
thing in one book which he called On Opposites, in which, too, 
there is an immense number of problems set forth ; of which 
they have set out a small portion. The others of these it 
would not be reasonable to include in an introduction, but 
those which the Stoics set out in agreement with Aristotle 
must be mentioned. Aristotle laid down an ancient definition 
of contraries, which we have mentioned previously, viz. that 
they are the things which differ most from one another 
within a genus ; but in his work on opposites Aristotle sub- 
jected this definition to all manner of tests, and amended 
it. He raised the question whether things that differ 1 are 
contraries, and whether difference can be contrariety, and 
whether 2 complete divergence is maximum difference, and 
whether the things that are farthest apart are identical with 
those that differ most, and what distance is 3 and how we are 
to understand maximum distance. These difficulties having 
been observed, something (he maintained) must be added to 
the phrase 'the genus', so that the definition comes to be 
'the things that are farthest apart in the same genus'. He 
pointed out the difficulties consequent on this ; he asked 
whether contrariety is otherness, 4 and whether the things 
that are most different are contraries, and added many other 
criticisms. . . . 388. 13-14. This is but a small part of the 
difficulties raised by Aristotle in his work on contrarieties. 

1 Omitting the second k<u in R. no. 9, with Hayduck. 

2 Reading in R. no. 10 Bvvarai, xal el, with the MSS. 

3 Reading in R. no. 13 *cai ti's ij dTroaraais, with the MSS. 

4 Reading in R. no. 16 el erepor-qs eoriv, with Brandis. 


2 (r 2 116, r 3 119) 

Simp, in Cat. 388. 21. The Stoics used all these distinctions, 
and in the other distinctions with regard to contraries they 
followed in Aristotle's steps; he had given them in his 
treatise on opposites the starting-points which they followed 
out in their own books. . . . 389. 4-10. Such being the Stoic 
teaching, let us see how they distorted the Aristotelian tradi- 
tion. Aristotle in his book on opposites says that justice is 
contrary to injustice, but that the just man is said not to be 
contrary, but to be contrariwise disposed, to the unjust man. 
If even such things as these are contraries, he says, ' contrary ' 
will be used in two senses ; it will be applied either with 
reference to contraries themselves, like virtue and vice, 
movement and rest, or to things by virtue of a sharing in 
contraries, e.g. to that which moves and that which rests, 
or to the good and the bad. 

3 (R 2 117, R 3 120) 

Simp, in Cat. 389. 25-390. 7. For this reason Chrysippus says 
that wisdom is contrary to folly, but that the definition of 
the one is not contrary in the same way to the definition of 
the other; 1 still, connecting the definitions with the things 
defined, they oppose the definitions also one to one. This 
distinction was first drawn by Aristotle, who held that a 
simple term is not contrary to the definition of its contrary, 
e.g. that wisdom is not contrary to ignorance of things good, 
evil, and neutral; but that, if there is contrariety here at 
all, definition is to be opposed to definition, and that the 
definitions should be said to be contrary only by being 
definitions of contrary things. He elaborates further on this, 
by saying that a definition is contrary to a definition if their 
subjects are contrary in genus or in differentiae or in both ; 
e.g. let the definition of beauty be 'mutual symmetry of 
parts ' ; ' mutual asymmetry of parts ' is contrary to this, 
and the contrariety is in respect of the genus ; but in other 

1 i.e. knowledge of things good, things evil, and things neutral, to ignorance 
of the same. 


cases it is by virtue of differentiae ; e.g. white is colour that 
pierces the sight, black is colour that compresses it ; in these 
the genus is the same, but there is contrariety in respect of 
the differentiae. We have stated, then, how definition is 
contrary to definition, and 1 how definitions that elucidate 
essence can be contrary. Let this discussion of the matter 

4 (r 2 118, r 3 121) 

Simp, in Cat. 390. 19-25. Aristotle himself in his book on 
opposites considered whether, if someone who has lost one 
of two things does not of necessity gain the other, there must 
be a mean between the two, or this is not in all cases so. A 
man who has lost a true opinion does not necessarily acquire 
a false one, nor does he who has lost a false opinion necessarily 
acquire a true one ; sometimes he passes from one opinion 
either to a complete absence of opinion or to knowledge ; but 
there is nothing between true and false opinion except 
ignorance and knowledge. 

5 (r 2 119-20, r 3 122-3) 

Simp, in Cat. 402. 26. Nicostratus paradoxically takes his 
start from privations due to custom, and says that privation 
can always change into positive state. ... 30. But Aristotle 
took his distinction between state and privation not from 
those due to custom but from those that are natural, to 
which the antithesis of state and privation is primarily 
applied. Let us use against Nicostratus the very arguments 
of Aristotle. In his book on opposites he himself says that 
some privations are privations of natural states, others of 
customary states, others of possessions, others of other 
things — blindness a privation of a natural state, nakedness 
a privation of a customary state, loss of money a privation 
of something acquired in practice. There are several other 
types of privation, and some it is impossible, others it is 
possible, to lose. . . . 403. 5-24. But the full account of 
privations we can get both from Aristotle's book and from 

1 Reading in R. in. 29 ko\ of. 


that of Chrysippus; Iamblichus has added some remarks 
which run as follows: '"State" has several meanings, as we 
have already shown, and "privation" extends to all the 
meanings of "state", but not to all contraries. For privation 
is equivalent to loss, so that we cannot talk of privation of 
evil, since there cannot be a loss of what is evil or harmful, 
but only of what is good or useful ; for a man relieved from 
disease or poverty would not be said to have been deprived 
of disease or poverty, though one bereft of health or wealth 
would be said to have been deprived. Blindness is privation 
of a good, for sight is a good ; nakedness is privation of some- 
thing indifferent, since raiment is indifferent, neither a good 
nor an evil. Thus no privation is a good ; privation is either 
an evil or indifferent. There can be privation either of all 
or of most goods. Aristotle says that of all goods it is those 
that are in the soul and depend on choice that we can least 
be deprived of; for no one says he has been deprived of 
justice, and he who said "No one takes away knowledge" 
was expressing the same thought. Privations, then, are 
rather of wealth, reputation, honour, and the like, and most 
of all of the so-called goods of property; that is why pity 
and condolence attend on most privations.' But here 1 Aris- 
totle has stated the opposition between natural privations 
and privations of the contraries. 2 So much for this subject. 

6 (R 2 121, R 3 124) 

Simp, in Cat. 409. 15. Aristotle adds this to what he has said 
about contraries ... 17 that the contrary of a good is always 
an evil, but the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good and 
sometimes an evil. ... 30. In the book on opposites he added 
to these types of contrariety that of things neither good nor 
evil to things neither good nor evil, saying that white is thus 
contrary to black, sweet to bitter, high to low in sound, rest 
to movement. . . . 410. 25-30. Nicostratus urges, as one 
criticism, that Aristotle's division of contraries is incom- 
plete, since he did not add that indifferent can be opposed 

1 i.e. in the Categories. 

2 i.e. of things contrary to the things which natural privations are priva- 
tions of. 

645 29 I 


to indifferent. Aristotle added this in the book on opposites, 
saying that there is a type of opposition between two things 
neither good nor evil — as we have said before. But he did 
not call them indifferent, the reason being 1 (I suppose) that 
the term 'indifferent' was later, being invented by the Stoics. 

1 Reading in R. 114. 9 Stdrt, with some MS. support. 




Aristox. Harm. 2. 30. 16-31. 3 (Macran). This, as Aristotle 
always used to say, was the experience of most of those who 
heard Plato's lecture On the Good. Each of them attended 
on the assumption that he would gain one of the recognized 
human goods, such as wealth, health, strength — in general, 
some marvellous happiness. When Plato's discourses turned 
out to be about mathematics — numbers, geometry, astro- 
nomy — and, to crown all, about the thesis that there is one 
Good, it seemed to them, I fancy, something quite paradoxi- 
cal; and so some people despised the whole thing, while 
others criticized it. 

Arist. Ph. 209 b n-i6. This is why Plato in the Timaeus 
says that matter and space are the same ; for the ' participant ' 
and space are identical. It is true, indeed, that the account 
he gives there of the ' participant ' is different from what he 
says in his so-called 'unwritten doctrines'. Nevertheless, he 
did identify place and space. 

Them, in Ph. 106. 21-23. Yet in the Timaeus Plato says that 
matter receives the Forms in one way, and in the unwritten 
doctrines says it receives them in another way; in the 
Timaeus he says it is by participation, in the unwritten 
doctrines by assimilation. 

Philop. in Ph. 521. 9-15. . . . i.e. naming matter differently 
in the Timaeus and in the unwritten doctrines, i.e. in the 
unwritten lectures; for in the unwritten lectures he called 
matter great and small (as Aristotle said previously; we 
have stated why matter is great and small), but in the 


Timaeus he calls matter the participant because it parti- 
cipates in the Forms. Aristotle himself copied out Plato's 
unwritten lectures. 

Simp, in Ph. 503. 10-15. Having shown that the infinite is 
enclosed rather than encloses, and is by its own nature un- 
knowable, Aristotle criticizes the superficial interpretation of 
Plato's words. Plato in his account of the Good called matter 
(which he said was indefinite) the great and the small, and 
said that all sensible things are enclosed by the infinite, 
and are unknowable because their nature involves matter and 
is indefinite and in a state of flux. 

Ibid. 542. 9-12. Aristotle says that Plato gives matter 
different names in the Timaeus and in the unwritten lectures ; 
in the Timaeus he calls it the participant (for it participates 
'most obscurely in the intelligible'), but in the unwritten 
lectures he called it great and small. 

Cf. ibid. 545. 23-25, Philop. in Ph. 515. 29-32. 

Arist. De An. 404 b i6-2i: see p. 83 supra. 

Philop. in De An. 75. 34-76. 1. By the books On Philosophy 
Aristotle means the work entitled On the Good 1 ; in this 
Aristotle reports Plato's unwritten lectures; the work is 
genuine. He relates there the view of Plato and the Pytha- 
goreans about realities and first principles. 

Cf. Simp, in De An. 28. 7-9, p. 83 supra. 

Asc. in Metaph. 77. 2-4. Yet we say there are no Ideas of 
evil things ; for evil things have no substantial existence but 
are incidental, as is said in the Platonic lectures. 

I (R 2 22, R 3 27) 

Vita Arist. Marciana, p. 433. 10-15 (Rose). Aristotle's 
character was remarkable for its moderation ; he says in the 
Categories that one should not express an opinion hastily, 

1 Philoponus is mistaken; Aristotle means what he says. 


but only after repeated consideration, and indeed that even 
the mere examination of difficulties has its uses ; and in the 
work On the Good he says ' not only he who is in luck but also 
he who offers a proof should remember that he is but a man'. 

2 (R 2 23, R 3 28) 

Alex, in Metaph. 55. 20-57. 2 %- Both Plato and the Pytha- 
goreans assumed numbers to be the first principles of existing 
things, because they thought that it is that which is primary 
and incomposite that is a first principle, and that planes are 
prior to bodies (for that which is simpler than another and 
not destroyed with it is prior to it by nature), and on the 
same principle lines are prior to planes, and points (which 
the mathematicians call semeia but they called units) to 
lines, being completely incomposite and having nothing prior 
to them ; but units are numbers ; therefore numbers are the 
first of existing things. And since Forms or Ideas are prior 
to the things which according to Plato have their being in 
relation to them and derive their being from them (the exis- 
tence of these he tried in several ways to establish), he called 
the Forms numbers. For if that which is one in kind is prior 
to the things that exist only in relation to it, 1 and nothing 
is prior to number, the Forms are numbers. This is the 
reason why he called the first principles of number first 
principles of the Forms, and the One the first principle of 
all things. 

Again, the Forms are the first principles of all other things, 
and since the Ideas are numbers the first principles of number 
are first principles of the Ideas ; and he used to say that the 
first principles of number are the unit and the dyad. For, 
since there are in numbers both the One and that which is 
other than the One (i.e. the many and few), he assumed 
that the first thing there is in numbers, apart from the One, 
is the first principle both of the many and of the few. Now 
the dyad is the first thing apart from the One, having in 
itself both manyness and fewness; for the double is many 
and the half is few, and these exist in the dyad ; and the dyad 

1 Reading npos avro ovtojv. 


is contrary to the One, since the latter is indivisible and the 
former is divided. 

Again, thinking that he was proving that the equal and 
the unequal are first principles of all things, both of things 
that exist in their own right and of opposites (for he tried 
to reduce all things to these as their simplest elements), he 
assigned equality to the monad, and inequality to excess and 
defect ; for inequality involves two things, a great and a 
small, which are respectively excessive and defective. This 
is why he called it the indefinite dyad — because neither 
the excessive nor the defective is, as such, definite ; they are 
indefinite and unlimited. But when limited by the One the 
indefinite dyad, he says, becomes the numerical dyad ; for 
this kind of dyad is one in form. 

Again, the dyad is the first number ; its first principles are 
the excessive and the defective, since it is in the dyad that 
the double and the half are first found ; for while the double 
and the half are respectively excessive and defective, the 
excessive and the defective are not necessarily double and 
half; so that these are elements in the double. And since the 
excessive and the defective when they have been limited 
become double and half (for these are no longer unlimited, 
nor is the threefold and the third part, or the fourfold and 
the quarter, or anything else that already has its excess 
limited), and this limitation is effected by the nature of the 
One (for each thing is one in so far as it is a 'this' and is 
limited), the One and the great and the small must be 
elements in the numerical dyad. But the dyad is the first 
number. These, then, are the elements in the dyad. It is 
for some such reasons that Plato used to treat the One and 
the dyad as the first principles both of numbers and of all 
existing things, as Aristotle says in his work On the Good. 

Aristotle says here 1 that it is for this reason also that Plato 
'made one of his first principles a dyad — because the num- 
bers, with the exception of the first numbers, are neatly 
produced from it as from a matrix.' This is because he thinks 
the dyad divides everything to which it is applied ; that is 
why he called it duplicative. For, by making into two each 

1 i.e. in the Metaphysics. 


of the things to which it is applied, it in a sense divides it, 
not allowing it to remain what it was ; which division is the 
genesis of numbers. As matrices and moulds make all the 
things fitted into them to be like, so too the dyad, being as 
it were a matrix for the successive numbers, becomes genera- 
tive of them, making two of, or doubling, everything to 
which it is applied. For when applied to 1 it makes 2 (for 
twice 1 is 2), when applied to 2 it makes 4 (for twice 2 is 4), 
when applied to 3 it makes 6 (for twice 3 is 6), and so too 
in every other case. 

By ' except the first numbers ' Aristotle means ' except the 
odd numbers'. For the genesis of odd numbers does not take 
place in this way — by doubling or by division into two. Here, 
then, he means by 'first numbers' all the odd numbers with- 
out exception ; for these are usually treated as prior to even 
numbers. By 'first numbers' simply is meant numbers 
divided only by the unit, e.g. 3, 5, and 7 (though 2 also has 
this characteristic) ; by ' numbers first relatively to one an- 
other' those that have 1 as their only common factor, though 
they are themselves measurable also by some number. 8 and 
9 are so related, for 1 is their only common measure, though 
each of them has also a number as a factor ; 8 has 2 and 4 ; 
9 has 3. Here, however, Aristotle must mean by 'first' all 
the odd numbers, as being prior to the even; for none of 
them is generated by the dyad in the aforesaid way; it is 
by the addition of a unit to each of the even numbers that 
the odd numbers are produced — a unit which is not the One 
that acts as first principle (for this was a formative and not 
a material principle), but as the great and the small when 
limited by the One became 2, so each of the two when limited 
by the One is said to be a unit. 

Cf. Alex, apud Simp, in Ph. 454. 19-455. 11. 

Alex, in Metaph. 85. 16-18. The first principles are the One 
and the indefinite dyad, as he has said shortly before and 
has himself related in the work On the Good. 

Simp, in Ph. 151. 6-19. Alexander says: 'According to Plato 


the first principles 1 of all things, and of the Ideas themselves, 
are the One and the indefinite dvad, which he used to call 
great and small, as Aristotle relates in his work On the Good.' 
One might gather this also from Speusippus and Xenocrates 
and the others who were present at Plato's lecture on the 
Good ; for they all wrote down and preserved his doctrine, 
and they say he used these as first principles. That Plato 
should call the One and the indefinite dyad first principles 
of all things is very natural (for the account is a Pythagorean 
one, and Plato in many respects clearly follows the Pytha- 
goreans) ; but to call the indefinite dyad, i.e. the great and 
small, first principles even of the Ideas, indicating by these 
phrases matter, how can this be consistent, when Plato limits 
matter to the sensible world and says clearly in the Timaeus 
that it is confined to becoming, and that in it that which comes 
to be comes to be ? Besides, he used to sav that the Ideas 
are known by thought, but that matter is 'credible only to 
bastard reasoning'. 

Ibid. 453. 25-454. I 9- They say that Plato maintained that 
the One and the indefinite dyad were the first principles of 
sensible things as well. He placed the indefinite dyad also 
in the objects of intelligence and used to call it 'indeter- 
minate ', and he made the great and the small first principles 
and called them indeterminate, in his lectures on the Good ; 
Aristotle, Heraclides, Hestiaeus, and other associates of 
Plato attended these and wrote them down in the enigmatic 
style in which they were delivered. Porphyry, undertaking 
to put them into articulate shape, has written as follows 
about them in his Philebus: 'The Master assumes the more 
and the less, and the more and the less intense, to fall under 
the heading of the indefinite. For where these are present, 
alternately intensified and relaxed, that which shares in them 
does not stand still and come to an end, but goes on towards 
the indefiniteness of infinity. So too with the greater and the 
smaller, and with Plato's equivalent for them, the great and 
the small. For let there be a limited magnitude such as a 
cubit. Let it be bisected and let us leave one half-cubit 
1 Reading in R. 41. 9 a.px a h with Diels. 


undivided, but let us cut up the other half-cubit and add it 
little by little to the undivided part ; the cubit will then have 
two parts, one advancing without end to the less and the 
other to the greater. For we should never in our cutting come 
to an indivisible part, since the cubit is a continuum, and a 
continuum is divided into ever divisible parts. Such an un- 
interrupted process of cutting shows that there is a certain 
character of indefiniteness enclosed in the cubit, or rather 
more than one, the one proceeding towards the great and 
the other towards the small. In this example the indefinite 
dyad, also, is seen to be composed of the unit in the direction 
of the great and that in the direction of the small. And these 
belong both to continuous bodies and to numbers; for 2 is 
the first even number, and in the nature of the even are 
included both the double and the half — the double involving 
excess, and the half deficiency. So there are excess and 
deficiency in even number. Now the first even number is 2 ; 
it is in itself indefinite, but was limited by sharing in the 
One; for 2 is limited in so far as it is a single form. Thus 
the One and the dyad are the elements of numbers as well, 
the one limiting and giving form, the other indefinite and 
involving excess and deficiency.' This is almost word for word 
what Porphyry said, in fulfilment of his promise to explain 
what was said obscurely in Plato's lecture on the Good; he 
presumably added that these views were in accordance with 
what had been written in the Philebus. 

3 (R 2 24, R3 29) 

Sext. Emp. Geom. 57. But Aristotle, at least, says . . . that 
the length without breadth of which the geometers speak is 
not unintelligible, but that we can without any difficulty 
arrive at the thought of it. He rests his argument on a rather 
clear and indeed a manifest illustration. We grasp the length 
of a wall, he says, without attending also to its breadth, so 
that it must be possible to conceive of the length without 
breadth of which geometers speak. 

Cf. Sext. Emp. Phys. 1. 412. 


4 (r 2 25, R3 30) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 59. 28-60. 2. One might ask how 
it is that, though Plato mentions both an efficient cause 
(where he says ' The maker and father of the universe it were 
a task to find and declare' 1 ), and also the final cause (where 
he says ' Everything exists in relation to the king of all things 
and for his sake'), 2 Aristotle mentions neither of these 
causes in his account of Plato's doctrines. Is it because Plato 
mentioned neither of these in what he said about causes (as 
Aristotle has shown in his book On the Good), or because 
Plato does not treat these as causes of things that come into 
being and perish, and did not even work out any theory 
about them ? 

5 (R 2 26, R3 31) 

Alex, in Metaph. 250. 17-20. For the proof that practically 
all contraries are referred to the One and plurality as their 
first principle, Aristotle sends us to the Selection of Con- 
traries, where he has treated expressly of the subject. He has 
spoken about this selection also in the second book On the 

Cf. ibid. 262. 18-26. 

Asc. in Metaph. 237. n-14. For the information that almost 
all contraries are reducible to the One and Plurality as to 
their first principles, Aristotle refers to the Selection of Con- 
traries. He has spoken of the selection also in the second 
book On the Good. 

Cf. ibid. 247. 17-19. 

Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 615. 14-17. Aristotle has made a dis- 
tinction in his book On the Good ... by which he reduced all 
contraries to Plurality and the One. To the One belong the 
same, like, and equal, to Plurality others, unlike, and unequal. 

Cf. ibid. 642. 38-643. 3, 695. 23-26. 

1 Tim. 28 c. - Ep. 2. 312 e. 



Asc. in Metaph. 79. 7-10. The Platonists are more, and indeed 
most, zealous for the existence of the first principles; for in 
their eyes these are first principles even of the Ideas them- 
selves. They are, as has been said a little earlier, the One and 
the indefinite dyad ; and Aristotle has himself stated this 
in his book On the Good. 


i (r 2 180, r 3 185) 

Syrian, in Metaph. 120. 33-121. 4. That Aristotle has noth- 
ing more than this to say against the theory of Forms is 
shown both by the first book of this treatise and by the two 
books he wrote about the Forms; for it is by borrowing 
practically these same arguments everywhere, and sometimes 
cutting them up and subdividing them, sometimes pro- 
claiming them more concisely, that he tries to correct his 
predecessors in philosophy. 

Ibid. 195. 10-15. These are the arguments which Aristotle 
here uses against the theories of the Pythagoreans and the 
Platonists ; which contain also those used in book A major, 
as the commentator Alexander indicated ; for which reason 
we, having opposed these arguments, do not consider that 
we have neglected those others — nor yet those which Aris- 
totle has used against those thinkers in his two books on 
Forms ; for there he goes the round of practically these same 

Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 836. 34-837. 3. Aristotle sums up the 
whole discussion by saying 'The consequences' — for those 
who assume the existence of the ideal numbers and the 
separate existence of mathematical entities, and make them 
causes of physical things — 'are those we have stated, and 
yet more than these might be collected ' ; he refers to the 
two books written by him on the Forms— books different 
from books M and N of the Metaphysics and falling outside 
its plan. 

2 (R 2 l8l, R 3 186) 

Schol. ad Dion. Thrac. p. 116. 13-16 (Hilgard). It must be 
recognized that definitions are of things universal and 
eternal, as Aristotle has said in the work On Ideas which he 


wrote against Plato's Ideas. Particular things all change and 
never remain the same ; universals are unchangeable and 

3 (R 2 182, R 3 187) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 79. 3. The Platonists used the sciences 
in more than one way to establish the existence of Ideas — as 
Aristotle relates in the first book of his work On Ideas ; the 
arguments he here seems to refer to are as follows: (1) If 
every science does its work with reference to one self-identical 
thing, and not to any particular thing, there must be, 
corresponding to each science, something other than sensible 
things, which is eternal and is the pattern for the products 
of the science in question. Now that is just what the Idea is. 

(2) The things of which there are sciences must exist ; now 
the sciences are concerned with things other than particular 
things ; for the latter are indefinite and indeterminate, while 
the objects of the sciences are determinate ; therefore there 
are things other than the particulars, and these are the Ideas. 

(3) If medicine is the science not of this particular instance 
of health, but just of health, there must be such a thing as 
health-itself, and if geometry is knowledge not of this equal 
and this commensurate, but of what is just equal and what 
is just commensurate, there must be an equal-itself and a 
commensurate-itself, and these are the Ideas. 

Such arguments do not prove the point at issue, that there 
are Ideas, but they do show that there are things other than 
sensible particulars. It does not follow, however, that if there 
are things other than particulars these are Ideas ; for besides 
particulars there are universals, which we maintain to be 
the objects of the sciences. Take, again, the argument that 
there must be Ideas of the products of the arts, since every 
art refers its products to some standard, and the objects of 
the arts must exist, and must be different from particular 
things. The latter argument, besides failing, like the others, 
to prove the existence of Ideas, will be seen to involve Ideas 
of things of which the Platonists insist that there are no 
Ideas. For if, because the medical art is knowledge, not of 


this particular instance of health but simply of health, there 
is such a thing as health-itself, there will be a similar object 
of each of the arts. For an art is concerned not with the 
particular, with the 'this', but simply with that which is 
the object of the art ; e.g. carpentry with bench simply, not 
with this particular bench, with bed simply, not with this 
bed ; so too are sculpture, painting, building, and each of the 
other arts, related to their own objects. There will, therefore, 
be an Idea of each of the objects of the arts — which the 
believers in the Ideas do not want. . . . 

80. 8. They also use the following argument to establish 
the existence of the Ideas. If each of the many men is a man, 
and each of the many animals an animal, and so too in all 
other cases, and these are not instances of a thing being 
predicated of itself, but there is something predicated of all 
men, &c, but identical with none of them, there must be 
something belonging to all of them, which is separate from 
the particular things and eternal; for in every case it is 
predicated alike of all the numerically different examples. 
But that which is one over many, separated from the many 
and eternal, is an Idea ; therefore there are Ideas. 

This argument, Aristotle says, involves the Platonists in 
setting up Ideas even of negations and of non-existent things. 
For even a negative term is predicated as a single identical 
term of many subjects, and even of non-existent things, and is 
not the same as any of these subjects. 'Not-man' is predicated 
both of horse and of dog and of everything except man, and 
therefore is a one over many, and identical with none of the 
things of which it is predicated. Again, it remains always 
similarly predicable of similar things ; for ' not-musical ' is 
predicable truly of many things (of all that are not musical), 
and similarly ' not-man ' of all that are not men ; so that 
there are Ideas even of negations. Which is absurd ; for how 
could there be an Idea of non-existence ? If one is to accept 
such Ideas, there will be one Idea of dissimilar and wholly 
different objects, e.g. of line and man ; for neither of these is 
a horse. Again, there will be a single Idea of an indefinite 
variety of objects. Again, there will be a single Idea both of 
what is primary and of what is secondary ; for both man and 


animal are not-wood, but the one is primary, the other 
secondary, and of such things the Platonists did not claim 
that there are genera or Ideas. It is clear that this argument, 
like the others, does not prove the existence of Ideas; it, 
like the others, tends to show that that which is predicated 
in common is different from the particulars of which it is 
predicated. Again, the very people who wish to show that 
that which is predicated of many things in common is a 
single thing, and that this is an Idea, devise a proof from 
negations. For if one who denies something of several things 
must do so with reference to a single term — if one who says 
of a man and of a horse that they are not white does not deny 
of each of them a separate attribute, but referring to a single 
thing denies an identical whiteness of both of them — then 
he who affirms the same term of several things does not 
affirm something different in each case. There must be some 
one thing that he affirms; e.g. in predicating 'man' he is 
referring to one identical thing ; for what is true of negation 
must be true of affirmation. There is, therefore, something 
apart from what there is in sensible things, something that 
accounts for affirmation that is true of many things and 
common to them, and this is the Idea. . . . 

81. 25. The argument which establishes the existence of 
ideas on the basis of the fact of knowledge is as follows: If 
when we think of man or land-animal or animal, we think 
of something real and at the same time not a particular 
(for the same thought remains even when the particular 
things have perished), clearly there is something apart from 
sensible particulars, something which we apprehend both 
when they exist and when they do not ; for surely we do not 
then apprehend something non-existent. This is a Form or 
Idea. . . . 

82. 11. The argument that establishes Ideas answering 
even to relative terms is as follows: When the same term is 
predicated of several things not homonymously but so as to 
indicate a single nature, it is predicable truly of them either 
because they have in the strict sense the property indicated 
by the predicate (as when we say Socrates is a man and 
Plato is a man), or because they are likenesses of the true 


possessors of the attribute (as when we predicate 'man' of 
men in pictures (for in these cases we refer to the likenesses 
of men, indicating a nature that is identical in them all)), or 
because one of them is the pattern and the others are like- 
nesses (as when we call both Socrates and the likenesses of 
him 'men'). We predicate of things in this world equality 
itself, which is only homonymously predicable of them ; for 
neither does the same definition apply to them all, nor are 
we referring to things truly equal. For a sensible thing's size 
changes and varies continuously and is not determinate, nor 
does anything in this world answer precisely to the definition 
of equality. Nor, again, are they related as pattern and 
image ; for one is not more pattern or image than another. 
Even if one were to allow that an image is not merely 
homonymous with its pattern, it always follows that parti- 
cular equal things are equal only as being images of that 
which is strictly and truly equal. If this be so, there is an 
equal itself, a strictly equal, by reference to which things 
in this world, as being images of it, come to be, and are 
said to be, equal, and this is an Idea, serving as a pat- 
tern to the things 1 that come into being by reference to 
it. . . . 

83. 22-30. This is the argument which according to Aris- 
totle implies Ideas answering even to relative terms. At all 
events the proof in question has referred to equality, which 
is a relative term ; but the Platonists denied that there are 
Ideas answering to relative terms, because for them Ideas 
exist in their own right, being substances, while relative 
terms have their being in their relation to one another. 
Again, if what is equal is equal to what is equal to it, there 
will be more than one Idea of the equal ; for the equal-itself 
is equal to the equal-itself, since if it were not equal to any- 
thing it would not even be equal. Again, according to the 
same argument there will have to be ideas even of unequals 
(for where there are opposites there must be Ideas either of 
both or of neither) ; but even the Platonists admit that 
inequality involves more than one thing. 

1 Reading napaSeiyfiaTiKOv ov tois kt\. 


4 (R 2 183, R3 188) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 83. 34. The argument which intro- 
duces the third man was as follows : The Platonists say that 
the things that are predicated universally of substances are 
precisely such as they are said to be, and that these are 
Ideas. 1 They say, too, that things that are like one another 
are so by sharing in one identical thing, which is strictly 
what it is ; and that this is the Idea. But if this be so, and if 
that which is predicated of certain things in common must, 
if it is not identical with any of them, be something else apart 
from them (for that is why man-himself is a genus — because 
while predicated of particular men it was identical with none 
of them), there will be a third man apart from the particular 
man (e.g. Socrates or Plato), and apart from the Idea, which 
is itself also numerically one. . . . 

84. 21. The existence of the third man is also proved in 
this way. If that which is predicated truly of several things 
also exists in se t ). m from these (this is what the believers 
in Ideas think they prove; the reason why, according to 
them, man-himself exists is that 'man' is predicated truly 
of the many particular men, and is other than they) — if this 
be so, there will be a third man. For if the 'man' which is 
predicated is different from those of whom it is predicated, 
and exists independently, and 'man' is predicated both of 
particular men and of the Idea of man, there will be a third 
man apart both from particular men and from the Idea. 
On this basis, too, there will be a fourth man, predicated 
both of the third man, of the Idea, and of the particulars; 
and similarly a fifth, and so ad infinitum. This argument is 
identical with the first, and follows from the assumptions 
that things that are like are like by participation in sonVe 
identical thing, and that particular men and the Ideas are 
like. ... 85. 9. The first exposition of the 'third man' has 
been used by others and plainly by Eudemus in his book 
On Diction, and Aristotle himself has used the last in the 
fourth book of his work On Ideas, and also, a little later, 
in the Metaphysics. . . . 

1 Reading in R. 150. 27-28 etvai ISeas, with Asclepius. 

045.29 K 


85. 18. Aristotle says that these arguments, used to estab- 
lish the existence of Ideas, destroy these first principles ; and 
with these will be destroyed the things that come after the 
first principles, if indeed they proceed from the first prin- 
ciples ; so that the Ideas also will be destroyed. For if in the 
case of all things that have a common predicate there is 
something separate, the Idea, and if twoness is predicated 
even of the indefinite dyad, there will be something — an 
Idea— prior to the indefinite dyad, which will then no longer 
be a first principle. But neither will duality, in its turn, be 
primary, a first principle ; for of it again, as being an Idea, 
number is predicable ; for the Ideas are assumed by the 
Platonists to be numbers ; so that for them number will be 
the first thing, being an Idea. But if this be so, number will 
be prior to the indefinite dyad (which is for them a first 
principle), not the dyad to number; and if so, the dyad will 
no longer be a first principle, if it is what it is by sharing in 
something. Again, the dyad is assumed to be a first principle 
of number, but according to the argument just stated number 
becomes prior to it ; but if number is relative (for every 
number is the number of something), and if number is the 
first of existing things (since it is prior even to the dyad, 
which they assumed to be a first principle), that which is 
relative will be according to them prior to that which exists 
in its own right. But this is absurd; for everything that is 
relative is secondary. For a relative term indicates the 
possession of a pre-existent nature which is prior to the 
possession that occurs to it. . . . 86. 11. But even if one were 
to say that number is a quantity and not a relation, it would 
follow for the Platonists that quantity is prior to substance ; 
but the great and the small themselves are relative. Again, it 
follows that they must say that that which is relative is a 
first principle of and prior to that which exists in its own 
right, inasmuch as for them the Idea is the first principle of 
substances, and the Idea's being an Idea depends on its 
being a pattern, and a pattern is relative, being the pattern 
for something. Again, if the being of Ideas depends on 
their being patterns, the things which come into being in 
relation to them, and which the Ideas are Ideas of, must be 


copies of them, and so one might say that according to these 
thinkers all natural objects turned out to be relative ; for all 
are either images or patterns. Again, if the being of the Ideas 
depends on their being patterns, and a pattern exists for the 
sake of that which comes into being in relation to it, and that 
which exists for the sake of something else is inferior to it, 
the Ideas will be inferior to the things that come into being 
in relation to them. . . . 

87. 3. Such are the arguments which, in addition to those 
previously mentioned, by means of the theory of Ideas 
undermine the foundations of the theory. If that which is 
predicated of certain things in common is the first principle 
and Idea of them, and if 'first principle' is predicated of all 
first principles in common, and 'element' of all elements, 
there will be something that is prior to, and a first principle 
of, first principles and elements ; and so there will be neither 
a first principle nor an element. Again, Idea is not prior to 
Idea; for all Ideas are alike first principles. But the One- 
itself and the Two-itself , Man-himself , Horse-itself , and each 
of the other Ideas is for these thinkers alike an Idea ; there- 
fore none of them will be prior to another, and therefore none 
will be a first principle ; therefore the One and the indefinite 
dyad are not first principles. Again, it is paradoxical that 
an Idea should derive its form from an Idea, for all Ideas are 
forms; but if the One and the indefinite dyad are first 
principles, one Idea will derive its form from another — the 
dyad itself from the One itself ; for that is how they are said 
to be first principles — the One as form, the dyad as matter ; 
therefore these are not first principles. But if they say that 
the indefinite dyad is not an Idea, then in the first place, 
though it is a first principle there will be something prior 
to it — the dyad itself, by participation in which the indefinite 
dyad is itself a dyad ; for the indefinite dyad is not the dyad 
itself, since it is only by virtue of participation that ' dyad ' 
will be predicated of it, as of particular pairs of things. Again, 
if the Ideas are simple, they cannot be derived from two 
different first principles, but the One and the indefinite dyad 
are different. Again, the number of the dyads will be sur- 
prising, if there is first the dyad-itself, then the indefinite 


dyad, then the mathematical dyad we use in counting (which 
is not identical with either of the other two), and then in 
addition that which exists in numerable and sensible things. 
These consequences are paradoxical, so that clearly by follow- 
ing out the assumptions made by these thinkers about the 
Ideas it is possible to destroy the first principles, which are 
for them more important than the Ideas. . . . 

88. 20-89. 7. Again, the argument which says that the 
cause of things happening in an orderly way is their being 
made after a fixed pattern, which is the Idea, applies not 
only to substances. There is also the argument which starts 
from what we assert truly, and maintains that this must 
exist. Now in saying that there are five (or three) forms of 
harmony, and three concordant intervals, we assert truly; 
therefore there are just so many; but the number of such 
things in the sensible world is infinite ; therefore there 
are other, eternal, objects with reference to which what 
we say is true. Thus this argument, also, applies not 
only to substances. And there are many other such argu- 

5 (R 2 184, R3 189) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 97. 27-98. 24. To prove that it is 
not, as Eudoxus and some others thought, by the intermix- 
ture of Ideas that other things exist, Aristotle says it is easy 
to collect many impossible conclusions that follow from this 
opinion. These would be as follows: If the Ideas are mixed 
with other things, (1) they will be bodies ; for it is to bodies 
that mixture appertains. (2) Ideas will be contrary to one 
another; for it is between contraries that mixture occurs. 
(3) Mixture will take place in such a way that either an Idea 
will be present whole in each of the things with which it is 
mixed, or only a part of it will be present. But if it is present 
whole, something that is numerically one will be present in 
several things (for the Idea is numerically one) ; but if 
mixture be by way of parts, it will be that which shares in 
a part of man-himself , not that which shares in the whole of 


man-himself, 1 that will be a man. (4) The Ideas would then 
be divisible and partible, though they are not subject to 
change. (5) The Forms must consist of like parts, if all the 
things that contain a part of a certain Form are like one 
another. But how can the Forms consist of like parts? A 
piece of a man cannot be a man, as a piece of gold is gold. 
(6) As Aristotle himself says a little later, in each thing there 
will be an admixture not of one Idea but of many; for if 
there is one Idea of animal and another of man, and a man 
is both an animal and a man, he will partake of both Ideas. 
And the Idea man-himself, inasmuch as it is also animal, will 
share in animal-itself ; but on that showing the Ideas will no 
longer be simple, but composed of many components, and 
some Ideas will be primary and others secondary. If on the 
other hand man-himself is not animal — it is surely absurd to 
say that a man is not an animal. 2 (7) If the Forms are mingled 
with the things that exist by reference to them, how can 
they still be patterns, as these thinkers maintain ? It is not 
thus, by mixture, that patterns cause the likeness of the 
copies of them to them. (8) On this showing, the Ideas would 
be destroyed along with the things in which they are. Nor 
would they have a separate existence, but only existence in 
the things which share in them. (9) On this showing, the 
Ideas will no longer be exempt from change ; and there are 
all the other absurd implications which Aristotle in the 
second book of his work On Ideas showed this theory to 
involve. This is why he said Tt would be easy to collect 
many insuperable objections to this view'; they have been 
collected in that work. 

1 Reading in R. 152. 7 ov to SXov tov avroavdpdnrov, with some MSS. and 

2 sc. 'Yet this follows from saying that man-himself is not animal'. 


i 1 (r 2 186, r 3 191) 

Apollon. Mirab. 6. These were succeeded by Pythagoras son 
of Mnesarchus, who first worked at mathematics and arith- 
metic, but later even indulged in miracle-mongering like that 
of Pherecydes. When a ship was coming into harbour at 
Metapontum laden with a cargo, and the bystanders were, 
on account of the cargo, praying for her safe arrival, Pytha- 
goras intervened and said: 'Very well, you will see the ship 
bearing a dead body.' Again in Caulonia, according to 
Aristotle, he prophesied the advent of a she-bear ; and Aris- 
totle also, 2 in addition to much other information about him, 
says that in Tuscany he killed a deadly biting serpent by 
biting it himself. He also says that Pythagoras foretold to 
the Pythagoreans the coming political strife ; by reason of 
which he departed to Metapontum unobserved by anyone, 
and while he was crossing the river Cosas he, with others, 
heard the river say, with a voice beyond human strength, 
'Pythagoras, hail!'; at which those present were greatly 
alarmed. He once appeared both at Croton and at Meta- 
pontum on the same day and at the same hour. Once, while 
sitting in the theatre, he rose (according to Aristotle) and 
showed to those sitting there that one of his thighs was of 
gold. 3 There are other surprising things told about him, but, 
not wishing to play the part of mere transcribers, we will bring 
our account of him to an end. 

Aelian, V.H. 2. 26. Aristotle says that Pythagoras was called 
by the people of Croton the Hyperborean Apollo. The son 
of Nicomachus 4 adds that Pythagoras was once seen by 
many people, on the same day and at the same hour, both 

1 Rose's fr. 190 is omitted because in the text of Clement ApioToreXys is 
only an emendation of Apiorapxos. 

2 Inserting after HpiororeX-qs in R. 153. 13 TTpovorjurjve rr/v Xevxyv apxrov 
(from Iamb. V.P. 142) xal 6 airros ApioTOTeXys, with Diels. 

3 Reading in R. 154. 1 -rots KaOrjutvois wj XP VOO * V > with Diels. 

4 i.e. Aristotle. 


at Metapontum and at Croton ; and at Olympia, during the 
games, he got up in the theatre and showed that one of his 
thighs was golden. The same writer says that while crossing 
the Cosas he was hailed by the river, and that many people 
heard him so hailed. 

Ibid. 4. 17. Pythagoras used to tell people that he was born 
of more than mortal seed; for on the same day and at the 
same hour he was seen (they say) 1 at Metapontum and at 
Croton ; and at Olympia he showed that one of his thighs 
was golden. He informed Myllias of Croton that he was 
Midas the Phrygian, the son of Gordius. He fondled the 
white eagle, which made no resistance. While crossing the 
river Cosas he was addressed by the river, which said ' Hail, 
Pythagoras ! ' 

Diog. Laert. 8. 1. 11 (9). He is said to have been very 
dignified in his bearing, and his disciples held that he was 
Apollo, and came from the men of the north. There is a story 
that once, when he was stripped, his thigh was seen to be 
golden ; and there were many who said that the river Nessus 
had hailed him as he was crossing it. 

Iamb. V.P. 28. 140-3. The Pythagoreans derive their con- 
fidence in their views from the fact that the first to express 
them 2 was no ordinary man, but God. 3 One of their traditions 
relates to the question 'Who art thou, Pythagoras? ' 4 ; they 
say he is the Hyperborean Apollo. This is supposed to be 
evidenced by two facts: when he got up during the games 
he showed a thigh of gold, and when he entertained Abaris 
the Hyperborean he stole from him the arrow by which he 
was guided. Abaris is said to have come from the Hyper- 
boreans collecting money for the temple and prophesying 
pestilence ; he lived in the sacred shrines and was never seen 
to drink or eat anything ; it is said, too, that in Lacedaemon 

1 Reading in R. 154. 17 tf>aal, suggested by Rose. 

2 Reading in R. 155. 3 avra, with Kiessling. 

3 Reading in R. 155. 4 d\X' 6 deos, with the MSS. 

4 Reading in R. 155. 5 rls el, IJvOayopa ; with Deubner. 


he offered preventive sacrifices, and that for this reason there 
was never again a plague in Lacedaemon. From this Abaris 
Pythagoras took the golden arrow without which he could 
not find his way, and so made Abaris witness to his power. 
At Metapontum, when certain people prayed that they 
might receive the cargo of the ship that was sailing thither, 
he said, ' Then you will have 1 a dead man ' ; and the ship 
was found to carry a corpse. At Sybaris he seized and dis- 
patched the serpent that had killed the hare, and similarly 
the little serpent in Tyrrhenia which killed by biting. 2 At 
Croton (they say) he caressed the white eagle, which made 
no resistance. When someone wanted to hear him speak, he 
said he would never speak until a sign had appeared ; and 
after that the white bear appeared in Caulonia. In speech 
with someone who was about to announce to him the death 
of his son, 3 he announced it first himself. He told Myllias of 
Croton that he was Midas the son of Gordius ; and Myllias 
went off to the mainland to do over Midas' tomb what 
Pythagoras had bidden. They say, too, that the man who 
bought his house and destroyed it dared tell no one what he 
had seen, and for this crime was convicted at Croton of 
sacrilege and put to death; he was found guilty of seizing 
the golden beard which fell from Pythagoras' statue. These 
things and others like them are what the Pythagoreans say 
in confirmation of their belief. 

Cf. Porph. V.P. 23-28. 

2 (R 2 187, R 3 192) 

Iamb. V.P. 6. 30. Besides, they numbered Pythagoras among 
the gods, as a good spirit and a great friend to men ; some of 
them identified him with the Pythian, some with the Hyper- 
borean, some with the Paean Apollo, and others with one 
of the spirits that inhabit the moon. ... 31. Aristotle relates 
in his work on the Pythagorean philosophy that the following 

1 Reading in R. 155. 17 Iotcu. 

2 Reading in R. 155. 21 5(f>iv 6? dW^Teu'e, with the MSS. 

3 Reading in R. 156. 2 aiirw rov rov vlov Bavarov, with Cobet. 


division was preserved by the Pythagoreans as one of their 
greatest secrets — that there are three kinds of rational living 
creatures — gods, men, and beings like Pythagoras. 

3 (R* 188, R3 I93) 

Apul. De Deo Soc. 20. 166-7. I believe that most of you are 
reluctant to believe what I have just said, and marvel 
greatly at Socrates' having had a vision of a divine being. 
But I suppose Aristotle is a sufficient witness to the fact that 
the Pythagoreans marvelled at any town-bred person who 
said he had never seen a divine being. Now if anyone can 
have the power of seeing a divine apparition, why should 
not such a power have fallen to the lot of Socrates, above all 
others ? 

Clem. Al. Strom. 6. 6. 53. 2-3. Isidorus the son and pupil of 
Basilides, in the first book of his commentary on the prophet 
Parchor, says himself in so many words: 'The Athenians 
say certain things were disclosed to Socrates by a divine 
being which accompanied him; and Aristotle says all men 
have divine beings which accompany them at the time of 
their incarnation;' this prophetic teaching he received and 
set down in his books, without confessing whence he had 
stolen this account. 

4 (R 2 189, R 3 194) 

Gell. 4. 11. 11-13. Plutarch also, a scholar of great authority, 
says in the first of his books on Homer that the philosopher 
Aristotle had in his writings made the same statement about 
the Pythagoreans, that they did not abstain from eating 
animals, except for a few kinds of flesh. Since the fact is not 
generally recognized, I add Plutarch's own words: 'Aristotle 
says the Pythagoreans abstain from eating womb and heart, 
the sea anemone, and certain other such things, but use all 
other kinds. The sea anemone is a marine animal which is 
called the nettle.' 

Porph. V.P. 45. Pythagoras advised his followers to abstain 


from other things as well, such as womb, the red mullet, the 
sea anemone, and indeed almost all other sea creatures. 

Diog. Laert. 8. i. 19 (18). Above all, he forbade them to eat 
erythinus and black-tail ; they must also abstain from eating 
heart or beans ; and Aristotle says that at times they must 
abstain from eating womb or red mullet. 

5 (R 2 190, R3 195) 

Diog. Laert. 8. 1. 33 (19). The Pythagoreans say we should 
not pay equal honour to gods and to heroes, but to the gods 
at all times, keeping a guard on our lips, in white raiment 
and with pure bodies, and to the heroes only from midday 
onwards. The purity is to be achieved by cleansing rites, by 
baths, by lustral water, by having no stain from funeral 
rites, from childbirth, 1 or from any infection, and by absten- 
tion from meat that has been nibbled at or has died by 
disease, and from red mullets, black-tails, eggs and oviparous 
animals, beans, and the other things that are forbidden to 
those who perform the sacred rites in temples. Aristotle says, 
in his work On the Pythagoreans, 2 that Pythagoras enjoined 
abstention from beans either because they are like the privy 
parts, or because they are like the gates of Hades (for this 
is the only plant that has no joints), or because they are 
destructive, or because they are like the nature of the uni- 
verse, or because they are oligarchical (being used in the 
choice of rulers by lot). Things that fall from the table they 
were told not to pick up — to accustom them to eating with 
moderation, or because such things marked the death of 
someone. . . . They must not touch a white cock, because 
this animal is sacred to Lunus and is a suppliant, and suppli- 
cation is a good thing. The cock was sacred to Lunus because 
it announces the hours ; also, white is of the nature of the 
good, black of the nature of the bad. 3 They were not to touch 

1 Reading in R. 158. 8 after k-qSovs the words /cat Ae'^ouy, omitted by Rose. 

2 Reading in R. 158. 13 after HpioTOTeXrjs the words «V tu> nepl twv Tlvda- 
yopelcov, with some MSS. and Diels. 

3 Reading in R. 158. 21-24 xal to Xcvkov . . . KaKov before tuiv IxQvwv . . . 
oovXois, with Diels. 


any fish that was sacred, since it was not right that the same 
dishes should be served to gods and to men, any more than 
they should to freemen and to slaves. They must not break 
the loaf (because in old times friends met over a single loaf, 
as barbarians do to this day) , nor must they divide the loaf 
which brings them together. Others explain the rule by 
reference to the judgement in Hades ; others say that dividing 
the loaf would produce cowardice in war; others explain 
that it is from the loaf that the universe starts. ... 36. 
These things Alexander says he found in the Pythagorean 
commentaries; Aristotle records the practices akin to 

6 (r 2 191, R 3 196) 

Porph. V.P. 41. Pythagoras said certain things in a mystical 
and symbolic way, and Aristotle has recorded most of these ; 
e.g. that he called the sea the tear of Cronos, the Bears 1 the 
hands of Rhea, the Pleiades the lyre of the Muses, the planets 
the dogs of Persephone ; the ringing sound of bronze when 
struck was, he said, the voice of a divine being imprisoned in 
the bronze. 

Aelian, V.H. 4.17. The origin of earthquakes was, Pytha- 
goras said, nothing but a concourse of the dead ; the rainbow 
was the gleam of the sun, and the echo that often strikes on 
our ears was the voice of mightier beings. 

7 (R 2 192, R 3 197) 

Porph. V.P. 42. There was also another kind of symbol, 
illustrated by what follows: 'Step not over a balance', i.e. 
be not covetous : ' Poke not the fire with a sword ', i.e. do not 
vex with sharp words a man swollen with anger ; ' Pluck not 
the crown', i.e. offend not against the laws, which are the 
crowns of cities. Or again, 'Eat not heart', i.e. vex not your- 
self with grief: 'Sit not on the corn ration', i.e. live not in 
idleness; 'When on a journey, turn not back', i.e. when you 
are dying, cling not to this life; 'Walk not the highway', 

1 Ursa Major and Minor. 


i.e. follow not the opinions of the many but pursue those of 
the few and educated ; ' Receive not swallows in your house ', 
i.e. do not make housemates of talkative men of uncontrolled 
tongue ; ' Add to the burdens of the burdened, lighten them 
not', i.e. contribute to no man's sloth, to every man's excel- 
lence ; 'Carry not images of the gods in your rings', i.e. make 
not your thought and speech about the gods manifest and 
obvious, nor lay it open to many; 'Make your libations to 
the gods at the handle of the cup', i.e. honour and celebrate 
the gods with music ; for this rings through the handle. 

Jerome, Adv. Libros Rufini 3. 39. To the Pythagoreans also 
belong such sayings as ' Friends have evetything in common ' 
. . . and those riddles which Aristotle recounts with care in 
his books : ' Leap not over a balance ', i.e. go not beyond what 
is just ; ' Poke not fire with a sword', i.e. vex not with abusive 
words a mind swollen with anger; 'Never pluck a crown', 
i.e. preserve the laws of your cities ; ' Eat not heart ', i.e. cast 
sadness from your mind; 'When you have started out, 
return not', i.e. desire not life itself after death; 'Walk not 
on the highway', i.e. follow not the errors of the multitude; 
'Take no swallow into your house', i.e. have not as house- 
mates garrulous and talkative men ; ' Place more burdens on 
the burdened, help not those who lay burdens down', 1 i.e. 
encourage those who press on to virtue, abandon those who 
give themselves to ease. 

8 (r 2 193, R 3 198) 

Mart. Cap. 7. 131 (Philosophy speaks). 'Although Aristotle, 
one of my followers, reasoning from the fact that the unit 
itself is one alone and wishes to be always sought after, 
asserts that it is called Desire because it desires itself, since 
it has nothing beyond itself and, never carried beyond itself 
or linked with other things, turns its own ardours on itself.' 

9 (R2 194, R3 199) 

Theo. Sm. Math, p. 21. 20 (Hiller). The first division of numbers 

they recognize is into two kinds, even and odd. ... 24. Some 

1 Reading in R. 160. 25 superponendum onus, deponentibus. 


said 1 was the first odd number. ... 22. 5-9. But Aristotle 
in his work On the Pythagoreans says that the One partakes 
of the nature of both kinds ; for added to an even number it 
makes an odd, and added to an odd an even, which it could 
not have done if it had not shared in both natures ; and that 
for this reason the One was called even-odd. 

10 (R 2 195, R 3 200) 

Simp, in De Cael. 386. 9. The Pythagoreans reduced all anti- 
theses to two lists of opposites, the one worse, the other 
better — the list of goods and the list of evils. They rounded 
off each list symbolically by the decad, as being the complete 
number, and they took each of the ten antitheses as revealing 
all its congeners within itself. Of the local positions they took 
the right and the left . . . 19-23 and explained the other local 
opposites in the light of these. Right, above, and before they 
called good, and left, below, and behind evil, as Aristotle 
himself related in his collection of Pythagorean tenets. 

11 (R 2 196, R 3 20l) 

Stob. 1. 18. i c (Wachsmuth and Hense). In the first book of his 
work on the philosophy of Pythagoras Aristotle writes that 
the heaven was one, and that time and breath and the void, 
which divides for ever the regions of different things, were 
drawn in from the infinite. 

12 (R 2 197, R 3 202) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 75. 15-17. Of the arrangement in the 
heavens which the Pythagoreans assigned to the numbers, 
Aristotle informs us in the second book of his work on the 
doctrine of the Pythagoreans. 

13 (R 2 198, R 3 203) 

Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 38. 8. Aristotle has shown what are 
the likenesses that the Pythagoreans believed in between 
numbers and the things that exist and come into being; 
assuming that reciprocity or equality is a property of justice 


and finding it to exist in numbers, they said, for this reason, 
that justice is the first square number; for in every case the 
first of a number of things that admit of the same definition 
is most truly that which it is said to be. Now this number 
some declared to be the number 4, because, being the first 
square number, it is divided into equals and is itself equal 
(being twice 2), while others declared it to be the number 9, 
which is the first square number produced by multiplying 
an odd number (3) by itself. Again, they said the number 7 
was opportunity ; for natural things seem to have their per- 
fect seasons of birth and completion in terms of sevens, as 
in the case of man. Men are born after seven months, they 
begin to grow their teeth in seven months, they reach puberty 
about the end of the second set of seven years, and grow 
beards about the end of the third. The sun, too, since it is 
itself thought to be (as he says) the cause of seasons, they 
maintain to be established where resides the number 7, 
which they identify with season; for the sun holds the 
seventh place among the ten bodies that move round the 
earth or hearth of the universe; it moves after the sphere 
of the unwandering stars and the five spheres of the planets ; 
after it come the moon, eighth, and the earth, ninth, and 
after the earth the counter-earth. Since the number 7 neither 
generates nor is generated by any of the numbers in the 
decad, they identified it with Athene. For the number 2 
generates 4, 3 generates 9, and 6, 4 generates 8, and 5 
generates 10, and 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10 are also themselves 
generated, but 7 neither generates any number nor is gener- 
ated from any ; and so too Athene was motherless and ever- 
virgin. Marriage, they said, was the number 5, because it is 
the union of male and female, and according to them the 
odd is male and the even female, and 5 is the first number 
generated from the first even number, 2, and the first odd 
number, 3 ; for the odd is for them (as I said) male, and the 
even female. Reason (which was the name they gave to 
soul) and substance they identified with the One. Because it 
was unchanging, alike everywhere, and a ruling principle 
they called reason a unit, or one ; but they also applied these 
names to substance, because it is primary. Opinion they 


identified with the number 2 because it can move in two 
directions; they also called it movement and epithesis. 1 
Picking out such likenesses between things and numbers, 
they assumed numbers to be the first principles of things, 
saying that all things are composed of numbers. 

But they also saw the concordant intervals to be con- 
stituted according to particular numbers, and said that 
numbers were the first principles of these also ; the octave 
depends on the ratio 2:1, the frfth on the ratio 3:2, the 
fourth on the ratio 4:3. They said, too, that the whole 
universe is constructed in accordance with a certain harmony 
. . . 39. 24-41. 15 because it consists of numbers and is con- 
structed in accordance with number and harmony. For the 
bodies that move round the centre of the universe have their 
distances in a certain ratio, and some move faster and others 
slower, and in their movement the slower strike a deep note 
and the faster a high one, and these notes, being propor- 
tionate to the distances, make the resultant sound har- 
monious ; and since they said number was the origin of this 
harmony, they naturally made number the first principle of 
the heavens and of the universe. For they thought the sun 
to be, say, twice as far from the earth as the moon, Venus 
to be three times as far, Mercury four times, and each of the 
other heavenly bodies to be in a certain ratio, and the move- 
ment of the heavens to be harmonious, and the bodies that 
move the greatest distance to move the fastest, those that 
move the least distance the slowest, and the intermediate 
bodies to move in proportion to the greatness of their circuit. 
On the basis of these likenesses between things and numbers, 
they supposed existing things both to be composed of num- 
bers and to be numbers. 

Thinking numbers to be prior to nature as a whole and to 
natural things (for nothing could either exist or be known 
at all without number, while numbers could be known even 
apart from other things), they laid it down that the elements 
and first principles of numbers are the first principles of all 
things. These principles were, as has been said, the even and 
the odd, of which they thought the odd to be limited and 

1 sc. the addition of 1 to 1. 


the even unlimited ; of numbers they thought the unit was 
the first principle, composed of the even and the odd; for 
the unit was at the same time even-odd, which he 1 used to 
prove from its power of generating both odd and even 
number ; added to an even it generates an odd, added to an 
odd it generates an even. 

As regards the agreements which they found between num- 
bers and concordant combinations on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the attributes and parts of the heavens, they 
took these for granted straight off, as being obvious, and 
inferred that the heavens are composed of numbers and dis- 
play a concord. If any of the heavenly phenomena seemed 
to fail to conform with numerical principles, they made the 
necessary additions themselves and tried to fill the gap so 
as to make their whole treatment of the matter self-consis- 
tent. Treating the decad straight off as the perfect number, 
and seeing that in the visible world the moving spheres are 
nine in number — seven spheres of the planets, the eighth that 
of the unwandering stars, the ninth the earth (for this, too, 
they thought, moves in a circle about the resting hearth of 
the universe, which according to them is fire) — they added, 
in their system, a counter-earth, which they supposed to 
move in a direction opposite to that of the earth's movement, 
and to be for that reason invisible to those on earth. 

Aristotle speaks of these matters both in the De Caelo 2 and, 
with greater precision, in his collection of Pythagorean doc- 
trines. They made out the arrangement of those bodies to be 
harmonious by assuming that the ten moving bodies of which 
the universe consists are at harmonic distances from each 
other, and move in proportion to their distances (as Aristotle 
has said before), some faster, others slower, and that, as they 
move, the slower moving sound deeper notes and the faster 
moving higher notes, and that by the harmonious propor- 
tions between these a harmonious note is produced, which, 
however, we do not hear because we have grown up with it 
from childhood. He has spoken of this also in the De Caelo, 
and shown there that it is not true. That the even is for them 
the indefinite and the odd the definite, and that these are 

1 Pythagoras. 2 Omitting fiev in R. 162. 19, with Hayduck. 


the generating principles of the unit (for it is by derivation 
from them that it is even-odd), and indeed of all number 
(since the units in turn are the generating principles of the 
numbers), and that the whole heavens, i.e. everything that 
is in the heavens, in other words all existing things, are 
number— this he says here, but he has spoken of the subject 
more fully in those other places. 

14 (r 2 199, R 3 204) 

Simp, in De Caelo 511. 25. The Pythagoreans oppose this 
view ; for this is what ' contrariwise ' means ; they do not say 
that the earth is at the centre, but that in the centre of the 
universe there is fire, and that about the centre the counter- 
earth moves, being itself an earth but called a counter-earth 
because it is on the opposite side to our earth. 'After the 
counter-earth came our earth, itself also moving round the 
centre, and after the earth the moon ; ' so Aristotle relates in 
his work on the Pythagorean doctrines. 1 . . . 512. 12-14. For 
this reason some call fire the tower of Zeus, as Aristotle him- 
self related in his work on the Pythagoreans, while others 
call it the stronghold of Zeus (so Aristotle says here), or the 
throne of Zeus (as other authors relate). 

Cf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 90. 14 (Friedlein). The Pythagoreans 
thought fit to call the pole the seal of Rhea . . . 17-18 and 
the centre of the universe the stronghold of Zeus. 

Cf. Procl. in Tim. p. 61 c, Simp, in Phys. 1355. 8-9. 

15 (R 2 200, R 3 205) 

Simp, in De Caelo, 392. 16-32. Aristotle says that the Pytha- 
goreans place us in the upper part and on the right side of 
the universe, and those opposite to us in the lower part and 
on the left side ; how can he say this if, as he himself relates 
in the second book of his collection of Pythagorean tenets, 
they say that one part of the whole universe is up and the 
other down, the lower part right and the upper left, and that 

1 Reading in R. 163. 1 eV rat -nepl t<I>v TIudayopiKcjv, with Karsten. 

645.29 L 


we are in the lower part ? Is it that he has used the words 
'upper' and 'on the right' here not in accordance with his 
own view but with that of the Pythagoreans ? They coupled 
'up' and 'before' with 'right', 'down' and 'behind' with 
'left'. But Alexander thinks that the statement in Aristotle's 
collection of Pythagorean tenets has been altered by someone 
and should be that the upper part of the universe is on the 
right, the lower part on the left, and that we are in the upper 
part, not in the lower as the text now runs; in this way 
Aristotle's original statement would agree with what he says 
here, that we, who say we live in the lower part and therefore 
on the left side (since the lower part is coupled with the left 
side), are in opposition to the Pythagorean statement that 
we live in the upper part and on the right side. The suggested 
corruption of the text is very probable, since Aristotle knows 
that the Pythagoreans coupled the higher position with the 
right side, and the lower with the left. 

Them, in De Caelo, 96. 17-22. If, indeed, the Pythagoreans 
say the upper part is that which is on the right side — as 
appears from Aristotle's criticism of them in his book against 
the Pythagorean tenets, where he opposes those who con- 
tended that the higher region is on the right. 


Stob. 1. 26. 3. Some of the Pythagoreans, according to 
Aristotle's account and the statement of Philippus of Opus, 
say that the eclipse of the moon is due to the interposition, 
sometimes of the earth, sometimes of the counter-earth. Of 
the younger members of the school there are some who 
thought it was due to distribution of the flame, which kindles 
gradually and regularly until it gives the complete light of 
full moon, and again diminishes correspondingly until the 
time of conjunction, when it is completely extinguished. 


i (r 3 206) 

Simp, in De Caelo, 296. 16-18. These things, then, Aristotle 
knows. For this reason, in his epitome of Plato's Timaeus 
he writes : ' He says the universe is a generated universe ; for 
he supposes that it is perceptible to sense, and that what is 
perceptible has been generated, and what intelligible has 
not been generated.' 

2 (R 2 201, R 3 207) 

Damasc. Pr. 2. 172. 16-22 (Ruelle). It is better, therefore, to 
stick to his distinction, treating as 'other', in accordance 
with the Pythagorean custom and that of Plato himself, 
things that have matter in their being, and matter itself ; 
for this is how Plato uses the word 'other' in the Phaedo, 1 
saying that sensible forms are ' other and in things that are 
other'. Aristotle in his work on Archytas relates that Pytha- 
goras, too, called matter ' other ', as being in flux and always 
becoming different. So it is clear that Plato, too, defines in 
this way the things that are 'other'. 

1 83 b. 

645.29 L 2 


I (R 2 202, R 3 208) 

Simp, in De Caelo, 294. 23-295. 26. Alexander adds that 
those who say the universe is now in this state, now in that, 
are ascribing to it change of quality, not generation and 
destruction. 'Those who say the universe is generated and 
perishable like any other composite thing, must be ' (he says) 
' the followers of Democritus. For as each other thing, accord- 
ing to them, comes into being and perishes, so does each of 
the numberless universes. And, as in the case of other things 
that which comes into being is not the same, except in kind, 
as that which has perished, so too (they say) is it with the 
universes.' Now if the atoms remain the same, being immune 
from alteration, clearly these thinkers also must be ascribing 
to the worlds change of quality and not destruction, as 
Empedocles and Heraclitus seem to do. A few words quoted 
from Aristotle On Democritus will reveal the line of thought 
of the Atomists: 

' Democritus thinks the nature of the eternal entities con- 
sists of small substances infinite in number; as a place for 
them he supposes something else infinite in size, and to this 
he applies the names "void", "nothing", and "the infinite", 
while to each of the substances he applies the names " thing ", 
"solid", 1 and "real". He thinks the substances are so small 
as to escape our senses, but have all sorts of shapes and 
figures, and differences of size. From these substances, as 
from elements, are generated and compounded visible and 
sensible masses. The substances are at variance and move 
in the void because of their dissimilarity and the other afore- 
said differences, and as they move they impinge on each 
other and are so completely interlocked that they touch one 
another or get near one another ; but a single substance is 
never in reality produced from them by this interlocking; 
for it would be very naif to suppose that two or more things 

1 Reading in R. 166. 5 rw Sev nal tu> vaarco, with Heiberg. 


could ever become one. The fact that substances stay with 
one another for some time the Atomists ascribe to the bodies 
fitting into one another and catching hold of one another ; 
for some of them are scalene, others hook-shaped, others 
concave, others convex, and others have numberless other 
differences. He thinks they cling to one another and remain 
together until some stronger force arriving from the environ- 
ment shakes them asunder and separates them.' 

He ascribes the genesis and the separation opposed to it 
not only to animals but also to plants and to worlds, and 
comprehensively to all sensible bodies. If, then, genesis is 
combination of atoms, and destruction separation of them, 
then even according to Democritus ' genesis ' must be change 
of quality. Indeed, Empedocles, too, says that that which 
comes into being is not the same, except in kind, with that 
which has perished, and yet Alexander says that Empedocles 
assumes the existence of change of quality, not of coming 
into being. 


(a) = not in Rose. (b) = not in Walzer. 

(c) = fuller quotation than Rose gives. 

Ael. V.H. 2. 26 . 



4- 17 • • • 135. 1 

al-Dailami, cod. Tub. Weiswei- 

ler 81 (a) 


Alex. Aph. 

in Metaph. 38. 8-41. 15 (c) 


55. 20-57. 28 (c) . 


59. 28-60. 2 . 


75. 15-17 


79- 3-83- 30 (c) 


83- 34-89. 7 ip) 


85. 16-18 


97- 27-98. 24 


117. 23-118. 1 (a, I 

) ■ 


250. 17-20 . 


250. 17-19 (a) 


262. 18-26 . 


in Top. 5. 17-19 


27. 11-18 


62. 30-63. 19 


149- 9-17 


242. 1-9 


apud Eliam in Cat. 115. 3-; 

i 5 

apud Simp, in Phys. 454 

19-455. 11 (a) . 



cod. Aya Sofia 4832, fol. 34! 


(«, b) 


cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 5' 

(a, b) 


Amm. in Cat. 6. 25-7. 4 (c) 


13. 20-25 


Apollon. Mirab. 6 




Apul. De Deo Soc. 20. 166-7 



De An. 404 b i6-24 [a, b) 

• 83 

404 b i6-2i (a) 

. 116 

404 b i8-2i (a) 


Metaph. ioo3 b 33-ioo4 a 2 (a 

) 109 

i054 a 29-32 (a) 


Ph. 194327-36 (a) 


i94 a 35-36 (a) 


209 b n-i6 (0) 

• "5 

Poe/. 1454W5-18 (a) 

• 1, ~z 

Aristox. Harm. 2. 

30. 16-31. 3 

(a) . 


Asa in Metaph. 77. 2-4 (a) . 


79. 7-10 (a) . 


112. 16-19 (a, b) . 


237- n-14 (a) 


237. 11-13 (a) 


247. 17-19 (a) 


Ath. 6 d. . 


34 b 


40 c-d 


44 d 


178 e-f 






429 c-d 


429 f . 


447 a-b 


464 c-d 


496 f . 


505 b-c 


555 d-556 a 


564 b . 


641 b . 


641 d-e 


674 e-675 a 



C. Jul. Pel. 4. 14. 72 (a) 


4- 15- 78 

■ 41 

Trin. 14. 9. 12 . 

. 46 

14. 19. 26 

. 42 

Basil, Ep. 135 



Consol. 3. 8 

. 40 

in Cat. 1. 161 d-162 a 

. 108 

Censor, c. 18. 11 . 


Chalc. in Tim. 208-9 (b, c) 



Acad. 1. 7. 26 (a) 

• 98 

Alt. 4. 16. 2 


12. 40. 2 

• 65 

13. 19. 3-4 . 


13. 28. 2 

• 65 

Brut. 31. 

1 20-1 

(a) . 





Cic. (cont.) 

Diog. Laert. {cont.) 

De Or. i. ii. 49 (a) . 


2. 5- 46 


3. 21. 80 (a) . 


2- 6. 55 


Div. ad Brut. 1. 25. 53 


3- 37 (25) 


1. 30. 63 {a) . 


3- 48 (32) 

. . 


Fam. 1. 9. 23 (a) 


3- 80 (45) 

- 105 

Fin. 2. 13. 39-4° 


8. 1. 11 (9) 

• 135 

2. 32. 106 


8. 1. 19 (18) 

• 138 

5. 4. 11 


8. 1. 33-36 (19) 

- 138 

5. 5. 12-14 («) 


8. 2. 51-52 (1) 


5- 5-12 


8. 2. 57-58 (3) 


Hortsnsius, fr. 35 


8. 2. 57 (3) • 


fr. 81 {a) 


8. 2. 63 (9) 


Inv. 2. 6 (a) 


8. 2. 74 (11) 


Lucullus 38. 119 (a) . 


9-5-25 (4) 


iV.D. 1. 13. 33 . 


9- 8. 53 (4) 

. 64 

1. 38. 107 


9- 8. 54 (5) 


2. 15. 42 


9. 11. 81 


2. 16. 44 


Diog. Oen. fr. 4 col. 1.7 — co 

2. 20. 51-2 . 


2.8 . 


2- 37- 95-6 • 


Dox. Gr. 432. 4-8 (a) 


Off. 2. 16. 56-7 



Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1 . 


in Cat. 114. 15-115. 5 (c) 


i?e/>. 3. 8. 12 . 


114. 25-115. 12 


Top. 1. 3 (0) . 


124. 3-6 (a) . 


Twse. 1. 10. 22 (a) 


133- 9-17 

• 103 

1. 17. 41 (a, 6) 


133- 9-17 («) 


1. 26. 65-27. 66 (a) 


in Porph. 3. 17-23 


1. 39. 94 (a, 6) 


Etymol. Magn. 722. 16-17 


3. 28. 69 


Eus. P.E. 14. 6. 9-10 (a) 


4. 19. 43-20. 46 . 


Gell. 3. 11. 7 


5. 5. 12-14 (*) 


4. 11. 11-13 . 

• 137 

5. 10. 30 (a) . 


Greg. Cor. Ad Hermog. c. 19 


5. 13. 39 {a) . 


Hist. Aug. 2. 97. 20-22. 


5- 30. 85-31. 87 (a) 


Horn. Opera, vol. 5. 244 


5- 35- 101 




Clem. Al. 

251-2 . 


Protr. 1. 7. 4 (a) 



Strom. 1. 14. 60. 3 


Comm. Math. 26. 79. 1-81.7 


1. 14. 61. 1 . 


26. 83. 6-22 . 


6. 6. 53. 2-3 . 


My st. 1. 11 


6. 18. 162. 5 (a, b) 


3- 9 • 


Clem. Rom. Recogn. 8. 15 (a, b 

1 99 

Protr. 6. 37. 3-22 (a) 


Cod. Marc. 257, f. 250 . 


6. 37. 26-41. 5 


Damasc. Pr. 2. 172. 16-22 


7. 41. 15-43- 25 (a) 


David, Proll. 9. 2-12 


7- 43- 25-45- 3 («) ■ 


Demetr. Eloc. 28 . 


8- 45- 4-47- 4 


Dexippus in Cat. 33. 8-13 


8. 47. 5-21 . 


Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1 

3. 72 

8. 47. 21-48. 9 


Diog. Laert. 1 Prooem. 8 (6) 


8. 48. 9-21 . 


2- 5- 23 (7) • 


9- 49- 3-52- 16 (a) . 


2. 5. 26 (10) . 


9. 52. 16-54. 





Iambi. — Protr. (cont.) 

10. 54. 10-56. 12 (a) 

11. 56. 13-59- 18 (a) 

12. 59. 19-60. 15 (a) 
V.P. 6. 30-31 . 

28. 140-3 
Jerome, Adv. Libros Rufini 3 

39 • 

Epit. 55 . 

7ms/. 2. 10. 24 (a, b) . 
3. 16 . 
5- 15 • 
Macr. 5. 18. 16-19 

7- 3-23 
Mart. Cap. 5. 44 {b) 

7- 131 
Michael Psellus, Sckol. ad Joh 

Climacum 6. 171 (a) 
Nemes. De Nat. Horn. ch. 34 

(a, b) 
Nonius 394. 26-28 

in Ale. p. 144 . 
in Phd. 26. 22-27. 4 
173. 20-30 . 
180. 22-23 ( a » £>) 
200. 3-6 
239. 19-21 • 
Pap. Here. 1020 (a) 
Pap. Oxyrrh. 666 

Aet. Mundi 3. 10-11 

5. 20-24 

6. 28-27. 34 . 

8. 39-43 
Leg. Alleg. 3. 32. 97-99 
De Plant. 34. 141-40. 166 
De Praem. et Poen. 7. 40-46 
De Spec. Leg. 1. 35. 185-36 
194 . 

De Ira, p. 65. 31-66. 2 
Pap. Here. 3, p. 41, col. 21: 

(a) . " . 
Piet. 7 b 4-8 {a, b) 
Voll. Rhet. 2. 175 fr. 15. 1-6 
(«) . 

in D» An. 75. 34-76. 1 {a, b) 
75- 34-76. 1 
























Philop. — in De An. (cont.) 

141. 22-147. 10 

186. 14-16 . 
in Nicom. Isagogen, 1. 

(a, b) 
in Ph. 515. 29-32 (a 
in Ph. 521. 9-15 (a) 
Pliny, N.H. 30. 3 (a) 

Aristid. 27. 2 
Dion 22. 3 
Mor. 115 b-e 

329 b . 

370 c (a) 

382 d-e (a, b) 

447 f -448 a (a) 

477 c-f (a) • 

503 e-504 b . 

527 a . 

612 d-e 

650 a . 

651 f-652 a (a) 

733 c (6) 

734 d • 

760 e-761 b . 

761 d-e 
90S f (a, b) . 
1040 e . 
1 1 1 5 b-c (a) . 
1115 b-c 
1118 c . 
1 1 38 c-1140 b 

Pel. 3. 1 
18. 4 . 

apud Stob. 3. 21. 26 . 
in De Int. apud Boeth 

De Int. 1. 1. p. 27 
V.P. 23-28 


Prise. Lydus. 41. 16-42 


apud Philop. De Aet 

Mundi, 31. 17-32. 8 
in End., 28. 13-22 . 

90. 14-18 
in Remp. 1. 42. 2-50. 26 

2. 349. 13-26 
in Tim. 61 c 
33S c-d 

















Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 615. 14- 

17 (a) 
642. 38-643. 3 (a) 
695. 23-6 {a). 
777. 16-21 (a, b) 

836. 34-837- 3 
Ps.-Amm. in Cat. 5 b 
9 b . 

13 « («) 

17 a. 
Ps.-Galen. PAi/. ff*s/. c. 35 (a, 6) 
Ps.-Jul. Ep. 391 b-c 
Ps. Plu. Vit. Horn. 3-4 
Quint. Inst. 2. 17. 1-14 

3- r. 13 

10. 1. 83 (a) . 

in Aristoph. Pacem. 1. 772 
in y4w. Pr., cod. Paris. 2064, 

fol. 263 a . 
in Ca/. 33 b ^5-33 
in Dion. Thrac. 116. 13-16 
in Proverb. Sal. cod. Pari: 

174, fol. 46 a 
in Theocr. 3. 21 

.Bra>. Vit. 1. 2 
De 7m 1. 3. 3 
1. 7. 1 . 
1. 9. 2 . 
1. 17. 1 

3- 3- l ■ 
Q.N. 7. 30 
Serv. in Aen. 6. 448 (a, b) 
Sext. Emp. Dogm. 1. 6-7 
Geom. 57 . 
P/rys. 1. 20-23 . 
1. 26-27 

1. 412 . 

2. 45-46 (a) 
Pyrr. 1. 84 


in Cat. 4. 14-22 (a) 
18. 16-21 

64. 18-65. 10 

65. 4-8 («) • 
382. 7-10 (a) 

387. 17-388. 14 

388. 21-389. 10 

389. 25-390. 7 

390. 19-25 . 
402. 26-403. 24 




65. 67 



















Simp. — in Cat. (cont.) 
407. 15-20 . 
409. 15-410. 30 
in De An. 28. 7-9 (a) 
28. 7-9 

53- i-4 

221. 20-33 . 

in De Caelo 

288. 31-289. 2 {a, b) 

289. 1-15 
294. 23-295. 26 
296. 16-18 . 
386. 9-23 
392. 16-32 . 
485. 19-22 . 
511. 25-512. 14 

in Ph. 151. 6-19 (c) 

453- 25-454- J 9 

454- 19-455- « ( a 
503. 10-15 (a) 
542. 9-12 (a) 
545. 23-25 (a) 
1355- 8-9 (a) 

Sophon. in DeAn. 25. 4-8 (a) 
Stob. 1. 18. ic 

1. 26. 3 

1. 43 (a) 

3- 3- 25 

4. 29 A 24 
4. 29 A 25 
4. 29C 52 
4. 32. 21 

Strabo 1. 4. 9, p. C 66 

14. 5. 9, p. C672 (a) 
Suet. De Blasph. p. 416 
Suidas, s.v. EvpvfiaTos ■ 

Calvit. Enc. 22. 85 c . 
Dio. 10. 48 a . 
Syr. iw Metaph. 61. 12-17 (a) 

120. 33- I2 i- 4 

159- 33- l6 °- 5 

168. 33-35 • 

195. 10-15 . 

Tac. Dial. 16. 7 (a) 
Tert. De /!«. 46 (a, b) . 

in De An. 24. 13-25. 25 

106. 29-107. 5 
in De Caelo 96. 17-22 
in Ph. 106. 21-23 i a ) 

































Them, (cont.) 

Or. 26 d-27 b 

107 c-d 

295 c-d 

319 c . 
Theo. Sm. 21. 20-22. 
Theon, Prog. 2. 165 


Vit. Arist. Marc. 427. 3-7 



43°- I5-43I- 2 



433. 10-15 


. 24 

vulgo .... 



Vitae Homeri in Homeri Opera, 


ed. Allen, 5. 244, 247, 

■ 103 








R 2 



R 2 



R 2 






. . 








































8, 29 


















































































































































































































































































































































































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Academy, x. 

Alexamenos, 73-74- 

Alexander the Great, ix, xi, 65, 67. 

Alexander, viii, ix, x, xi, 67. 

Anger, 6S-71. 

Antisthenes, xi. 

Archytas, 109-10, 147. 

Archytas, On the Philosophy of, 147. 

Aristotle's style, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 92-93 ; 

open-mindedness, 4; attitude to 

Plato, 4. 
Art and nature, 43-46. 

Bignone, E., xii. 

Categories, 107-8. 
Cicero, viii, x, xii. 
Colonists, On, viii, ix. 
Contraries, On, 109-14. 
Corinthian dialogue, viii, 24. 

Delphi, 78-79. 

Democritus, On, 148-9. 

Deucalion, 81. 

Dialogues, Aristotle's, vii-xii, 1-6. 

Diogenes Laertius, vii, viii, xi. 

Dissertations, 106. 

Divisions, 105. 

Dreams, 55-56. 

Drinking and Drunkenness, 8-14. 

Drunkenness, On, vii, n. 7. 

Education, On, viii, ix, 64. 

Einarson, B., x. 

Empedocles, 15, 72-73. 

Eroticus, vii, ix, 25-26. 

Eudemus, 16. 

Eudemus, vii, n. 8, viii, ix, xi, xii, 

Eudoxus, 132. 
Euripides, 75. 
Euthydemus, x, n. 1. 
Exoteric works, 5, 6. 

Fifth element [aKarovo^aaTov) , 98- 


Forms, Platonic, 22. 

Good, On the, viii, xi, 115-23. 
Good Birth, On, vii, viii, ix, 59-62. 

Gorgias, x. 
Great year, 55. 
Gryllus, vii, 7. 
Gryllus, vii, ix, 7. 

Happiness, 54~55- 
Hermippus, vii. 
Hesychius, vii, viii, xi. 
Homer, 8-9, 72, 76-77, 84-85. 
Hortensius, viii, 27. 
Howald, E., vii. 

Ideal numbers, xi. 

Ideas, Platonic, xi, xii, 117, 124-33. 

Ideas, On, xi, xii, 124-33. 

Immortality, 16-18. 

Indefinite dyad, 1 17-21, 123. 

Isocrates, x. 

Jaeger, W., ix, xi, xii. 
Justice, On, vii, ix, 100-2. 

Kingship, On, viii, ix, x, xi, 65-66. 

Love, 25-26. 

Magi, 79-80. 
Magicus, xi. 

Mathematics, 30-31, 34. 
Melissus, 82. 
Menexenus, vii, ix. 
Metaphysics, xii. 
Music, 95-97- 
Mysteries, the, 87. 

Nerinthus, vii, viii, ix, 24. 
Numbers, n 7-19. 

One and indefinite dyad, 11 7-21, 
123; One and Plurality, 122. 

Parmenides, 82. 

Parts of speech, 106. 

Phaedo, x, n. 1. 

Philosophy, 27-30, 33-34, 37. 52- 

Philosophy, On, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, 

Plato, ix, x, xi, 74, 82-84, 88, 




Pleasure, On, viii, ix, 63. 

Poets, On, vii, viii, ix, 72-77. 

Politic us, vii, viii, ix, x, 68-71. 

Prayer, On, vii, ix, 58. 

Privation, 1 12-13. 

Problems, On, 104. 

Protrepticus, vii, viii, ix, x, n. 1, xii, 

Pseudo-Ammonius, xi. 
Pythagoras, 134-9. 
Pythagoreans and numbers, 117, 

140-5 ; and cosmology, 145-6. 
Pythagoreans, On the, xii, 134-46. 

Religion, origin of, 84-87. 
Rhetoric, 1. 
Rhetoric, On, vii, 7. 
Rose, V., xi, xii. 

Sardanapallus, 52-53. 

Sophistes, vii, ix, 15. 

Soul and body, 17-22, 32, 34. 

Soul, On, vii, viii, 16-23. 

Stage-effect, 1. 

Strabo, xi. 

Suidas, xi. 

Symposium, vii, ix, 8-14. 

Themison, 27. 
'Third man', 129. 

Von der Miihll, P., x. 

Walzer, R., xii. 
Wealth, On, vii, ix, 57. 
Wilpert, P., xi, xii. 
World, ungenerated and imperish- 
able, 88-93. 

Zoroaster, 79-S0.